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Abstract 
Performance improvement is the natural objective of any intervention in the organisation. 
Performance improvement in operational terms is particularly interesting when it is able 
to influence the competitive position of the firm. By being able to deliver superior value 
and/or offer prices through lower costs a firm will increase customer satisfaction and 
loyalty and potentially increase its market share and profitability. This research explores 
the determinants of strategic operational performance improvement, the particular 
questions we address are: 1) What characterise the process in which the firm achieves 
operational performance that is strategically significant?, and 2) Why once advantage is 
achieved, it is not automatically replicated? 
The manufacturing strategy model and the literature associated with the resource-based 
theory provide the theoretical foundations of this work, although the link between the two 
literatures is problematic because their fundamentals are usually at odds. Because the 
nature of the work is exploratory, and its purpose is one of theory building, we build a 
model of strategic operational improvement through grounded research. Four case studies 
are studied and analysed in order to test and improve the model. 
The results provide a number of insights on the role of managerial rationality, managerial 
behaviour, and the relationship between managerial and workers behaviour. We are also 
able to address a number of questions on the nature of strategy in operations. The final 
product of this thesis is model that relates the processes in the organisation to the firm's 
initial conditions to explain the evolution of performance. Empirical evidences suggest 
that the strategic improvement of operational performance depends on the sequence 
evolution of initial conditions, managerial behaviour, and organisational behaviour. It is 
argued that by understanding the relationships in this model it is possible to develop more 
effective operations processes which are able to deliver superior value and or lower costs. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
We introduce this research by placing the discussion within the 
literature and argue for the need of a new model of strategy in 
operations. In this chapter we identify the literature that will be 
review in the next one. 
1.1. Introduction 
The issue of this thesis is at the heart of corporate strategy. We are concerned with how a 
firm achieves competitive advantage. We want to understand the dynamics of the process 
through which an organisation develops its operational performance to become a source 
of competitive advantage. We also want to know whether this advantage, once achieved, 
can be sustained. 
The management of operations and competitive advantage are related disciplines. The 
emergence of the manufacturing strategy model represented a break with the Tayloristic 
paradigm. For almost a hundred years managers had managed the factory with an 
exclusive inward concern for efficiency. This was changed by the concept of 
manufacturing strategy. The manufacturing strategy model provided the link between the 
management of the factory and proactive support of the business strategy of the firm. The 
factory became more outward looking. 
However, the paradigm that dominated strategic thinking until the mid nineties is one that 
assigns little strategic importance to operations. Manufacturing strategy cannot have the 
same analytical focus as a theoretical framework that sees competitive advantage as 
determined by the structure of particular industries. The two disciplines were never able 
to establish a dialogue because the locus of advantage was found outside the firm's 
boundaries. Business strategy decided where to compete and manufacturing strategy then 
J promoted the "strategic fit" of the firm's productive resources with that strategy. Hayes and Pisano (1995) write: 
The [five forces] framework also created a sharper demarcation between 
the domains of competitive strategy and manufacturing strategy that 
had existed before. Not only were these two domains separated by 
problem focus (simplistically: where to compete vs. how to compete there 
effectively), but also by conceptual approaches. Whereas the roots of 
Porter's framework were in industrial organization economics and were 
based on industry-level studies, the manufacturing strategy framework 
2 
was based on the specific nature of manufacturing and technology at the 
firm level. 
A profound uneasiness was created by the successful competitive inroads of Japanese 
companies into western markets. Their competitive advantage could not be explained by 
a favourable market structure but instead by outperforming western competitors in 
operational terms. In a number of other industries similar examples became apparent. Not 
only was a position of competitive advantage based primarily on operational 
performance, but inter-firm differences proved surprisingly resilient to imitation. Gittel 
(1995) reports the unsuccessful attempts by major American carriers to reproduce 
operational features of Southwest, a relatively small carrier. Challenging the odds posed 
by a five forces' model analysis, Southwest thrived on direct competition with its more 
powerful competitors. Its vigorous expansion and above normal profit margin resulted 
directly from unmatched operational performance. Southwest's combination of low costs 
and quality (in terms of reliability) seemed to resist imitation attempts at least by the 
larger companies. American, United and Continental launched their copycat versions but, 
for the most, they were failures which generated large losses. 
aýJ. The RBV' was a reaction to the fact that the fundamentals of industrial economics (IO) 
on which the five forces model was based, could not explain a phenomenon like the one 
described above. Wernerfelt's (1984) paper, which inaugurated the RBV, was an attempt 
to expand the classical theory of business strategy. A number of other works followed, 
and by the late eighties a sizeable literature was claiming to be an alternative to the 10- 
based competitive paradigm. 
The emerging theory found conceptual grounding in the "Austrian" school of economics 
(Jacobson, 1992). Schumpeter (1932), in particular, provided the foundation of 
legitimacy upon which a new theory could be based. Early management writers, such as 
Penrose (1959) and behavioural economists (Nelson and Winter, 1982), contributed to a 
definition of the first constructs. 
1 Abbreviation for Resource-Based View, that we will be using throughout this thesis. 
3 
Manufacturing strategy remained largely untouched by the changes that occurred 
in the competitive paradigm. Hamel and Prahalad's concept of "core 
competencies" triggered an increase in academic and practitioners' attention to the 
new theory. Some authors attempted to add the concept of "competencies" to the 
existing framework of manufacturing strategy. The resulting framework (Vickery, 
1991) attracted little interest. The inability to integrate the new concepts into the 
management of operations should not come as a surprise. The existing framework 
cannot be expanded and adapted to accommodate the new concepts. It carries a 
number of assumptions that were inherited directly from 10 and from neo- 
classical economics. The way forward is perhaps to deconstruct the manufacturing 
strategy model and reassemble it on new grounds provided by the new 
competitive paradigm. This is the broader goal of this work. 
1.2. Research toward a new model 
The model that will result from this research should be coherent with the premises and 
elements that underpin the RBV. Thus, an important point in this research is the explicit 
acknowledgement and articulation of the premises and concepts that shape our work and 
the terminology that we will be using throughout this thesis. The exploratory nature of 
the research demands continuous refinement of the concepts that we will be attempting to 
establish. In many cases, the final meaning will deviate significantly from the original 
one. 
The new paradigm of competitive advantage poses questions of competitive interaction 
but expects operations answers, which the current paradigm of operations strategy cannot 
provide. To be able to complement the new paradigm of competitive advantage, the 
notion of strategy in operations must deploy mechanisms to understand how the 
organisation internally creates elements that allow it to deliver superior operational 
performance. orpora strategy, then, should explain how superior operational 
JL 
Ir 
4 
performance will affect the competitive interactions between the firm and its 
environment. 
Much of the discussion inspired by the concept of "core competence" has highlighted the 
importance of technology. There is an intuitive appeal in the link between proprietary 
learning, technology development and competitive edge. Proprietary technology can 
deliver differentiated products. Thus, product R&D is the primary source of advantage. 
Alte in this thesis the notion of technological-based advantage will be disregarded. 
Although there may be cases in which technological edge is the most important factor 
determining the differentiation of products and service, we consider it to be restricted to a 
specific industry such as pharmaceutical. What is of more interest are industries in which 
there is no significant technological difference between competitors. These industries are 
not R&D intensive. Firms have to rely on the production processes, instead of the product 
itself, to gain an edge. The nature of competition of a pharmaceutical company that 
depends heavily on the outcome of its R&D is different, for instance, from that of an 
airline. The products the airlines offer are, from the point of view of technology, 
undifferentiated, because the technology embedded in planes and information systems is 
available to all competitors. 
We concentrate on the internal organisation of the firm which defines how effectively it 
produces value for its customers. The first step is to analyse the theories that offer 
prescriptive advice about how a firm should manage its internal resources. In search of 
clues to build our model, we evaluate the assumptions, concepts, and constructs offered 
by the resource-based view and manufacturing strategy. These issues will dominate 
chapter II which is dedicated to reviewing manufacturing strategy and resources-based 
literature. A number of unanswered questions will result from the tension generated by 
the confrontation of both literatures. 
After reviewing the literature, it will become clear that we do not have the necessary 
constructs to implement our research. The resource-based theory, on which we should 
base our constructs began very theoretical and has a strong background in economics. Its 
constructs are ill defined and difficult to recognise in a real organisation. Thus, one of the 
central challenges of this research is to develop constructs that are at the same time firmly 
grounded in reality and coherent with RBV's principles. Vl 
A process view of the organisation, based on Garvin (1994), was the vehicle that allowed 
us to operationalise the research. This led us to Teece et al. 's (1994) concept of "dynamic 
capabilities", which is coherent with the process view, as well as with RBV's principles. 
We kept in mind that whatever is the vehicle on which we should base our model, it 
should be able to incorporate a number of important pieces of literature which the 
manufacturing strategy model was unable to do. Any explanation of how a firm develops 
its operational performance would be incomplete if it ignored well-established concepts 
such as learning organisation, TQM, or business re-engineering. 
Equipped with this theoretical background we went into the first site. In the tradition of 
grounded research, we did not have a framework. We asked the managers to tell us their 
experience with the process of change. A few interviews gave us the overall picture of the 
strategic process that had occurred. 
To define the model, it was necessary to identify those variables whose variation would 
explain the outcome of the strategic process. Chapter III describes the grounded 
research phase. The model resulted from the interaction of our first set of data with the 
literature. The terminology and concepts were increasingly refined throughout the thesis, 
but here we present the final version. The model provided a more structured picture of the 
process. Specific pieces of literature were added to define new elements highlighted by 
the model. 
Chapter IV and V define respectively the macro and micro research framework. 
Chapter VI describes the within case analysis based on data treatment provided by the 
case studies. The case studies are not reproduced here because of lack of space. Chapter 
VII presents a cross case analysis of the data. The first conclusions are drawn through a 
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discussion of the open literature questions from chapter II. Finally, Chapter VIII is 
dedicated to a discussion, improvement, and consolidation of the proposed model. 
1.3. Deconstructing the concept of strategy in operations 
From the beginning manufacturing strategy embedded in its fabric many "imported" 
assumptions. It could not be different. Strategy, as an academic concept, does not belong 
to the discipline of operations. Hayes and Wheelwright (1994) adopt the classic school of 
strategy model in which the different strategies within the firm are organised in rigid 
horizontal and vertical relationships. According to this model, strategies filter down the 
organisation. The Co orate rate determines the SBU2 strategy under which are the 
functional strategies (e. g., marketing, finance, and operations). This neat separation of the 
several strategies and their hierarchy is an important implicit assumption. 
The concept of strategy in operations was built into the (then) dominant paradigm of 
strategy. Consequently, it carries all the assumptions built into its parent framework. But 
business strategy could not find legitimacy within itself. It turned to economics in the 
search for established concepts. This is why early business writers such as Penrose 
(1954), who saw the roots of advantage in the internal organisation of the firm, were 
ignored. Their ideas were not compatible with those of economists who treated the firm 
as a black box. Economists dismissed the firm as an inscrutable black box and turned to 
the market for explanations as to why firms appropriate above-normal returns. 
The paradigm of competitive strategy summarised by Porter in the five forces' model is, 
in broad terms, a translation of the economics discipline known as industrial 
organisations (IO) into business literature. This model is built upon neo-classical 
assumptions. These assumptions manifestly shaped manufacturing strategy. We should 
also add to the economic rooted assumptions those which are particular to the classical 
school of strategy. Together they represent a straight jacket that prevents the opening of 
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the black box of the firm and the understanding of what affects its ability to compete. 
Some of the central premises are: yý 6J J- t'-I 
Mobility of resources. Susta' able competitive advantage is not a concern of 
manufacturing strategy. deed such discussion does not make much sense because of the 
new-classical assumption that firms' productive resources are mobile or are available to 
external markets. This conviction is so strong that the big American carriers did not 
hesitate to set up operations designed to match Southwest's. They have considered only 
the general business formula to be strategic. Backed up by a financial capability that 
dwarfed Southwest's, these companies acquired the necessary resources from external 
markets. What they did not realise ex-ante was that they lacked what cannot be bought in 
perfect markets. In this case, intangible differences determined the competitive outcome. 
Rational manager. In the discipline of business strategy the assumption of the 
unbounded rational manager has been under attack for some time. Revisionist writers 
such as Pettigrew and Mintzberg (1991) have provided sufficient evidence that this 
assumption has no correspondence in reality. Nonetheless, the MSM assumes no 
ambiguities in the process of identifying where the organisation stands (A), where it 
should go (B), and perhaps more important, how to get from A to B. 
However, in most cases, there will be plenty of uncertainty about what A and B are. 
Besides the ambiguities involved in formulating the strategy, there are those that relate to 
the process. This point touches the core issue of this thesis. According to Hayes and 
Wheelwright's (1984) model, management should choose which attributes of 
performance it will prioritise. The definition of the strategic gaps guides a number of 
decisions in each of the decision areas. This ambiguity-free process, in which a number 
of decisions result in the organisation moving from A to B, is particularly detached from 
reality. The fact is that managers are faced with enormous ambiguity and have very little 
understanding of cause-and-effect relationships. 
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Dichotomy between content and process. Mintzberg (1990) quotes an example that 
reflects the mindset of most of authors in manufacturing strategy: "the perfectly pre- 
formed policy idea (... ) only requires execution and the only problems it arises are ones 
of control". The planner, or the planning team, should be able to set the goals, plans, and 
control and manage incentives and indoctrination in order to "take care of the human side 
of the equation". Above we suggested that managers are not super rational individuals. 
The internal transformation of the organisation is an extremely complex and ambiguous 
process. As Mintzberg notes, the organisation may be resilient to change because of a 
range of factors. In addition, those in charge of implementation may have different 
interests and interpretations of what causes the process to experience slippage between 
formulation and implementation. 
The firm is not isolated from its environment. The third factor identified by Mintzberg 
suggests that the external environment may cause unexpected events not foreseen by 
strategy. Therefore a number of uncertainties inside and outside the firm strongly suggest 
that process and strategy, formulation and implementation, and thinking and acting 
cannot be separated. Nevertheless, Vickery et al. (1993) see operational differentiation as 
the outcome of a better ability to implement. 
Organisational members as profit maximisers. This assumption refers to one of the 
problems highlighted by Mintzberg above. A reason why strategy "drifts" away from 
planning is the fact that many people in the organisation have power to influence the 
course of the project but they do not converge. Senior and middle management do not 
constitute a homogeneous group. Organisational reality may be characterised by vested 
interests, rivalry, and different perceptions, etc. In empowered organisations, even the 
workers will have reasonable levels of discretion and power to affect the outcome. 
Classic economists ignore the human side of the firm and so does the classical school of 
strategy and in consequence, manufacturing strategy. A theory of strategy should not 
limit the human side to a few infrastructural decisions, but instead have it as its central 
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focus. Sustainable performance differences can only be related to what people do. Any 
structural differences will be short lived under intense competition. 
No change inertia. A framework based on neo-classical assumptions will assume that 
the menu of possible strategic choices is unlimited. A failure to materialise intentions in 
outcomes is regarded as an implementation failure. Histories told ex-post usually ascribe 
the failure to several factors, such as lack of commitment of management. Explanations 
which depart from the traditional frameworks will not consider that the problem may 
have been that the menu was rather more limited than initially assumed. 
History is important. The idea that the organisation's previous history will somehow limit 
its future choices is intuitively appealing. From this point of view, it is strange to assume 
that strategy can be formulated in complete disregard of history. Hayes and Pisano (1995) 
give examples of how previous decisions can influence the formulation of strategy. They 
highlight the particular influence of the asset structure of the company. But the influence 
of history goes beyond this. History is embedded in many other elements of the firm. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) proposed the enlightening concept of organisational routines 
and argued that these would incorporate the history of the firm. In conclusion, we can say 
that theories of strategy cannot ignore the role played by the firm's history. ,/ 
Optimisation of productive resources. The notion of "strategic fit" is a very strong one. 
Traditionally, strategy is about achieving a "fit" between the firm's capabilities and its 
environment. At this point the notion that inertia does not exist is very important. 
Because inertia is not considered, the temporal dimension is lost. Strategies can, or at 
least should, be quickly achieved. This creates the illusion that lean producers do not face 
any trade off and are able to deliver high performance simultaneously on many 
performance attributes. Slack (1991) considered that high performance in various 
attributes may be possible if we consider the process over a long period. According to 
this perspective, the basic difference between lean production and manufacturing strategy 
is considerably diluted. 
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"Strategic fit" is then associated with a perspective that disregards the temporal 
dimension and suggests the optimisation of the resources that the organisation already 
possesses or can quickly acquire. In contrast, a perspective based on "strategic stretch" 
considers that, given the necessary time, the organisation can achieve essential 
transformation that will allow it to respond to the environment from a new resource 
platform. L)(e - 
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1.4. New directions for research 
Here we attempt to develop a theoretical base that is essential to understand how 
operations can evolve to the point that they are able to influence the competitive position 
of the firm. We have argued above that we would fail on grounds of conceptual 
inadequacy if we chose to expand the existing framework in order to accommodate the 
developments in the paradigm of competitive advantage. 
A more developed theoretical body would help us to build and refine concepts necessary 
to understand the new nature of strategy in operations. This theoretical framework should 
incorporate much related literature on approach issues, such as: 
a) The role of managerial cognition - it should acknowledge the debate between top 
down and emergent forms of strategy 
b) The importance of knowledge and organisational learning - it should be defined what 
we mean by knowledge and how the learning process relates to the evolution of 
operational performance 
c) The importance of quality frameworks and process redesign - No explanation of 
performance evolution can ignore the whole of TQM related methods and process 
redesign 
d) The impact of the history of the organisation - We should acknowledge the 
evolutionary notion that history matters 
e) Sustainability of the firm's idiosyncrasy - We have to consider the mechanisms 
through which the firm is able to keep its operational advantage 
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We should be looking to develop a theory that has practical relevance to the practice of 
strategy in operations. Although we concentrate our attention on theoretical issues, it 
would be ideal if practical advice could be derived from the resulting model. It will 
depend on whether constructs are recognisable or not. Therefore, it is important to use c) ý. s 
grounded research to set the initial framework on which the rest of the thesis should be 
based 
ýrcýw 
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Chapter 2- Literature Review 
Two sets of literature form the central issues of this research: (a) 
how organisations should manage its productive resources to 
achieve improvement of operational performance, and (b) how (a) 
can be related to competitive advantage and strategy. To discuss 
the former issue we consider the manufacturing strategy 
literature, whilst keeping perspective of the relationship of this 
theory with the lean production theory. In order to tackle (b) we 
pin down the most relevant aspects of the RBV literature. The 
confrontation of both models generates a tension between 
frequently conflicting explanations. We attempt to capture this 
tension in a series of questions that should expose the literature 
gaps. There we consider the central themes that run through this 
research. 
Finally, it is explained why we intend to operationalise the 
research by adopting a view of the organisation based on 
processes, and we close the chapter by discussing the research 
question and scope. 
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Z1 - Introduction to the manufacturing strategy literature 
The concept of manufacturing strategy is already thirty years old. Throughout this period, 
many of the fundamental dogmas of manufacturing management which have influenced 
and have been influenced by the concept of manufacturing strategy, have undergone 
radical changes. 
Skinner was still a student at Harvard in the late 1940s when he recognised that firms 
were homogenous neither in their approach to competition nor in the way they organised 
manufacturing operations. In his 1969 article which is considered to mark the beginning 
of manufacturing strategy, "Manufacturing - The Missing Link in Corporate Strategy", he 
challenges the assumption that manufacturing should compete in just one dimension - 
cost. The framework put forward in that article has underpinned much of the ensuing 
work in the field. As Voss (1985) argues, successive authors concentrated on 
"simplifying and explaining the framework rather than expanding [it]". The concept of 
focus and the need for internal and external consistency was the subject of the second 
article called "The Focused Factory". 
Some empirical evidence has supported the validity of the concept. Tunaly (1992) found 
empirical support for the idea that companies with explicit manufacturing strategies 
perform better than those without one. Swamidass and Newell (1987) researched 35 firms 
and also found a positive correlation between the strategic importance of manufacturing 
managers and performance. 
The basic idea that, by developing competitive criteria that are consistent with the firm's 
overall competitive strategy the manufacturing function could effectively contribute to 
the improvement of a firm's performance, remained largely unchanged. However, some 
of the foundations of manufacturing strategy, such as top down planning and the 
emphasis on structural decisions, are now being questioned. Changing paradigms in 
manufacturing management and competitive strategy may give rise to the need for some 
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reassessment of the basic assumptions of the manufacturing strategy literature. Hayes and 
Pisano (1995) noted that the new paradigm had opened up a number of questions that had 
affected developments in the field. 
2.2. Breaking with the tayloristic paradigm in manufacturing 
Until the early 1980s the old tayloristic paradigm had dominated industrial practices in 
the USA (Hayes and Pisano, 1985) and, to some extent, in the whole western world. 
Tayloristic engineers had improved manufacturing systems by breaking down the 
manufacturing process into elementary parts, improving each part individually, and then 
assembling them again. According to Skinner (1969) this conventional approach lacked a 
strategic view of the context in which the business was operating and tended to drive all 
efforts towards cost reduction, responding to other factors only in a reactive way. 
Manufacturing strategy was born as a reaction to the scientific management paradigm 
that dominated the management of manufacturing. The current framework is still based 
on the original work of Skinner (1969) and subsequent developments by Hayes and 
Wheelwright (1984). Some of the principles laid down by Skinner can be summarised as 
follows: 
a) Cost efficiency is not the sole criterion in competition 
b) Among competitive criteria trade-offs are necessary because every production system 
has constraints 
c) The firm's strengths and weaknesses should guide trade-offs because there is no ideal 
way of competing, even among firms operating in the same market and industry 
d) Factories focused on narrow product markets geared towards a particular market 
niche will outperform a conventional plant 
e) Manufacturing strategy should be formulated as a top down process, where the 
manufacturing role is to support a given business strategy. The ensuing research did 
not deviate significantly from this initial framework. 
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From the late 1970s, the successful Japanese challengers have represented an even 
greater challenge to the "Scientific Management" paradigm. Traditional production 
thinking at the shop floor level assumed that specialists should take all the initiatives and 
the role of the worker was solely to obey his/her superior's instructions. A number of 
authors that can be grouped under the TQM banner proposed a whole new way of 
operating in the shop floor. Instead of narrow tasks and little responsibility for tasks 
performed upstream and downstream, horizontal structures encourage the worker to have 
a more holistic view of the processes in the organisation. Consequently this approach 
fosters cross-functional co-ordination and learning. 
An important dogma under the old paradigm was that all processes carried some inherent 
variation and that quality should be achieved by defect inspection. Another 
misconception was that superior quality implied superior costs. Crosby (1979) proposed 
some principles for the quality movement which refuted the old dogmas. They were as 
follows: First, quality means conformance to specifications. Second, quality is achieved 
through defect prevention, not correction. Third, the final aim of quality improvement is 
nothing less than zero defects. Fourth, the cost of quality is the cost of doing something 
wrong. Crosby claimed that the cost of non-conformance could be as much as 40 percent 
of the whole operating costs. 
The concept of manufacturing strategy transformed the way the factory is managed 
Today the management of operations has to consider the contingencies imposed by the 
business/marketing strategy chosen by the firm. We now examine the current notion of 
strategy in operations. 
2.3. The concept of manufacturing strategy 
In his 1969 article on manufacturing strategy Skinner argued that: 
A company's competitive strategy at a given time places particular 
demand on its manufacturing function, and conversely, the company's 
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manufacturing posture and operations should be specifically designed to 
fulfil the task demanded by strategic plans. 
Following these arguments, many articles and books appeared. Hayes and Wheelwright 
(1984) were perhaps the most influential in helping to shape the content and process of 
strategy. Their contribution was to link manufacturing strategy and business strategy. To 
perform the link manufacturing needs would need some essential capabilities. Hayes and 
Wheelwright (1984) created a list of dimensions, called competitive criteria, in which 
manufacturing could compete, namely: quality, dependability, cost, and flexibility. Other 
authors presented their own list and called the criteria by different names such as critical 
success factors or performance objectives. Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) recommended 
that the criteria in the list should then be ranked according to a priority trade-off. They 
stated: 
It is difficult, if not impossible, for a company to try to compete by 
offering superior performance along all dimensions (price, quality, 
dependability, and flexibility), since it will probably end up second best 
in each dimension to some other company that devotes more of its 
resources to develop that competitive advantage. 
Their advice to firms was to attach clear priorities to each dimension, and then 
positioning would be an outcome of this trade-off. 
According to Skinner, trade-offs are necessary because, all technology-based systems are 
limited by their technology in what they can do and this limitation leads to a necessary 
trade-off. This became the core of manufacturing strategy because it captured its essence: 
the channelling of available resources to develop those competitive criteria that support 
business' goals more efficiently. In order to upgrade the manufacturing function from a 
purely reactive role, it was necessary to pursue a manufacturing task, which generated a 
need for focusing manufacturing efforts along determined competitive dimensions. 
Ferdows and DeMeyer (1990) wrote: 
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The fundamental premise of production management is the one of focus. 
To be successful, a manufacturer has to choose between the capabilities 
of cost efficiency, quality, dependability, and flexibility, and focus all of 
its attention and resources on pursuing this capability. 
Hayes and Wheelwright's (1984) basic framework saw business strategy as determining 
the manufacturing mission which guided the trade-off between manufacturing objectives, 
which in turn would determine the policies that should be adopted in relation to the 
decision areas. The company makes strategic choices into structural and infrastructural 
decision areas in order to implement the manufacturing strategy. Structural decision areas 
according to Hayes and Wheelwright (ibid. ), relate to facilities, technology, vertical 
integration, and capacity. The infrastructure decision areas concern soft issues such as 
organisation, quality management, work force policies, and information system 
architecture. The outcome of manufacturing strategy is therefore a pattern of decisions 
developed from the eight decision areas. The composite of these decisions determines 
"the structure and capabilities" of a manufacturing organisation. 
Other authors express similar views although acknowledging slight variations. 
According to Schroeder, Anderson, and Cleveland (1986) manufacturing strategy is a 
collection of mission, objectives, policies, and distinctive competencies. The mission 
originates from the business strategy and from the market. It defines what manufacturing 
should do in order to support business success. Manufacturing objectives are the expected 
and measurable results. Schroeder, Anderson, and Cleveland (1986) understand 
distinctive competencies as those which set manufacturing apart from competition. 
However, they are not able to explain how distinctive competencies relate to 
manufacturing strategy. Swamidass (1986) considers manufacturing strategy as a concept 
that: 
... involves the development and deployment of manufacturing 
capabilities in total alignment with the firm's goals and strategy. When 
manufacturing strategy is well formulated and implemented it gives 
competitive advantage to the manufacturer through the best and 
conscious use of the uniqueness of the manufacturing function such as 
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low cost manufacturing, high quality production, manufacturing 
flexibility, etc. 
Swamidass (1986) sums up the concept of manufacturing strategy as the orientation of 
the manufacturing function to meet objectives derived from those perceived by the 
business unit and the corporation. 
Hill's (1985) book on manufacturing strategy provides further variations in relation on 
the Skinner/Hayes and Wheelwright model. The core idea of Hill is the alignment on the 
manufacturing process to market needs. Instead of a manufacturing mission aimed at 
supporting a business strategy and guiding a trade-off among competitive criteria, Hill 
sees the trade off exercise as less important because the competitive priorities are 
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determined directly by the market. This process of conversion from market needs to 
manufacturing dimensions is made through the concept of order winner and order 
qualifier. This concept originated from the original distinction made between motivating 
and hygiene factors. The idea is to divide the criteria into two levels of priority according 
to what the market perceives as being an acceptable performance. 
Priority should be given to qualifiers which, according to Hill, are "those criteria which 
are necessary even to be considered by a customer as a possible supplier". Once the order 
qualifiers achieve an adequate level, the focus should be on the order winners that are 
responsible for giving the company an edge over competitors. The idea is therefore to 
identify ways in which orders are won, and to do this better than competitors, and not to 
lose orders by offering products below the minimum acceptable to consumers. 
Hill considers his framework to be one that asks "marketing questions and get 
manufacturing answers". He argues that it provides a unified terminology that allows for 
the flow of information at the interface of manufacturing and marketing function. The 
expected result is a manufacturing process that will support marketing strategy. 
Infrastructure is also considered and should be aligned with a long-term corporate 
strategy in a latter phase of development. 
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There are important conceptual differences from the classic model. Hill's concept has 
influenced many authors in the UK (Platts and Gregory (1990), Slack (1991)) but has 
been much less successful in the US. The main conceptual difference is that it breaks 
with the business strategy/manufacturing mission/objectives trade-off/decision areas 
policy framework. Instead, it focuses on matching structural decisions (manufacturing 
process and technology) to market requirements. Only then, infrastructural decisions 
should be taken, in order to support business strategy. 
There are some assumptions in the model that need to be questioned. It assumes that: (a) 
Customers have accurate information about the products and about how the products 
meet their preferences and needs. (b) This information comes at no cost. (c) The company 
can obtain accurate information about customers' judgements along competitive 
dimensions and about how the customers differentiate between qualifiers and order 
winners. 
Another issue is the lack of importance given to trade-offs. Priorities are set by the 
market requirements so it is very clear which dimension should concentrate on the 
improvement efforts. However, it has been suggested by Ferdows and DeMeyer (1990) 
that, in fact, improvements have to follow a certain sequence. To achieve competitive 
levels on a certain dimension it may be necessary to achieve certain levels in others first. 
It should be said that focusing strategy in matching market needs might only partially 
capture the concerns of business strategy and lead competitors to pursue the same "best 
way" of competing. 
2.4. The context of manufacturing strategy 
There is a clear agreement in the literature that the process of manufacturing strategy 
should support strategies further up in the hierarchy. The top-down hierarchical model 
advocated by Skinner (1969,1985) and Wheelwright (1984) acknowledges three levels of 
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strategy in a firm: The Corporate level, the business unit level, and the functional level. 
The manufacturing task defines the role and capabilities that the manufacturing needs to 
support business strategy. Skinner (1985) writes: 
The manufacturing task must be consistent and supportive of the 
corporation's competitive strategy. The manufacturing structure should 
be organised to accomplish a sharp focus for that manufacturing task. 
Swamidass (1986) also sees manufacturing strategy as a process capable of aligning 
manufacturing capabilities with the goals and strategies of the firm. 
Anderson et al. (1989) question the top down process of strategy asking: "should 
operations capabilities be adjusted to achieve corporate objectives, or should corporate 
objectives be confined to what operations are capable of doing? " Although, as we have 
pointed earlier, there is consensus that the main role of operations is to support corporate 
objectives, some alternative approaches can be found in the literature. 
In the same book where they show operations strategy to be subordinate to business 
strategy, Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) argue that " manufacturing should take a more 
proactive role in defining the competitive advantage to be pursued". They further argue 
that it should not just caution top management about the potential constraints placed by 
operations, but that it should also inform them about the capabilities that can be exploited 
in a way which would make it difficult for competitors to match them. Manufacturing 
would then be turned into a competitive weapon if it succeeded in interacting with other 
functions and playing a proactive role. They write: 
Unfortunately, companies become preoccupied with marketing aspects 
of their distinctive competencies and lose sight of the nature of their 
distinctive competencies in manufacturing. When this happens, the 
company's strategic thinking tends to be dominated by product, market, 
and product life cycle considerations. 
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In the article "Strategic planning: forward in reverse", Hayes (1985) takes this idea 
further and argues that in some cases, specially where the environment is hard to forecast, 
instead of the end determining the means, the opposite might be true. Operations 
competencies should work as a solid base to formulate market strategies. The issue of 
effectiveness of the manufacturing function in increasing the competitiveness of the firm, 
is illustrated by a theoretical four stages model proposed by Hayes and Wheelwright 
(1984) where the strategic role of manufacturing ranges from non existent to proactive. 
In Stage 1, manufacturing is described as "internally neutral". The main concern at this 
stage is to minimise the negative impact of manufacturing. Some characteristics of this 
stage are the reliance on external constancy to solve basic manufacturing problems; 
extensive control to avoid serious damages from occurring before they are detected; and a 
reactive flexibility which is always necessary to compensate for wrong processes and 
facilities. Stage 2 is described as "externally neutral" because the objective is to achieve 
equivalence in competitors' manufacturing. This phase is characterised by the adoption of 
an industry's "best practices". The only contribution of manufacturing to competitive 
advantage at this phase is through accurate timing in capital investment. A possible 
consequence would be to have the capacity available to meet seasonal fluctuations or 
unexpected peaks in demand. 
Stage 3 is described as "internally supportive" because, at this stage, manufacturing is 
able to provide support to business strategy. The achievement of this stage accords with 
the majority of the definitions of manufacturing strategy found in the literature. Strategy 
is aimed at aligning manufacturing decisions with corporate objectives, co-ordinating the 
manufacturing efforts with other functions, and also capturing long term developments 
and trends in the industry that can impact on the firm's competitive position. Stage 4, 
described as "externally supportive", corresponds to the stage where one of the sources of 
competitive advantage is manufacturing virtuosity. This challenges the idea normally 
embodied in most definitions of manufacturing strategy. It is not developed in a top-down 
way in reaction to corporate strategy. Instead, it is the product of an interactive process 
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between corporate and manufacturing strategies. Manufacturing therefore becomes a 
source of differentiation and competitive advantage over competitors. 
The idea of operations-based competitive advantage leads us to the concept of distinctive 
competencies. The term was coined in the strategic management field. However the 
development of the concept, theoretically and empirically, has encountered many 
difficulties. According to Cleveland et al. (1989) little is known about how distinctive 
competencies can be developed or changed in order to gain competitive advantage. 
2.5. Manufacturing strategy content 
The content area of manufacturing strategy consists of two categories: competitive 
priorities, which can be understood as the objectives of the manufacturing identified to 
support business and corporate strategies, and the decision areas, seen as the structural 
and infrastructural elements that make up the manufacturing function. 
2.5.1. Competitive priorities 
The four competitive priorities proposed by Wheelwright (1984) have been widely 
adopted with slight modifications by the authors in manufacturing. They are: Quality, 
dependability, cost, and flexibility. The table below links these authors with the 
competitive priorities that they consider relevant. As shown earlier, the original research 
into manufacturing strategy saw trade off among the competitive criteria as a necessary 
step to identify the most strategically important dimensions, once it was recognised that it 
was not possible to perform well along many dimensions at the same time. However, two 
pieces of empirical research suggest that these competitive criteria may not necessarily be 
in conflict. 
The achievements of Japanese "lean manufacturers" are described in the book The 
machine that Changed the World (Womack and Roos, 1990). It is the most influential 
research which challenges the concept of trade off. The book suggests that lean 
manufacturers can achieve simultaneous high performance in the following competitive 
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dimensions: lower costs, higher quality, faster product introduction, and greater 
flexibility 
The other significant empirical research was carried out by De Meyer et al. (1989). Based 
on an international survey conducted by the Manufacturing Futures Projects, which 
compared manufacturing companies in the USA, Europe, and Japan, the results suggest 
that traditional trade-offs are often unnecessary. The writers argue that instead of giving 
preferences to one criterion at the expense of the others, Japanese manufacturers 
appeared to build one on top of the other. The implication of this research is that there is 
a logical sequence to the process of building several capabilities. For instance, reductions 
in cost could be observed through a focus on improving quality. However, the opposite is 
not true because adopting a policy of cost reduction does not imply improvements in 
quality. 
AUTHORS COMPETITIVE PRIORITIES 
Wheelwright (1984) Quality, Dependability, Cost, Flexibility 
Fine and Hax (1985) 
Swamidass and Newell (1987) 
Tunalv (1992) 
Skinner (1985) Cost, Delivery, Quality, Reliability (Service), 
Flexibility of Product, Flexibility of Volume, 
Investment 
Swamidass (1986) Flexibility, Delivery, Product Introduction, Quality, 
Cost 
DeMeyer, Nakane, Miller, Ferdows (1989) Quality, Dependability, Flexibility, Cost-Efficiency 
Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark (1988) Cost, Product Performance, Dependability, 
Flexibility, Innovativeness 
Leong et al. (1990) Quality, Delivery, Unit Cost, Flexibility, 
Innovativeness 
Slack (1991) Quality, Speed, Cost, Flexibility, Dependability 
New (1992) Delivery, Quality, Flexibility, Price 
Table 2.1 - Competitive priorities 
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According to De Meyer et al. 's sand cone theory, if a company wants to obtain 
competitive levels of dependability it first needs to achieve a minimum level of quality. 
In order to be cost efficient, it has to have the initial two competitive dimensions (quality 
and dependability) sufficiently developed to support the base of the cone. Next in the 
progression is flexibility. Finally cost reduction requires a minimum of quality, 
dependability, and flexibility. Therefore the writers conclude that the Japanese companies 
consider "quality, dependability, cost, and flexibility as priorities which a firm addresses 
sequentially over time rather than as alternative points of emphasis". 
Tunalv (1992) also found some causal relationships between certain competitive priority 
variables. However, New (1992) sees these deterministic relationships in a more sceptical 
optic. Although he recognises that some of the conventional trade-offs have been altered, 
he asserts that choices over quality and flexibility must at least be considered in the 
formulation of strategy. Skinner (1985) agrees: "Trade-offs are just as real as ever but 
they are alive and dynamic" 
2.5.2. Decision areas 
The capabilities of the manufacturing function are determined by the policies actually 
adopted towards decision areas. Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) divide the decision areas 
into structural and infrastructural issues. Structural issues consist of aggregate capacity, 
vertical integration, technology, and facility plans. Infrastructural decisions refer to 
organisation and control. 
The great majority of the researchers have adopted the Hayes and Wheelwright 
framework. Skinner (1985), however, divides the decision areas as fixed assets and 
infrastructure. Other researchers have developed their own lists but, despite some 
differences, these do not differ much from the original model. 
Early writers such as Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) and Hill (1985) concentrate much 
of their discussion on the structural decisions. The product-process matrix, developed by 
Hayes and Wheelwright, helped to visualise a possible mismatch between the process 
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adopted and the volume of market requirements. The core of Hill's concept of 
manufacturing strategy is the choice of the right process according to what is regarded as 
order winners and qualifiers. Other extensively discussed topics were capacity. the type 
and location of manufacturing plants, and technological issues. 
Haves and 
Wheelwright 
(1984) 
Skinner (1985) Fine and Hax 
(1985) 
Platts (1993) 
structural capacity plant and equipment capacity capacity 
facilities facilities facilities 
vertical integration technology process and 
technology 
technology vertical 
integration 
span of 
process 
infra 
structural 
workforce production planning 
and control 
quality quality 
quality organisation and 
management 
manufacturing 
infrastructure 
control 
policies 
production planning 
and control 
labour and staffing scope new 
products 
new 
products 
organisation product 
design/engineering 
human resources human 
resources 
vendor relations suppliers 
Table 2 .2- Decision areas 
As noted by Hayes and Pisano ( 1995), Skinner had already highlighted the fundamental 
role of human resources and "production systems". This was later found to he correct, 
with much evidence in the literature confirming that different practices adopted by 
competing companies, rather than different hardware and production processes, reflected 
on performance. Haves et al. ( 1988) argue that because manufacturing competitiveness is 
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dynamic so also should infrastructure decisions be dynamic because static systems and 
policies will fail to reflect competitive needs over time. Mills et al. (1995) note that 
although there have been studies on the interaction of the decision areas, it is still a new 
and promising line of research3. 
2.6. Manufacturing strategy process 
Among the process variables considered in manufacturing research to date are those 
involved in determining strategy, such as order winners, and making trade-offs explicit 
(Hill, 1985; Wheelwright, 1984), and also those which involve manufacturing strategy 
implementation and support. Some examples include the role of manufacturing manager, 
managerial leadership, organisational involvement, resource allocation and reward 
systems (Anderson, Schroeder and Cleveland, 1991), and accord with higher level 
strategies (Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 1985; Tunalv, 1992). Consistency is also important. 
There are at least three types of consistency: between infrastructure and manufacturing 
task (Skinner, 1985), between manufacturing strategy and other functional strategy, and 
between manufacturing strategy and the business environment (Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 
1985). 
The process of manufacturing strategy incorporates issues and activities involved in the 
development and implementation of the strategy. To use a metaphor: content is the 
universe of ingredients available to the cook, whereas process refers to how the dish (the 
strategy) is prepared. It involves the selection of the ingredients and the knowledge 
involved in the actual process of cooking them. 
As shown before, it is widely agreed that the process of manufacturing strategy should 
support higher level strategies. For instance, Swamidass (1986) regards manufacturing 
strategy as the process of aligning manufacturing capabilities with the goals of the firm. 
Therefore the process of manufacturing strategy must be considered successful when the 
3 They quote examples of research on manufacturing process and control systems (Berry and Hill, 1992) 
and the influence of human resources policies in the implementation of manufacturing control systems 
(Kinnie and Staughton, 1991). 
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company reaches the third stage on the Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) scale of the 
competitive role of manufacturing. But how should the outcome of the manufacturing 
process be assessed? 
Hayes and Wheelwright proposed three dimensions that could be used to assess the 
outcome of manufacturing strategy, covering internal and external consistency. 
Manufacturing strategy should (a) be externally supportive by performing well along 
firm's competitive factors (b) be internally consistent by presenting consistency between 
business and other functional strategies and (c) be consistent within the decision areas. 
Slack (1991) adds the time dimension in assessing the outcomes of the manufacturing 
strategy process. He argues that it is necessary to achieve credibility and consistency over 
time. But, in actual terms, the assessment of the process is restricted to the formulation 
process. No work has been done in assessing the actual implementation of the strategy. 
The process of manufacturing strategy is seen by Platts (1993) as having four 
dimensions: point of entry, participation, procedure and project management. The initial 
phase, or point of entry, is aimed at making clear the need for a manufacturing strategy, 
and also at providing a common language, or platform, that generates debate within the 
group. The importance of this fact is demonstrated by the findings of Swamidass (1986). 
In his survey of 35 firms, he found different interpretations from manufacturing managers 
and CEO's on the concept and practice of manufacturing strategy. 
Participation can involve other functions or external actors. Slack (1991) sees marketing 
and product development as involved in the strategic debate, whereas other authors such 
as Platts and Gregory (1990) and Fine and Hax (1985) regard the involvement of all 
functions as something that should be encouraged. Financial and human resources 
functions are likely to be directly involved in the process of manufacturing strategy. 
Human resources function can play a central role in the implementation of the strategy. 
Mills et al. (1995) note that participation can also come from outside the business unit. 
Corporate specialists and external consultants can adopt the role of facilitator in the 
debate because they do not generally hold the same assumptions as organisation members 
and may also have experience in the process. 
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Procedure is seen by Mills et al. (1995) as consisting of three parts: (1) the identification 
of gaps between adequate and current performance of manufacturing, (2) the formulation 
of the action plans to close these gaps, and (3) the implementation of these action plans. 
The audit stage can be done by comparing the performance of the manufacturing function 
with the levels of expectations of the market along competitive dimensions. This is how it 
is done by Hill (1985). Slack (1991) explicitly incorporates the performance of 
competitors into the framework. We say 'explicitly', because market expectations are 
correlated with competitors' performance. 
Different authors have interpreted the formulation stage in fairly different ways. Hill 
emphasises that the choices of the manufacturing process which meet the needs of the 
marketplace best should come first. Only then should infrastructural issues be addressed. 
Slack's audit framework prioritises the gaps to be closed but the actions taken to close 
them are assumed to be contingent with the organisation and its competitive environment 
and should be decided by the organisation's personnel. The literature is very inconclusive 
on what action should be taken in infrastructural decision categories in order to close the 
gaps identified in the audit stage. 
Mills et at. (1995) suggest that an alternative view of the decision areas proposed by 
Rhodes (1991) has some advantages over the traditional framework, as it clarifies the 
actions that should be taken, and helps strategy implementation. This model replaces the 
manufacturing list of decision areas for nine business processes which encompass various 
activities and functions. 
The implementation part of the procedure overlaps with the project management phase of 
the manufacturing strategy process. As noted by Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) in 
operations and Mintzberg (1994) in business strategy, what is actually implemented is not 
what was agreed to in the action plans. Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) conclude: 
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It is the pattern of structural and infrastructural decisions that 
constitutes the "manufacturing strategy" of a business unit. More 
formally, a manufacturing strategy consists of a sequence of decisions 
that, over time, enables a business unit to achieve a desired 
manufacturing structure, infrastructure, and set of specific capabilities. 
Skinner and Hayes and Wheelwright have different views over the formulation of 
strategy. It has a parallel in the business literature with a dichotomy created between the 
design school and the emergent strategy school, epitomised by the work of Mintzberg. It 
has a parallel in the implementation process. Taken to an extreme form, the top down 
planning view adopted by Skinner sees the development of manufacturing capabilities as 
ultimately programmatic, whereas the bottom up model adopted by Hayes and 
Wheelwright sees capabilities as emerging through an adaptive process. The planning 
process mode adopted by Skinner has a long tradition in the business strategy literature, 
informed by the writings of Ansoff (1965), Ackoff (1979), and Andrews (1971). The 
design school relies on systematic financial analysis to evaluate alternatives. Decisions 
should be implemented through a series of systematic steps determined by top 
management and followed by the lower ranks. 
Mills et al. (1995) contend that strategy frameworks are generally limited to the audit 
stage of the strategic process (Platts and Gregory, 1990; Fine and Hax, 1985; Tunaly, 
1992; Slack, 1991). They neglect the formulation and implementation stages, because 
many (in fact the majority of) authors have adopted the same analytical style inherited 
from Skinner, who, by its turn, was influenced by the design school. 
The contingent view advocated by Mills et al. (1995) suggests that business culture and 
other conditions must play a fundamental role in the making and implementation of 
manufacturing strategy. Strategy is then multi-dimensional and strategy formulation and 
implementation might follow neither Skinner's top down deterministic style nor the 
bottom up adaptive way adopted by Hayes and Wheelwright. Instead they may fall 
somewhere in between. 
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Mintzberg has identified three alternative modes for the planning school: entrepreneurial, 
ideological, and grass roots. In the entrepreneurial mode the boss is, in many cases, the 
head of a small enterprise and his vision opens the way for other members whose role is 
to obey. In the ideological mode a strong vision tends to give members a sense of identity 
and guides their behaviour towards the achievement of clearly stated corporate goals. 
Instead of simply obeying, members are expected to collaborate in the formulation of 
ideas, in an effort to achieve the strategic intent. In the adaptive mode (the one that best 
fits Hayes and Wheelwright's view), fully rational planning at the top, which determines 
the rational steps that should be taken by lower rankings is considered unattainable. 
Instead, frameworks to guide decisions are built through a process of interactions with the 
environment. Strategy is then the product of many small steps and it changes over time to 
adapt to contingencies. 
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2.7. Manufacturing distinctive competencies 
The competitive strategy paradigm developed by Porter (1980,1985) is the principal 
reason why the strategic role of operations has not until recently been incorporated in the 
strategic management debate. Porter sees competitive advantage as coming from the 
manipulation of market forces, as shown by the five forces model. Within this 
framework, it is difficult to see how differences (therefore potential advantages) in the 
production system could radically affect competition. The emergent paradigm of 
competitive advantage, called 'res -based theory' argues th superior performance is 
achieved by means of suPerior duc on resourceKýthat 
are 
particular jaf the firm and P 
whose transferability, immitability, or substitutability are imperfect. According to Hayes 
and Pisano (1995) it has blurred the clear line that used to divide business strategy from 
operations strategy. The new business strategy paradigm together with operations 
strategy seek answers to the same question: "How to compete? ". 
According to S hor, eder, Anderson, and Cleveland (1986) distinctive competencies are 
"what sets manu acturing apart from the competition and thus can be defined in terms of 
uniqueness". Distinctive competence gives strength to manufacturing in dealing with the 
pj%. - 
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competition. The authors interviewed managers and found that they did not have any iv uw(y, 
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difficulty in identifying what they believed were their company's distinctive competence. 
Some of the examples the authors collected were: 
a) Being able to do things that others cannot do with consistent quality and delivery 
b) An ability to do specials with short turn around high quality assurance 
c) Very knowledgeable workforce and manufacturing staff and strong technical support 
staff 
d) Unique ability to be flexible to cope with changes caused by external influences 
e) Highly efficient and volume orientated physical plant layout 
Swamidass and Newell (1987) see distinctive competence as an outcome of 
manufacturing strategy content, defined as cost, quality, flexibility, and dependability. 
They write: "Manufacturing strategy content refers to the distinctive competencies of the 
manufacturing function in the pursuit of competitive advantage". In a similar way 
Cleveland, Schroeder, and Anderson (1989) defined the term production competence as: 
"preparedness, skill, or capability that enables manufacturers to prosecute a product- 
market specified business strategy". Both authors understand competence as the degree of 
alignment between manufacturing process and strategy. 
Cleveland et al. (1989) also argue that competence can be measured and has direct 
relation to the level of actual performance. According to them, production competence 
can be measured along nine dimensions which are: adaptive manufacturing, cost- 
effectiveness of labour, delivery performance, logistics, production economies of scale, 
process technology, quality of performance, throughput and lead time, and vertical 
integration. 
Vickery (1991) also sees production competence as the degree of alignment of the 
manufacturing process to business strategy. However, he draws a distinction between 
production competence and distinctive manufacturing competence which is defined as 
"those things an organisation does specially well in comparison to its competitors 
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operating in a similar environment". Vickery (ibid. ) focused on the development and 
implementation of manufacturing strategy to measure production competence defined as 
"a snapshot of the performance or effectiveness of manufacturing with respect to its 
current set of competitive priorities". 
Vickery, Droge, and Markland (1993) deepen this line of research. They develop a 
broader measure of production competence, still understood as the degree of alignment of 
manufacturing process (or manufacturing performance) to the strategic goals of business. 
They draw from the literature in manufacturing, business strategy, organisational theory, 
and marketing and build a thirty items scale. According to the views of production 
competence in the operations literature, competence is related to the success of the 
organisation in achieving in full the third stage of Hayes and Wheelwright (1984)'s 
framework. 
Hayes and Pisano (1995) develop a distinct line of research. They attempt to develop a 
capabilities based approach to manufacturing strategy. Their work is closely linked to the 
emergent resource based theory, especially to the dynamic capabilities concept developed 
by Teece and Pisano (1994). Instead of concentrating on defining and measuring 
competencies, as the researchers reviewed above have done, they focus on the 
implications of the new paradigm of competitive advantage for operations strategy. 
They contend that the very concept of manufacturing strategy might need to be 
reassessed. Ten years ago Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) proposed a basic model of 
manufacturing strategy that was focused on the market. The classic steps encompassed by 
the framework included the statement of the manufacturing mission that would support 
the business strategy, trade off among the competitive priorities to select the capabilities 
that should be developed in order to fulfil the manufacturing mission, followed by 
decisions over structural and infrastructural issues. Ten years later, the product/market 
orientated approached changed. Hayes and Pisano (1995) write: "Manufacturing strategy 
can no longer confine itself to guiding short-term choices between competing priorities 
like cost, quality, and flexibility", and further, "... manufacturing strategy is not just about 
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aligning operations to current competitive priorities but also selecting and creating the 
operating capabilities a company will need in the future". 
Hayes and Pisano (1995) argue that it was clear from the beginning that a paradigm 
defined by the concepts of strategic fit and focus was inadequate to explain corporate 
success and failure. They ask: 
If fit and focus are not enough, what other concepts must be added? 
Such additional considerations as the "ability to implement" and 
"management commitment" have been proposed, but most fall under the 
umbrella of organisational learning. 
The emergence of the capabilities-based approach has altered the very notion of 
manufacturing strategy in a way that is still not very clear. The manufacturing strategy's 
concept of strategic fit, represented by the "right" process and structural and 
infrastructural decisions supporting the selected competitive priority, is not enough. 
Hayes (1985) had already observed that the most successful companies tend to be inward 
looking in the development of basic manufacturing capabilities, instead of developing 
capabilities in order to achieve market or financial goals. As changes in the external 
environment created new opportunities, these companies used the skills basis which they 
already possessed to develop new and complementary capabilities. 
2.8. Implications of the manufacturing strategy literature 
The concept of manufacturing strategy has found some empirical support and wide 
acceptance. However the current paradigm has to adapt to changes in the competitive 
strategy paradigm and manufacturing management (Hayes and Pisano, 1995). Some basic 
characteristics define the current paradigm: (a) it is determined by business strategy (b) S ý, f 3 ýS 
its implementation follows a top-down approach (c) it is divided into content and process 
(d) it emphasises structural issues. 
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Research in manufacturing strategy has largely been concentrated on the content area. 
There is a need for theory building in this area in order to develop sound constructs about 
how strategy is formulated and implemented in manufacturing firms. The present 
research has been largely limited to the audit phase of the manufacturing strategy process. 
Most of the frameworks in the literature concentrate on assessing the effectiveness of 
current operations in meeting competitive requirements and defining the manufacturing 
task (Mills et al., 1995), following a planning model of strategy. Most authors consider 
that the scope of manufacturing strategy finishes here. Once the content is defined, the 
relationship among its constructs known, and the audit phase indicating the competitive 
dimension that should be tackled is finished, the role of manufacturing strategy is 
complete. Few authors address the next phase in the strategy process - formulation. 
Despite many shortfalls, the manufacturing strategy paradigm and its lean production 
counterpart are established approaches to the evolution of operational performance. The 
next literature review which focuses on the resource-based theory, offers a different 
perspective on similar issues. 
2.9. Introduction to the resource-based theory 
Many authors have contributed and are still contributing to the resource-based theory. 
\Vernerfelt (1984) is considered as the ground breaking work in a series of co-ordinated 
efforts to build an alternative paradigm of competitive advantage, although it should be 
noted that some earlier constructs were later incorporated into the framework, such as 
Lippman and Rumelt's (1982) uncertain imitability. 
The initial stage of the resource-based theory is marked by an effort to create a solid 
conceptual ground in order to (1) refute the current paradigm of business strategy, (2) 
define what is meant by resources, and finally (3) forge a link between resources and 
superior performance. 
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Many of the central concepts of this theory have their roots in economics rather than in 
managerial reality. In order to affirm itself as a model that could explain competitive 
advantage it was necessary to prove the old paradigm wrong. Thus, the initial research is 
based on quantitative studies using large samples to try to prove that competitive 
advantage is determined by firm specific attribut rath r than market structure. 
A second phase (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Pisano, 1995) is 
characterised by qualitative and conceptual works by authors whose aim was to produce a 
managerial theory based on the resource based theory. This aim was assisted by the fact 
that the RBV4 became a catalyst for many parallel research streams that had never 
coalesced. Business policy, behavioural organisational theory and operations literature 
are among those research streams that are now allowed to integrate their perspectives in 
order to create a theory of how organisations can create and deploy resources with the 
purpose of achieving competitive advantage. 
2.10. A new strategy perspective and economics 
2.10.1. IntemaVextemal dichotomy 
One of the initial works in strategic management was Learned, Christensen, Andrews, 
and Guth (1969)'s Business Policy: Text and Cases. According to their framework, 
competitive advantage was about exploiting opportunities raised in the competitive 
environment using a firm's strengths while neutralising external threats and avoiding 
being trapped by internal weaknesses. This dichotomy polarised future investigations into 
the sources of competitive advantage. One research stream focused on a firm's 
opportunities and threats, while the other focused on a firm's strengths (Penrose, 1959). 
Each branch of research had its core grounded on competing economic theories. The 
environmental approach adopted neo-classical economics and, more specifically, the 
industrial organisations theory (Bain, 1956). On the other hand, the resource-based theory 
(which inherited the internal orientation) is not exclusively grounded in any specific 10 
4 We use RBV, which stands for resource-based view, when referring to resource-based theory because this 
is the convention in the literature. 
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theory. Its core ideas find many similarities with the Austrian school (e. g., the importance 
of entrepreneurship), and with behavioural economics. 
2.10.2. The RBV and the several schools of thought in economics 
According to Conner (1991), the RBV adopts some aspects of the various IO models, 
including its rival, Bain-type IO. RBV agrees with the neo-classical theory that the firm is 
a combiner of inputs, and also with the Chicago view that the firm seeks to maximise its 
efficiency during production and distribution of the goods. However, she notes that 
resource-based theory analyses intermediate term events instead of a long-vision 
suggested by the Chicago view. RBV is also in disagreement with neo-classical's 
assumptions of perfect information, resource mobility, and divisibility. Like the Bain- 
type IO, the resource based theory regards consistent above average returns as possible. 
However, there is a fundamental distinction. What is crucial is the fact that Bain-type 
models see persistent above normal profits as resulting from monopoly which must be Witi. 
protected via entry-deterrence. RBV sees such earnings accruing to company as due to 
"costly-to-copy productive assets. " 
2.10.3. The current paradigm 
RBV grew out of the need to challenge the environment-biased competitive strategy 
paradigm. The works by Porter (1980,1985) stand at the centre of this paradigm. The 
essence of his work is to identify environmental conditions that allow a firm to achieve 
high performance. His elegant framework is easy to understand, teach, and use. This 
partly explains its popularity with managers. Nevertheless, it suggests that competitive 
advantage is largely determined by industry structure and consequently, the proactive role 
of management in creating intra-firm competitive advantage is not an important strategic 
input. Using his "five forces" model it is possible to examine the attributes which 
characterise industry's attractiveness where opportunities are greater and threats are 
minimised. The normative implications of Porter's Bain-type IO based theory are that a 
firm should analyse the five forces to assess the profit potential of a certain industry, and 
then design a strategy that aligns the firm to the environment. Porter (1985) introduced 
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the concept of a value-chain that related intra-firm activities to external environment. 
Nevertheless the role played by managers is still dominated by the importance attached to 
the external environment as the driver of corporate strategy. 
2.10.4. Distinct assumptions, incompatible models 
Two distinct sets of assumptions clearly distinguish the two approaches. First, each 
approach has a particular view of how: (a) rents (profits) are created and (b) 
heterogeneity is maintained. Environmental models see the creation of rents as a result of 
market power and a deliberate restriction of output also called monopoly rents (Peteraf, 
1993). The internally focused RBV, sees superior profits resulting from Ricardian rents. 
Ricardian rents are closely related to the assumption that firms hold different bundles of 
resources (Barney, 1991). This model suggests that due to superior production factors 
(resources), that are restricted in nature, some firms are able to obtain superior efficiency 
and, therefore, achieve a lower cost position. In contrast, the alternative monopoly model 
suggests that heterogeneity may occur between two groups of firms; those that participate 
in strategic groups and those that want to, but are prevented by intra-industry mobility 
barriers. Firms within these groups restrict their output in order to maximise their profits. 
According to Peteraf (1993) monopoly models regard heterogeneity as arising from 
spatial competition and product differentiation. Mobility barriers can create heterogeneity 
among group of firms, although they cannot create heterogeneity at the firm level. 
Therefore, heterogeneity can occur between incumbent firms and potential entrants. The 
maximisation of profits is achieved by the conscious restriction of outputs. As noted by 
Barney (1986), these models assume that firms inside an industry or strategic group have 
no relevant differences regarding the resources they hold or the strategy they pursue. 
Another assumption (rooted in the first one) is that, if for some reason heterogeneity 
develops it will not last long, because the resources on which difference depends are 
highly mobile. 
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The refutation of these two assumptions and the investigation of the strategic 
consequences they bring are the very core of the resource-based theory. The resource 
based theory (Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984) regards the heterogeneity of resources and 
the immobility of the resources that are at the root of the heterogeneity as at the core of 
the explanation as to why some firms in the same industry perform differently. According 
to Peteraf (1993), in order to achieve Ricardian rents it is necessary that superior 
resources remain limited in supply. 
2.11. A resource based view of competition 
An aspect of the resource based theory that has achieved considerable sound macro- 
foundations, is the constructs that explain the reasons for intrinsic firm heterogeneity 
among firms and its consequences for durable intra-industry profit differences. The fact 
that most authors focused on this as a crucial issue in building the basis of the theory 
(Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Itami, 1987; Barney, 1986; 
Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Teece, Pisano, and Schuen, 1990) reflects a theory building 
effort largely biased towards refuting the dominant environment-oriented paradigm of 
competitive strategy. Hence, supporting the notion that firms in the same industry keep 
their heterogeneity is critical. 
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As mentioned before, much of the antagonism between the two paradigms of competitive 
advantage relates to their economic foundations, which carry different and generally 
conflicting assumptions. Both models have their own view of the mechanisms that 
determine the level of profitability of a firm. Managerial advice depends directly on the 
view that is adopted. 
It is central to both models that the condition of heterogeneity be preserved. It is only 
possible in the long term if there are mechanisms in place which limit the competition 
when ex-post advantage is achieved. As put by Peteraf, whatever the reasons for the 
initial advantage are, explained either by the Ricardian or the Monopoly model, 
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competition may either enhance the production of the limited resource or weaken the 
market power of oligopolistics. 
2.11.1 Explaining heterogeneity 
Once resource-based theory sees heterogeneity in a different way, then it needs new 
constructs to explain it. It sees two critical factors limiting ex post competition: imperfect 
imitability, and imperfect substitutability (similar to how substitutability is treated in 
market power models as one of Porter's five forces). Barney (1991) sees substitution 
occurring in two forms. If a firm wants to replicate a strategic resource but is not able to 
do so, it may be able to substitute it for a similar or a different resource that is able to 
produce the similar strategic effects. To illustrate this point, Barney notes that charismatic 
leadership can arguably be substituted by a corporate culture that induces teamwork and 
commitment to the achievement of higher levels of quality. 
If no alternative substitute resource is feasible, then competitive advantage depends on 
the possibility of replication. If firms do not possess such resources and are unable to 
obtain them, they are considered to be the source of competitive advantage. Lippman and 
Rumelt (1982) and Rumelt (1984) argue that a competitive advantage can only be 
considered sustainable if it remains a advantage after efforts of duplication have ceased. 
Barney (1994) states: 
A firm is said to have a sustained competitive advantage when it is 
implementing value-creating strategy not simultaneously being 
implemented by any current and potential competitor and when these 
other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of such strategy. 
2.11.2. Isolating mechanisms 
Rumelt coined the term `isolating mechanism' to describe the phenomenon that protects 
firms from imitation. Isolating mechanisms are very similar to Caves and Porter's (1977) 
mobility barriers. The difference lies in the level of analysis. Mobility barriers isolate 
groups of homogeneous firms inside heterogeneous industries, whereas isolating 
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mechanism refers to particular firms. Rumelt (1987) includes producer learning, 
reputation, buyer search costs, economies of scale, buyer switching costs, which are all 
very similar to Porter's five forces model. However, several other isolating mechanisms 
have been identified within the resource-based approach, they are: (a) causal ambiguity 
(Barney, 1986, Reed and DeFillipi, 1990, Rumelt 1984, Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) (b) 
uncertain imitability and (c) path dependence. 
2.11.3. Causal Ambiguity 
Causal ambiguity is said to exist when the causal relationship between the firm's 
resources and its observed competitive advantage is not fully understood. As Rumelt 
(1984) explains: 
... if the precise reasons for success or failure cannot be determined, even 
after the event has occurred, there is causal ambiguity and it is 
impossible to produce an unambiguous list of the factors of production 
much less measure their marginal contribution. 
Barney (1991) and Rumelt (1987) consider causal ambiguity as at the heart of the 
explanation of variations in a firm's performance. He argues that for these resources to be 
a source of competitive advantage, both the firm that has the competitive advantage, and 
its competitors have to confront the same level of causal ambiguity. Otherwise, it is just a 
matter of time before this knowledge is made available to competitors. Therefore none of 
the competing firms must be aware of the link between the competitive advantage and the 
resources if they are to retain the advantage. Barney writes: 
... if a firm with a competitive advantage understands the link between 
the resources it controls and its advantages, then other firms can also 
learn about that link, acquire the necessary resources (assuming that 
they are not imperfect imitable for other reasons), and implement the 
relevant strategies. In such a setting, a firm's competitive advantage is 
not sustained because they can be duplicated. 
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Szulanski (1994) suggests four dimensions for causal ambiguity: Tacitness, complexity, 
robustness, and integrity. Tacitness is the polar opposite to articulation and can be 
defined at both individual and organisational levels. While articulated knowledge can be 
communicated in full by the person who possesses that knowledge to another person, 
tacit knowledge has to be taught through models of performance and supervised imitative 
learning. Tacitness at organisational level may occur when some members of the 
organisation possess tacit knowledge or when collective action is co-ordinated through 
implicit rules. 
Complexity, according to Szulanski, is the degree to which a practice is perceived as 
relatively difficult to understand and adopt. Reed and DiFillipi (1990) and Simon (1962) 
argue that interaction between the various isolated practices creates more uncertainty than 
the sum of the individual uncertainty because the nature of that interaction is ignored. 
Robustness refers to the insensitivity that an organisational routine exhibits when faced 
with variations in the environment in which it is operating. Nelson and Winter (1982) 
argue that organisational routines need to have damage controlling mechanisms to be 
effective. These mechanisms should be able to select inputs from the environment, 
modify the inputs to make them suitable, and also monitor their performance and invoke 
the other two mechanisms. Learning-by-doing is expected to impact positively on 
robustness because it is likely that basic problems have been sorted out. Galbraith (1990)5 
found that as technology becomes more mature, the relationship men-machine is better 
understood. Consequently, it is less prone to be affected by external variations. 
Integrity, the last of the four dimensions, refers to the extent to which the boundaries of 
the capability target for transfer are identified. If elements that have interdependence with 
this capability are not recognised, or cannot be transferred, causal ambiguity in the 
functioning of the imitated capability is expected to increase. 
In Suizanick (1994). 
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2.11.4. Uncertain imitability 
Even if a competitor knows what it should imitate, doing so might not be straightforward. 
Barney (1991) refers to social complexity to explain this phenomena. According to him, 
interpersonal relations among managers in a firm, a firm's culture (Barney, 1986b), 
reputation among suppliers, and customers are examples of resources that are socially 
complex. Hence causal ambiguity is not just related to the causes, but also to the 
replication of the cause. Even if a potential imitator were able to pinpoint which 
resources are a critical determinant of the competitive advantage, it might be very 
difficult to identify the specific processes required to accumulate such critical resources. 
2.11.5. Path dependence 
Path dependence is another major hurdle that can prevent imitation. Barney notes that 
traditional strategists, such as Ansoff (1965) and Learned (1969) had already 
acknowledged the impact of path dependency on a firm's long term performance. An 
innovative feature of the resource-based theory is the provision of a framework that 
enables a systematic study of the impact of the history of the firm's decision on its ability 
to compete in a long term. 
The difficulty of transference does not reside only in the fact that resources are strongly 
tacit and socially complex but also because their development is `path dependent'. As 
Teece and Pisano (1994) explain: 
The notion of path dependencies recognises that history matters (... ) 
Thus a firm's previous investments and its repertoire of routines (its 
'history') constrains its future behaviour. 
Efficient asset accumulation by imitators is limited by three factors expressed by 
Dierickx and Cool (1989) as: 
43 
a) Time compression diseconomies. This refers to the extra cost of acquiring a resource 
in a shorter period than is necessary for its natural development by the firm which 
holds such a resource. Such relationships are likely to happen in all functional areas. 
Marketing may incur extra costs in order to catch up with a first mover who has 
managed to develop a solid reputation among buyers. Manufacturing may need to 
spend to develop capabilities such as JIT under time pressure, while these were 
possibly costless to competitors who managed to develop them organically. 
b) Asset mass efficiencies: These argue that the more developed a resource is the easier 
it is to develop it further. For instance, it is more difficult for a firm that has just 
entered a certain product category to develop a high rate of product innovation, than, 
for another who has been manufacturing such products for a long time and has 
already mastered the technology and production process. 
c) Asset interconnectedness: The accumulation of certain assets may depend on 
complementary assets that may not be available. Even if a group of scientists holds 
the knowledge for the development of a new drug, the absence of efficient co- 
ordinating mechanisms of the appropriate expertise may make it impossible to patent 
the product before competitors do. 
In conclusion, it can be said that heterogeneity is preserved among firms because of the 
existence isolating mechanisms. These isolating mechanisms are: 
a) Barriers to imitation: reputation, buyer's search and switching costs, etc. 
b) Causal ambiguity: Tacitness, complexity, robustness, integrity 
c) Uncertain imitability: socially complex resources 
d) Path dependency: Time compression, asset mass efficiency, asset interconnectedness 
2,12. Organisational theory and resource based theory 
The Carnegie tradition in organisational theory is a product of the application of 
behavioural theory to economics. Instead of concentrating on the vertical structure of 
organisations (the moral-hazard issue), the Carnegie tradition presents an alternative to 
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agency theory and basically focuses on two phenomena: the process of decision making, 
and lateral intra-organisational relationships. Concerning the process of decision making, 
organisational theory is substituted for the old neo-classical assumption that the actors are 
profit maximisers in search of an optimal solution. According to Cyert and March (1963), 
the firm is, rather, a coalition of different interests accommodated in a political truce. In 
this context, actors take decisions that are rationality constrained (Simon, 1945). 
Therefore, decisions are satisfactory instead of optimal. 
2.12.1. The concept of organisational routine 
Organisational routine is an important construct for the resource-based theory developed 
within this tradition. The notion that organisations have a repertoire of organisational 
routines that evolve by learning was proposed by Nelson and Winter (1982). Their 
evolutionary perspective shares the foundations of the Carnegie tradition. According to 
the authors, organisations tend to develop, stabilise and follow routines. Although these 
routines may change in the long term, they argue that, in the short term they are the 
carriers of knowledge and experience that an organisation has. Although this concept is 
older than the initial resource-based works and the notion of path dependency, it 
acknowledges the fact that history matters. Nelson and Winter (1982) write: 
It's quite inappropriate to conceive behaviour in terms of deliberate 
choice from a broad menu of alternatives that some external observer 
may consider to be available opportunities to the organisation. The menu 
is not broad but narrow and idiosyncratic, it is built into the firm's 
routines and most of the choosing is accomplished automatically by these 
routines. 
Organisational routine has a privileged role to play in the building of a solid managerial 
theory because it captures the abstract notion of distinct competence through a concrete 
and observable phenomenon. Grant (1991) considered that in order to understand the 
anatomy of a firm's capabilities, organisational routine is an illuminating concept. More 
recently, studies that attempt to understand firm's distinctive capabilities (Henderson and 
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Cockburn, 1994; Pisano, 1994) have used the concept of organisational routines as a unit 
of analysis. 
2.13. Applied management and the resource based theory 
The resource-based view is acknowledged in one way or another by every recent author 
in strategy but its implications for applied management are still very speculative. Grant's 
(1991) Contemporary Strategy Analysis, for instance, uses the notion of firm's specific 
aspects only to give new insights into Porter's five forces model. Kay's (1993) 
Foundations of Corporate Success recognises that "... successful strategy is rarely copycat 
strategy. It is based on doing well what rivals cannot do readily, not what they can do or 
are already doing". Nevertheless Kay does not give credit to a conscious building of this 
advantage inside the firm because it would represent another version of a wish-driven 
strategy. Because he concludes that firms are unable to build a competitive edge 
consciously, he advises them to look for business markets and activities that match their 
current competencies. We find implicit in both views the old assumption that the inward 
looking building of advantage is not important. 
The `core competence' concept - Prahalad and Hamel (1990) is considered by Wernerfelt 
(1995) as mainly responsible for the diffusion of the resource based view in the 
managerial world. The building blocks of corporate strategy, they argue, are the `core 
competencies' of the corporation. Core competencies are defined as the combination of 
discrete technologies and production skills that support a company's product line. 
Using the example of Honda and Cannon, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) attribute their 
success to the management and exploitation of proprietary expertise. Cannon's core 
competencies in optics, imaging, and microprocessor control, and Honda's competencies 
in engine and power trains, allowed both firms to enter and quickly establish leadership 
in markets that were seemingly unrelated. 
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Hamel and Prahalad (1994) argue that an important weakness of the environment 
paradigm is that it is of little help when managers need to plan for the future. They 
contend that although the current paradigm provides a useful framework to keep track of 
competitive positions it fails to capture the dynamics of competence building and to 
provide insights about how leadership should develop a sound point of view into the 
future. 
Indeed, their view of the need for a strategic intent, that challenges employees to achieve 
"unrealistic" goals, denies the general assumption that resources should have a tight fit 
with goals. It runs against the environmental paradigm's concept of short run 
optimisation. 
The firm operates in the short run and is contractually encumbered with 
a variety of fixed facilities-Strategic choices then express the top co- 
ordinator's attempt to maximise the rents to these fixed factors over the 
planning horizon. Caves (1984). 
Hamel and Prahalad's concept of strategy sees the sources of advantage in the 
transformation of the industry. Strategy is then concerned with " (a) changing some 
fundamental ways the rules of engagement in long-stand industry (... ), (b) redrawing 
boundaries between industries, and /or (c) creating entirely new industries. " As in the old 
paradigm, the implications for management are outward oriented, although this time 
managers should take into consideration that firms are different and this difference may 
last long enough for them to redraw the competitive environment. 
In short, according to Hamel and Prahalad (1994), creating the future has more to do with 
revolutionising the competitive environment than with creating competencies within 
company's exclusive difficult-to-replicate organisational routines. Therefore, they 
contribute little to an understanding of how operational edges develop. Stalk, Evans, and 
Schuman (1992) note that Prahalad and Hamel's (1990) concept of core competencies is 
largely restricted to technological and production expertise. Instead, they suggest that 
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their concept of capabilities as distinctive high performance organisational routines is a 
more comprehensive one. They argue: 
The building blocks of corporate strategy are not product and markets 
but business processes. Competitive success depends on transforming a 
company's key processes into strategic capabilities that consistently 
provide superior value to the customer. 
This focus on organisational process is shared by Teece and Pisano (1994). They 
introduced the concept of dynamic capabilities which will be discussed later. 
2.13.1 Evidences from the operations literature 
The operations literature has no direct connection with the resource-based theory. 
However it has provided intriguing evidence that the difference in practice adopted in 
different companies is reflected on its operational performance, which demonstrates that 
firms are different internally and that these differences are sustainable over time. 
According to Nanda (1994), research on quality (Garvin, 1988), speed (Stalk, 1990), 
flexible manufacturing (Jaikumar, 1989), and new product development (Leonard- 
Barton, 1992) have traced the sources of competitive advantage, directly or indirectly, to 
capabilities that are embedded in organisational practices. Garvin (1988), found that 
quality differences were a result of the differences in the organisational routines 
responsible for gathering and processing information, linking customer experience with 
customer design, and co-ordinating factories and component suppliers. Although Garvin 
concluded that a competence such as quality could be supported by different 
combinations of routines, the best performers present remarkably similar patterns in their 
approaches. He concludes that the source of advantage can be traced back to particular 
systems, practices, and behaviours. 
Similarly, Henderson and Cockburn (1994) and Leonard-Barton (1992) trace the source 
of advantage to being firm specific and embedded in the organisation's routines and 
systems. Henderson and Cockburn argue that differences in research productivity are 
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dependent on firm specific search routines that would be difficult to transfer across the 
organisational boundary. However, Leonard-Barton argues that knowledge which 
distinguishes and provides a competitive advantage to the firm is embodied along: (a) 
employee knowledge and skills (b) technical systems, (c) managerial systems and (d) 
values and norms. Similarly, Bohn (1994) argues that superior knowledge of the 
production process, which is firm specific, would give the firm a competitive edge over 
competitors. 
2.14. Literature definitions of resources, capabilities, and competencies. 
2.14.1. Definitions 
Selzenick (1957) coined the term "distinctive competence". Authors associated with the 
classical school of business strategy authors such as Andrews (1971), and Hofer and 
Schendel and Patton (1978) later used the same term when they referred to firm's 
strengths. With the recent interest in resource-based theory and the role of intra-firm 
differences, which is argued to produce competitive advantage, came a profusion of terms 
that seem to have very little coherence. Competencies, firm's resources, and 
organisational capabilities are used rather freely and interchangeably in the literature. 
Cases of authors referring to the same phenomenon but employing different terms are 
frequent. 
"Distinctive competence" was originally defined by the planning school of strategy. 
Significant authors include Andrew (1971), and Hofel and Schendel (1980). Andrew 
defines it as "what [an organisation] can do particularly well" while Hofel and Schendel 
define it as "the pattern of... resource and skill deployment that will help it achieve its 
goals and objectives". Contemporary definitions also suggest that it is some sort of 
activity that a firm performs better than its competitors. The concept gained importance 
along with resource-based theory and became the central source of competitive advantage 
according to a new paradigm. 
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Resources and capabilities, which are considered scarce and difficult to replicate, 
represent a competitive advantage, or a distinctive competence. However, initial 
definitions of resources and capabilities in the RBV were largely intertwined and were 
similar to those of the design school. Wernerfelt (1984) identified resources as "anything 
that could be thought as a strength or weakness of a given firm". Barney (1991) also 
considered resources as "assets, capabilities, organisational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc. controlled by the a firm that enable the firm to conceive and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness" 
2.14.2. Abstraction and confusion 
Nanda (1994) notes that a closer look at the above definitions would reveal the circularity 
of the concepts. We can infer that by definition distinctive capabilities result from 
superior resources. These resources are superior because they caused competitive 
advantage. The definition of resources in terms of what they do ("a distinctive 
competence is that which yields a competitive advantage") instead of what they are, made 
impossible to analyse why they are productive. As an alternative Nanda (1994) suggested 
that resources should be viewed as inputs to the organisational production function, and 
recommended that the situations that determine their usefulness should be analysed. 
Grant (1991) had already proposed a basic distinction between resources and capabilities. 
Resources should be understood as inputs into the production process, such as items of 
capital, skills, and patents. This distinction gives room for improved definitions of 
capabilities. This was defined by Grant as the result of "teams of resources working 
together". This view is shared by Ammit and Schoemaker (1993) who consider 
capabilities as referring to "a firm's capacity to deploy resources, usually in combination, 
using organisational processes, to effect a desired end". 
Nevertheless, there seems to be an enormous difficulty inherent in defining resources in 
general terms, and an even greater one in linking them to capabilities in a relationship of 
causality. Barney (1986) and Cremer (1989) have highlighted corporate culture as a 
strategic resource, but no one has gone further than guessing which capabilities a 
desirable corporate culture can produce. This is because resources are not normally solely 
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responsible for a capability, but instead interrelate with others to form a capability. This 
means that the analysis is likely to be insurmountably ambiguous. 
2.14.3. Resources, capabilities, and competencies 
Based on the discussion above we can adopt the dominant view that resources are firm 
specific inputs to the production process (Nanda, 9 
9) 
Resources can be tangible or 
intangible. It is also generally assumed that tangible assets are always purchasable. One 
of the tenets of the resource-based theory is that it automatically excludes this category of 
resources from the strategy debate. Dierickx and Cool (1989) suggest that purchasable 
assets can not be sources of long lived rents, because these assets can be traded in the 
market. Therefore resources such as technology whose supply can be expanded according 
to demand cannot be a source of competitive advantage. 
However, this analysis is not complete. Indeed there are cases where a resource, although 
tradable, can still be a source of sustainable competitive advantage when its supply is 
fixed; in other words, when it cannot be created despite the demand for it. A simple 
example is British Airways' ownership of the best slots for business travel in Heathrow 
airport. It is a source of advantage, but it can also be traded. This category of resources 
has occurred for historical reasons (e. g. previous monopoly). Thus first mover advantage 
may be important because those that pre-empt a certain market or industry may be able to 
acquire a resource at a much lower price than latter entrants or also be protected from 
competition by regulations (Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt 1984), or simply by luck (Barney, 
1986). 
Leaving aside specific cases where tangible resources can be a source of advantage due to 
imperfections in factor market, the strategic debate is totally concentrated on intangible 
assets, initially termed "invisible assets" by Itami (1987). Intangible resources are both 
within and outside the firm (Nanda, 1 92 . Those that are outside include consumer trust, O 
brand image, and control of distribution. Referring those within the firm Teece, Pisano, 
and Schuen (1990) describe them as: "the mechanisms by which firms learn and 
accumulate new skills and capabilities. " This quote captures the overwhelming trend to 
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equate intangible assets with "organisational knowledge". Nanda (1994) defines 
intangible assets as: 
... an organizational intangible resource, which accumulates from 
organizational learning, a by-product of the production process. 
Following the argument of those who believe that the difference in performance between 
competing firms can be primarily explained by differences in knowledge, Leonard- 
Barton (1992) defines core-capability as: "the knowledge that distinguishes and provides 
a competitive advantage"6. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) also refer to collective learning in 
order to explain the origin of core competencies. Barney (1986), Cremer (1989), and Fiol 
(1991)7 equate the pool of knowledge accumulated by the organisation with corporate 
culture. Hence, it can be concluded that there is a wide consensus that organisational 
knowledge is the only resource that can effectively determine competitive advantage. It 
gives strategic importance to organisational learning but considers the accumulation of 
intangible assets as a black box. 
The first authors to write on the subject do not make a distinction between capabilities 
and their deployment. Grant (1991), for instance, considers organisational resources to be 
a "capacity for a team of resources to perform a task". The following authors tend to 
consider capabilities as something separated from resources. Collis (1994) isolates three 
categories of organisational capabilities8 proposed in the literature: 
a. The first category of capabilities refers to an outstanding ability to perform a basic 
functional activity of the firm (plant layout, distribution logistics, marketing 
campaigns... ) 
6 Note the terminology confusion. Her definition of capability is close to the general understanding of 
resource, as an input to production process. 
7 As noted by Nanda 
8 Note that capabilities can also be understood as competencies. 
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Amit and Schoemaker (1993) developed in functional areas, e. g., brand management 
Stalk et al. (1992) `set of business processes strategically understood' 
Treacy and Wieserman 
(1993) 
`One of the three value disciplines - operational 
excellence, customer intimacy, and product leadership' 
b. Dynamic improvement is the common theme in the second category. 
Amit and Schoemaker `repeated process or product innovations, manufacturing 
flexibility, responsiveness to market trends, and short 
development cycles' 
Teece et al. (1994) dynamic routines that `govern the ability of an organisation 
to learn, adapt, change, and renew over time' 
Hayes and Pisano (1994) enabling a firm to `switch gears from for example, rapid 
product development to low cost- relatively quickly and 
with minimal resources' 
c. The third category of capabilities also refers to dynamics improvements and to the 
more metaphysical strategic insights into the intrinsic value of other resources or to the 
pre-emption of competitors in the development of novel strategies. 
Barney (1992) Those organisational characteristics that 
`enable an organisation to conceive, choose 
and implement strategies' 
Henderson and Cockburn (1994) `The organisation's ability to deploy the 
firm's resources and to develop new ones'. 
The role of management in the development of a capability (understood as the ability to 
perform a task well) asks for a third construct. Nanda (1994) calls it competence, which 
he defines as: "Higher order routines which develop and configure organisational 
resources" (Teece and Pisano, 1994). We should conclude that not only do resources 
determine capabilities, but competencies also help develop and configure capabilities. By 
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defining competence in such a way, Nanda allows room for managerial discretion. The 
ability of an organisation to compete is not just determined by the organisational learning 
accumulated over time, but also by managerial choice or in other words, strategy. 
Teece and Pisano (1994) define as `dynamic capabilities' what Nanda calls `competence'. 
They recognise that strategic management can play a key role in "appropriately adapting, 
integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external organisational skills, resources, and 
functional competencies toward changing environment. " According to them, the 
development of firm's specific `capabilities' (understood as the managerial ability of 
shaping skill, resources, and functional competencies) and the way in which they renew 
`competencies' (understood as performing a task better than competition) are deeply 
linked to business processes (Nanda's higher order routines), market positions, and 
expansion paths. 
Although there is a degree of confusion and lack of coherence in the literature a general 
view can be extracted: 
a) Resources are inputs in the production process which are firm specific. The 
strategically important resources are the `invisible assets'. `Invisible assets' are 
understood as the knowledge embedded in the organisation. Organisational 
knowledge is accumulated over time, through learning-by-doing. There is no room 
for managerial discretion 
b) Capabilities can be regarded as superior operational outcomes that distinguish 
competing firms (e. g. fast product development, quality, etc. ), or the ability to 
improve those abilities faster than the competitors, or, the ability of management to 
create an advantage; in other words, a superior ability to transform strategic intents 
into operational reality. This last category is closer to the general view of 
competencies in operations which sees advantage as the ability to implement better 
c) There is an intermediate construct between the inputs and the outcomes. It refers to 
the organisational ability of altering capabilities. These are managerial routines 
responsible for firm's resources deployment and development 
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Nanda (1994) notes that the resource-based frameworks are able to produce rigorous and 
robust predictions only when micro foundations of the theory are developed and provide 
tractable models. Nevertheless, the mechanisms that prevent replication have, by in large, 
monopolised the conceptual work, while the emergence of competencies has been left 
practically untouched. He writes: 
How intangible assets develop, and what parameters influence this 
development, are important questions which have received 
comparatively little attention in the resource-based framework. 
2.15. The managerial relevance of the resource based theory 
Do we have an economic or a managerial resource-based theory? Contributions to the 
theory building have been numerous and complementary (Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 
1984; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Itami, 1987; Barney 1986; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; 
Teece, Pisano, and Schuen). Based on these works, frameworks for the application of the 
theory have been developed by Wernerfelt (1984,1989), Amit and Schoemaker (1993), 
Grant (1991), and Stalk, Evans, and Schulman (1992). Prahalad and Hamel's (1990) 
concept of "core-competencies" was enthusiastically embraced by the business world to 
an extent that competencies became a major buzzword. As a result, it is now widely 
accepted that firms are fundamentally idiosyncratic because they develop unique 
combinations of resources and competencies that may be hard to match. Consequently 
sustainable heterogeneity at firm level allows firms to earn superior rents than 
competitors in the same industry or strategic group. 
Doz (1994) considers that research on core competencies to date has resulted in an 
economic theory rather than a managerial theory. He writes: 
Research on core competencies has so far been largely externally 
oriented and driven by theory building and theory refutation. Theory 
has developed more in reaction to the economics-driven industry and 
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environment analysis evolution of the business strategy field, and as a 
follow up on the seminal work of Nelson and Winter (1982). 
The attribution of competitive advantage to resource or capabilities loosely defined 
(generic terms) has not proved to be a viable path towards managerial theory. Nanda 
(1994) argues that generic factors such as management skills, corporate culture, and 
organisational systems, cannot be a source of competitive advantage because, whether 
resources are strategic or not, is defined by their idiosyncrasy and the contingency of the 
situation. 
Some of the key implications of the theory developed so far are: 
a) The RBV radically changes the perspective on how competitive advantage is created. 
The focus is shifted from the analysis of the external environment to the development 
of internal resources 
b) The literatures tend to associate strategic idiosyncrasy to "organisational 
knowledge". It therefore gives learning a central role in strategy 
c) Although managerial routines have been acknowledged to have a role by current 
authors who have focused on the ways in which organisations develop particular 
operational abilities (e. g., Henderson and Cockburn, 1994), the isolating mechanisms 
pose a number of limitations on managerial choices in creating advantage 
Porter (1991) argues that research on strategic operational outcomes can be either focused 
at (a) separating the causes of superior performance at a given period of time or (b) 
understanding the dynamic processes that produced that outcome. He then called the 
former a cross-sectional problem and the latter longitudinal problem and concluded that 
the position of advantage that is demonstrated by cross-sectional approach has to be 
explained in terms of two key issues: initial conditions and managerial choice. Schendel 
(1996) asks: "Which [of the two] is more important in terms of what Porter defines as the 
longitudinal problem? " 
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Schendel argues that this is precisely the point where evolutionary ecology comes into 
the strategic debate about the longitudinal problem. This theory argues that initial 
conditions are important and may indeed determine the outcome of the strategic process. 
The resource-based theory is especially relevant when allied to an evolutionary 
processual view of the development of a firm's abilities. 
The path dependency concept broadens the deterministic idea that initial conditions will 
certainly determine strategic outcomes but reaffirms that these initial conditions do pose 
limitations on managerial actions. The role of history (and hence time) becomes crucial. 
Each important decision concerning resources taken by the firm somehow shapes its 
future alternatives. Nanda (1994) considers that the long-term issue is how to develop an 
optimal repertoire of competencies, once this repertoire is limited and its alterations are 
constrained by history. It also suggests that if eventually a firm commits itself to a less 
than effective repertoire of capabilities it may find itself in a competitive "cul-de-sac" 
which cannot revert quickly. This was empirically demonstrated by Leonard-Barton 
(1992). 
Doz (1994) draws on the behavioural theory which assumes that organisational routines N 
are the product of a satisfactory compromise (organisational truce) between the 
company's stockholders. Hence, these routines reflect the relative credibility and power 
of the various categories of stakeholders. Organisational rigidities then arise because to 
question practices means to question the people behind those practices and unless the 
organisation is under clear threat of survival that would eventually provoke a rupture of 
the organisational truce, which would lead to the alteration of a certain competence 
development path. This is a major impediment for competencies' renew and the creation 
of entrepreneurial structures within the firm (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Teece and Pisano 
conclude: 
Thus, firms, at various points in time, make long term, quasi-irreversible 
commitments to certain domains of competence. To decide, under 
significant uncertainty about future states of the world, which long term 
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paths to commit to and when to change paths is the central strategic 
problem confronting the firm. 
The imperfect managerial choice limited by causal ambiguity and uncertain imitability 
will probably determine the behaviour and knowledge acquired by the organisation at 
both managerial and shop-floor level. Hayes and Pisano (1995) argue that firms that 
adopt a "push" system for supplies based on MRP will develop different routines to those 
that adopt a "pull" system based on JIT. Garvin (1988) notes that the best performing 
firms in terms of quality which he had studied had chosen to develop particular 
competencies, and in those particular areas they did notably better than anybody else. 
It can be concluded that a firm's specific effects do drive differences in competitive 
performance (Wernerfelt, 1989; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). This is because firms 
have a previous history that is embedded in the organisation's initial conditions which 
cannot revert very quickly because managers are limited in their cognition (causal 
ambiguity and uncertain imitability) and because managerial choices are restrained by 
path dependencies (time-compression, asset mass-efficiency, and asset 
interconnectedness) 
2.16. Conclusions from literature review 
The discussion of the literature can be organised around the discussion of the five 
questions below: 
2.16.1. Does a company necessarily need to implement a manufacturing 
(operations) strategy to have a competitive advantage? 
For an operational performance to be a source of competitive advantage it has, according 
to the resource-based theory, to meet three basic conditions: (a) It must be impossible to 
buy or sell in the available factor markets at less than its true marginal value, (b) it must 
present difficulties and/or be costly to replicate, and (c) it must be heterogeneously 
distributed among competitors (Peteraf, 1993). 
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The objective of manufacturing strategy is to achieve competitive advantage through 
operations by guiding the organisation of firm's production processes in a way that 
affects the competitive position of the firm. The core of Skinner's (1969) argument is that 
each company has its particular strengths and weaknesses and strategy should explore 
this fact through a number of idiosyncratic decisions in key decision areas. In spite of the 
original idea, the theory that followed Skinner's inaugural article firmly adopted the 
notion that the role of the production function was a supportive one. Consequently, 
differentiation at the production level and replication were not issues for manufacturing 
strategy. The resulting literature is unable to answer the question above or to explain the 
evolution of firm specific abilities. Hayes and Pisano (1995) write: 
Neither the traditional approach to manufacturing strategy nor its "lean 
manufacturing" challenger provide much guidance about this new role. 
Once a company had followed the dictates of manufacturing strategy 
and configured it to meet the needs of its competitive strategy, there was 
little operations could do to provide additional differentiation. It could, 
of course, strive for continuos improvement, but soon as its competitors 
had similarly aligned their manufacturing structures and infrastructures 
with their competitive strategies and embarked in comparable 
improvement programs, everyone would be evenly matched again. 
Similarly, adopting "lean manufacturing" leaves little room for 
differentiation: once all competitors have adopted TQC, JIT, and other 
of its components, how can manufacturing further contribute to a 
competitive advantage? 
," 
So far, the concept of manufacturing strategy has not incorporated notions that address 
any of the three basic factors that provide competitive advantage. Despite the arguable 
incompatibilities of the fundamental of manufacturing strategy, there have been attempts 
to link the idea that firms possess specific features (which have strategic importance) to 
the framework of manufacturing strategy. The theory developed by Vickery (1991) 
argues that "competent" companies are those that are more efficient in implementing 
strategy. For them, the key factor that drives differentiation of the operational function is 
the ability to implement. Apart from its over simplicity, the major weakness of such a 
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proposition is the non-existence of a conceptual link with the resource-based theory. The 
addition of new concepts to the current framework of manufacturing strategy is not the 
route towards developing a capability-based notion of operations strategy. We need a 
new framework built upon the new conceptual framework resulting from developments 
that have occurred in the field of strategic management. 
2.16.2. How incompatible are the resource-based view and the paradigm of 
manufacturing strategy? 
The purpose of manufacturing strategy is to align manufacturing capabilities to market 
contingencies (e. g. Hill, 1988) or, more indirectly, to link them to a business strategy 
whose focus is on product-markets (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Slack, 1991). In 
contrast, the notion that products are only ephemeral manifestations of the firm's 
capabilities is a basic tenet of the resource-based theory. Prahalad and Hamel (1990)'s 
core competence concept explains, for instance, Honda's clear product superiority in the 
1980s mainly as an outcome of its engine expertise. The basic message is that strategic 
efforts of the organisation should be concentrated on firm's specific skills and resources 
instead of product markets. Not only the focus of strategy, but the principles that underlie 
the literatures, are at odds. When the incompatible issues are put side by side, we can see 
that the different approaches lead to different perspectives of developing distinctive 
operational abilities. 
The content of strategy and the performance gap framework have been dominating 
themes in manufacturing strategy's conceptual and empirical research over the years. 
Indeed its prescriptive advice concentrates on structural issues such as technology which 
can be acquired from external markets and does not present any barrier against emulation. 
Hayes and Pisano (ibid. ) argue that strategy as strategic fit between environment and 
structure cannot explain differences in performance. 
... though several airlines may adopt similar competitive strategy, choose 
the same kind of planes, use the same ground crews at each airport, and 
adopt very similar passenger reservation systems some turn out to be far 
more successful than others? 
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Manufacturing strategy Resource-based theory 
Prescriptive advice emphasising 
structural factors 
Advantage based on infrastructure 
"invisible assets" 
Replication not considered Replication is a central issue 
Capability building Process 
determined by strategy 
Capability building Process led by 
learning-by-doing 
Capabilities developed in function 
of agreed objectives. Focus on 
content 
Capabilities development as an 
emergent process. Focus on 
process 
Top down strategy implementation Adaptive strategy processes 
Short run optimisation of resources Long run processes development 
of resources 
Undifferentiated strategic outcome Differentiated strategic outcome 
Unlimited managerial cognition Limited managerial cognition and 
action 
Initial conditions are not important Initial conditions are important 
Table 2.3 - RBV x MSM 
3 
Alternative studies focusing on the process side of strategy are rare. This lack of 
understanding of the strategic process is partly responsible for the fact that current views 
of manufacturing strategy do not recognise alternative modes to the top down hierarchical 
approach, as Skinner originally conceptualised it. This view assumes the principles of the 
Classical School of business strategy that have long been greatly extended by the works 
of revisionist authors who focus on the process of strategy. Adaptive views of the 
strategy process are more appropriate frameworks to understand how firms develop 
specific abilities (Mills et al., 1995). 
Thus the essence of the manufacturing strategy concept is the short run optimisation of 
the organisational resources in order to achieve the fit between operational capabilities 
and environmental conditions. It attempts to maximise the rents of fixed factors of 
production over the planning horizon through the trade off between static alternatives. 
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At this point, Sanchez and Thomas' (1995) distinction between capability leverage and 
capability building is a useful one. It highlights the basic distinction between the MSM9, 
based on optimising the existing resources and acquiring resources from external markets 
(structural decisions), and an alternative framework which sees the evolution of 
operational performance as dependent on the development of intangible assets. In the first 
case, a firm's history is not important, whilst, in the second the development of intangible 
assets would require the alteration of initial conditions. This parallels Sanchez and 
Thomas' (ibid. ) discussion of the difference of a qualitative change in the asset base 
required by capability building as opposed by a quantitative change demanded by 
capability leveraging. 
Thus there is an important distinction between quantitative and qualitative expansion of 
the firm assets. The manufacturing strategy refers to quantitative development through 
the acquisition of resources from external markets while capability building refers to a 
qualitative change in the firm's asset base. Therefore, while manufacturing strategy does 
not demand a significant alteration of initial conditions, unless perhaps a quantitative one, 
capability building demands a qualitative alteration of initial conditions, reaching far 
beyond the shop floor's practices and policies. 
2.16.3. What are the consequences to operations of the change in the 
competitive advantage paradigm? 
The environmental analysis paradigm regards the level of profitability as dependent on a 
company's power to manipulate market forces. Being outwardly oriented, it is virtually 
silent about the importance of firm specific abilities. The substitution of this paradigm 
with the resource-based paradigm creates the context and conceptual ground to argue that 
differentiation at the operational level can lead to superior financial performance. Hence 
the management of operations assumes unprecedented importance within corporate 
strategy. 
9 Manufacturing Strategy Model 
(. . 
('ak( . 
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The focal question in the previous paradigm of competitive advantage is "where to 
compete"? Hayes and Pisano (1995) note that for the first time the questions of both 
operations and business strategy have converged on the same focal point: How to 
compete? Once both theories have the same key concern, they should share the same 
conceptual foundations. However a major obstacle is to base practical advice on the 
resource-based view. 
The resource-based theory is a convincing framework to describe competitive success in 
an ex-post manner. However, unlike Porter's (1985) five forces model, it is not able to 
produce a robust (within the conceptual foundation of that paradigm) and prescriptive 
model. Although the resource-based view is not yet able to produce a clear prescriptive 
framework (perhaps it will never be), it has provided solid concepts which have opened 
new horizons for the competitive debate. Below we list some of the most significant 
ones: 
1/ 
a) Different levels of profitability are caused primarily by the firm's internal capabilities 
which are imperfectly transferable or replicable. The strategic question changes from 
"Where to compete? " to " How to compete? " 
b) Learning, understood as the accumulation of tacit knowledge, is brought to the 
ý`ýý " 
foreground. The "invisible assets" that sustain a firm's competitive advantage in the 
market are developed through learning-by-doing. This strongly suggests an emergent 
character for the process of capability building relegating the intentional aspect to a 
secondary role 
c) Strategy is given a long-term frame and is restricted. Capabilities take considerable 
time to develop (time compression diseconomies). The previous history of the 
organisation conditions the necessary time and ultimately, the ability, to develop a 
determined capability (path dependence). This concept suggests that the available 
alternatives to the organisation are restricted. According to Nelson and Winter (1982): 
The menu is not broad but narrow and idiosyncratic. It is built into the 
firm's routines and most of the choosing is accomplished automatically 
by these routines. 
ej e 
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d) The distinction between capability leverage and capability building (Sanchez and v 
Thomas, 1995). While competence building implies the expansion of the existing 
assets through a process of qualitative change, capability leverage represents the 
expansion of the existing assets through internal development or external markets. 
Competence building will determine the competitive opportunities available to the 
firm in the future. 
Although the concept of manufacturing strategy has not changed, in order to 
accommodate the change in the competitive paradigm, Hayes and Pisano (1995) argue 
that it has the following consequences for the operations function: 
a) Elevating the importance of the operations function. Because the emergent 
competitive strategy paradigm sees competitive advantage as a consequence of doing 
certain things better than competitors can, the implementation of strategy assumes a 
dynamic character. We need to understand how structural and infrastructural 
decisions can create a differentiated operations function 
b) A new role for operations. Hayes and Pisano (1995) write: "The best companies did 
not stop once they had structured their manufacturing organisations to support their 
competitive strategies... They challenged (and supported) their manufacturing 
organisations to become so proficient that they generated new opportunities for the 
other functional groups. " However, they note that it is not clear how operations 
strategy should be formulated and implemented in order to create a proactive 
operations function 
c) A greater emphasis on operations infrastructure. The new perspective clearly sees 
enduring differentiation of the operations function as possible only when it can be 
traced back to infrastructure, because competitive edges based on structural factors 
can be automatically matched by competitors 
2.16.4. Are distinctive advantages emergent or intentional? 
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The discussion over the intentionality of the evolution of operational abilities has to focus 
on to which extent the outcome of the strategic process is determined by the strategic 
intent. In opposition to the manufacturing strategy paradigm the resource-based theory 
places a central impediment to the notion that management rationality is the only driver 
of capability building. According to Barney (1991), if the firm that holds the advantage 
can articulate the mechanisms of this advantage, the knowledge will eventually spread 
and competitors will also be able to understand the links between resources and 
performance, and develop or acquire the relevant resources, resulting in loss of 
advantage. A key proposition of the RBV is that sustainability is directly related to 
tacitness; in other words, the less articulated an advantage is, the more sustainable and 
consequently the more valuable it is. 
In accordance with this ambiguity principle, authors who share the principles of the 
resource-based paradigm regard the emerging learning process as the central driver of 
capability creation. Consequently, the resource-based literature tends to assume little or 
no connection between the strategy process and the process of capability creation. Pisano 
(1994) writes: 
If proficiency at a determined activity (such as manufacturing) is critical 
to competitive advantage, and such proficiency can be improved over 
time, then learning must play a central role in the competitive advantage 
of firms. Without learning it is difficult to imagine from where a firm's 
unique skills and competencies would come. 
There is a suggestion that direct managerial intervention may have little to do with the 
development of operational abilities. According to the associated literature, tacit 
knowledge is accumulated by the firm through an inward oriented learning process based 
on experimenting, failing, and using. Nanda (1994), for instance, sees organisational 
knowledge as a by-product of the production process. Firm specific knowledge is 
assumed to evolve in a purely emergent fashion without any planning, occurring inside 
the black box of the learning curve concept, through repeated practice at the individual or 
small group level. Doz (1994) writes: 
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Most organisational competencies start with the individual. Individuals 
have skills and knowledge, benefit from intuition, and can develop 
expertise. Collective competencies start to develop with individuals and 
small group learning by doing, rather than with top management 
engineered grand designs. Competence develops partly as an individual 
action learning process, through reflective learning between practice and 
cognition (Schon, 1983). Learning also results from small group 
interaction involving know-how development and exchange in 
communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1990). 
The evocation of the learning curve effect suggests that this is a relevant concept. The 
historical discussion over the learning curve is of interest here because, for a long time, it 
was the frame of reference for discussing the evolution of operational abilities, or at least 
the evolution of productivity. 
Alchian (1963) reported an empirically observable phenomenon. Cost reduction could be 
observed in terms of a linear relationship between the logarithms of direct labour per 
pound of airframe produced and the cumulative volume produced. The discussions over 
the causes of the learning effects were polarised. Some attributed it to increasing skills of 
workers involved in manual operations. Others advocated the influence of redesign of 
processes, alterations of raw material and end-product quality specifications, more 
effective maintenance procedures, planning and scheduling, change in production- 
volume, and incentive pay plans (Conway and Schultz, 1959; and Baloff, 1966). 
Although Alchian (1963) provided evidence that the rate of learning differed according to 
different model-facility combinations, there was a wide spread assumption in the 
literature that followed that the slope of the experience curve was fixed, fairly constant 
over time, and constant among all firms in the same industry. Therefore the dominant 
view implicitly places the rate of improvement outside managerial control in favour of 
manual dexterity (Dutton and Thomas, 1984). 
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So is it managerial choice or manual dexterity that drives the evolution of operational 
abilities? If the learning curve is inconclusive other works such as Garvin (1988) are not, 
and perceive the differences in the evolution of the quality ability in different companies 
as the result of different managerial choices. On the other hand what those that studied 
the learning curve called manual dexterity is closely linked to Doz's idea of evolution of 
capabilities at the individual level and its effects cannot be overlooked. Therefore it 
would be safe to assume that a more reasonable position lies in the middle ground and 
should assume intentional (grand design) elements as well as emergent ones. 
We have to keep in mind that managerial cognition is limited by path-dependence, or the 
notion that where you can go depends on where you have been. The evolutionary 
argument taken to an extreme would posit that "current organisational fates can be traced 
to causes at the time of founding" (Barnett and Burgelman, 1996). In this sense 
managerial cognition and action would not be relevant to the final outcome of the 
strategic processes. Put more moderately, the perspective highlights the importance of 
initial conditions in limiting managerial cognition. 
This somewhat conflicting and fragmentary literature begs a number of questions on the 
evolution of operational abilities. Is the strategic process that leads to superior operational 
outcomes driven by managerial cognition? Does it emerge from lower levels bearing little 
connection with managerial actions? Or instead, is it simply determined by initial 
conditions? 
The way towards answering these questions is to identify the drivers of the evolution of 
operational abilities. Porter (1991) suggested that the drivers that create sustainable 
advantage are plentiful and varied and somewhat ambiguous. This can be taken as a 
departure point for this research although it should be emphasized that our question is 
much smaller in scope than Porter's discussion of sustainable market positions. 
2.16.5. What are the drivers of the evolution of operational abilities? 
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We concluded above that there are two categories of drivers: one is intentional and 
related to managerial activity and design and the other is emergent and relate to the 
actions of workers and line managers of the production function. In order to discuss the 
intentional category we have to consider the concept of strategy. 
Strategy is, by definition, the central determinant of the evolution of operational 
performance in manufacturing strategy. Operations scholars implicitly adopt the 
assumptions of Classic School of Business strategy which hold that senior managers, 
whose rationality is unbounded, formulate strategy as it should be implemented by lower 
levels of management. A key notion behind it is the idea that the strategic intent is the 
key (or even the only) driver of capability creation. Thus top managers should be 
involved in the development and deployment of organisational assets aimed at achieving 
a goal. Sanchez and Heene (1995) define goals as "... the set of interrelated `gap closing' 
objectives which motivate a firm's decision making and give direction to its competence- 
building and competence-leveraging activities". 
The kind of gap-closing action is dependent on the speed of improvement. Operational 
improvement should be seen along a continuum that ranges from strategic leaps to 
continual improvement. Strategic leaps are determined by managerial processes alone, 
where large amounts of funds are required to finance the acquisition of structural 
elements from external markets and the introduction of technology by external 
consultants. On the other hand continual improvement does not depend on massive 
acquisitions from external markets being an inward focused process of capability 
building. Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) write: 
Rather than putting massive resources into developing elaborate plans 
and projects in the rarefied atmosphere of a remote headquarters 
building, such a company [that follows a continued incremental 
improvement approach] expects the bulk of its improvements to bubble 
up from lower levels in the organisation. 
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A number of authors have argued for the superiority of the continuous improvement 
approach. Garvin (1988), for example, reports that no significant technological 
differences could be observed between high and low performers in manufacturing. Hayes 
and Pisano (1995) note that the emphasis on infrastructure is consistent with principles of 
"lean manufacturing". The central concepts of lean production (JIT, TQM, cross- 
functional integration, and the delegation of problem identification and solving in the 
shop floor) exclude any hint of hardware driven advantage. 
Mills et al. (1995) note that most of the works on manufacturing strategy consider that 
managerial intervention finishes when the gap-closing areas are identified and actions 
plans determined. Nevertheless, the outcome of strategy can depart considerably from the 
strategy as originally formulated by top managers because it has to be continuously 
modified to accommodate contingencies and conflicting interests, Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1991) write: 
The importance attributed to linking strategic and operational change is 
because the process has both an intentional and emergent character. The 
need is to appreciate how intentions are implemented - and hence 
transformed overtime. 
This suggests that there are other managerial activities, like negotiating the 
implementation, that go beyond the formulation of the strategy. 
Apart from top management the contribution of other actors in the organisation to the 
evolution of operational performance is ill defined. Another ill-defined issue is the 
contribution of lower hierarchical levels to the strategic process. The lean production 
paradigm recognises the importance of participation at the lower levels of the 
organisation. It is not limited to contributing directly to change in processes through 
participation in QCCs. Staff are also directly involved in the change of responsibility 
roles which leads to total quality management and to the process of team building, 
necessary for production in cells. Although the lean production paradigm advances in 
relation to the manufacturing strategy paradigm by demonstrating that lower hierarchical 
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levels have a significant role, what exactly the nature of their contribution to the 
evolution of operational abilities is, is still not clear. 
Teece and Pisano (1994) argue that high performance routines embedded in the firm's 
processes are sources of advantage and are conditioned by the firm's history. If we think 
of the processes as business processes in the production function, then lower 
organisational levels are those that carry high performance routines. 
Porter (1991) suggests that the longitudinal problem is about understanding how 
managerial choices are limited by original conditions, but he should consider not only 
managerial but also the actions of those in the bottom of the organisation and choices as 
factors that drive the evolutionary process. Although managerial choices, such as 
incentives and reporting systems, do have an effect on behaviour at the bottom of the 
organisation, firm specific routines present in the production function are "invisible 
assets" whose action can transform the initial conditions of the organisation and allow the 
evolution of operational abilities. 
In conclusion it can be said that the only categories of managerial action recognised by 
the manufacturing strategy literature are those concerned with identifying and closing 
performance gaps. Decisions should then be taken in the structural and infrastructural 
decision areas in order to close the gap(s). As already stated, the literature is very specific 
and prescriptive on structural decisions, while "soft" infrastructural decisions are more of 
an art form. There is certainly scope to enlarge the literature in the area of defining what 
managers actually do during the strategic process and not only during the audit phase. 
2.16.6. Is the systems and structure view enough to understand the evolution of 
operational abilities? 
The evolution of operational abilities is assumed in the manufacturing strategy literature 
to be controlled by management systems and processes. Hayes and Wheelwright (ibid. ) 
acknowledge that the Japanese success in capability building is due to the emphasis of 
their managerial systems on infrastructure issues. Measurement and control systems, 
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workforce policies, management selection and development policies, capital budgeting 
and allocation systems, and organisational structure are some of the main concerns of 
management. When appropriately refined, the systems elements can: 
... provide a firm with a competitive advantage that is difficult for 
competitors to overcome if they have not developed a similarly effective 
infrastructure. (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984). 
Hayes and Wheelwright advise firms who want to become stage IV manufacturers not to 
rely on major breakthroughs, but instead, to improve on the basis of " accumulation of 
knowledge and relatively small steps". Systematic improvement would be dependent 
upon the quality of the management of the factory. They refer to the quality of the 
management of the factory as "internal capabilities". Managers should be able to alter the 
company's systems and policy in order to create the ability to learn and improve faster 
than competitors. 
If manufacturing competitiveness is dynamic rather than static process, 
the company infrastructure must be dynamic as well. If its systems and 
policies become static, over time they will fail to reflect competitive 
needs. Production control systems, performance evaluation procedures, 
capital budgeting processes, and project management structures must all 
be developed with flexibility and improvement in mind. (Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1984) 
The link between systems and behaviour at the bottom of the organisation is better 
established in the human resources literature. According to Gittel (1995) cognitive 
frameworks determine behaviours. Managers can shape behaviour at the bottom 
hierarchical levels by adopting systems and redesigning the organisation in a way that 
influences the way in which people think about their jobs. This, in short, alters line 
managers and employees' cognitive frameworks. Gittel (1996) quotes an emergent set of 
literature in organisational design suggesting that horizontal co-ordination can be 
improved by changes in accountability, performance assessment, rewards, conflict 
resolution and culture. In a similar way, the human resources systems literature suggests 
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links of cause-and-effect among organisational practices, how employees view their jobs, 
and operational performance. 
Teece and Pisano (1995) argue that one of the strategic dimensions of the firm is its 
managerial and organisational processes which they define as "the way things are done in 
the firm, or what might be referred to as its `routines', or patterns of current practice and 
learning". It has been argued that the lean production paradigm requires different 
management processes to support change in processes and practices on the shop floor. In 
other words to change what workers are doing on the shop floor, managers have to alter 
their own patterns of behaviour. Therefore, the infrastructural decision areas framework 
of the manufacturing strategy paradigm should at least be enlarged to consider what 
management actually does instead of focusing only on their systems and policy decisions. 
In fact, Rosenbloom and Abernathy (1982) already stressed the importance of 
understanding management behaviour. They used a two by two matrix, defined in terms 
of software and hardware in one axis and hardware and software on the other, to show the 
weaknesses and prescriptions of the western approach to manufacturing, on which they 
comment: 
In our judgement, the basket most in need of watching today is the 
cluster of management practices in quadrant IV... issues in the other 
quadrants are important, to be sure, but we believe that "micro 
software" - what management does - is essential to the renaissance of a 
beleaguered American industry 
A useful addition is to also understand what people on the shop floor do because this can 
shed light on the process of how intangible assets develop and what the parameters 
influencing such development are. Nanda (1994) considers this issue that has received 
little attention to date. 
In order to move forward, we need to formulate a view that includes behaviour at various 
levels of the organisation. This alternative view has been proposed by Garvin (1994) and 
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is reviewed together with Teece and Pisano's (1995) concept of dynamic capability 
which follows the same line as Garvin's (1994) work and provide an integrative strategic 
framework. 
2.17. A process view of capability creation 
Organisations have been traditionally regarded in terms of structure and systems. The 
strategy-structure-systems doctrine is about allocating resources, assigning 
responsibilities, and assuring their effective management through control (Ghoshal and 
Bartelett, 1995). Structure involves roles, positions, and levels. Systems are similar to 
process in the sense they are descriptions of a series of interconnected activities. The 
essential difference, however, is that systems have , according to 
Garvin (1994), a more 
"mechanistic, fixed quality than process... [systems are] less organic and more structured" 
than processes. 
Instead of simply enriching and extending the systems and structure framework, the 
process approach represents a real alternative. It has been argued (Weick, 1979; Garvin 
1994) that processes are the best unit of analysis to investigate the organisational 
evolution. Garvin (1994) writes: 
Some scholars have gone a step further, arguing that a processes 
perspective is more than a supplement to traditional theories of 
organisational structure and systems: it is actually the best way to 
understand and describe organisations. In their view, a process 
perspective best matches the dynamic, evolving quality of organisations 
and should be the dominant form of analysis... A process approach 
encourages thinking in story lines rather than events. 
Garvin's distinction between behavioural and managerial processes suggests a way 
forward in this research by proposing a dynamic middle ground beyond the static 
distinction between emergent and intentional advantages. Instead of assessing the 
contribution of static drivers we should juxtapose managerial processes and the processes 
at the bottom of the organisation. Although both should directly contribute to the process, 
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managerial processes are also geared towards shaping processes at the bottom of the 
organisation. 
... managers exert influence by using managerial processes. These 
processes help them shape the behaviour of others in the organisation, 
keeping them aligned and moving in the desired direction. They are the 
means to an end: well functioning organisational processes and superior 
organisational performance. (Garvin, 1994) 
This view is a multi-disciplinary one that integrates different streams of research. The 
novelty and usefulness of this approach is backed by Garvin's (1994) observation of the 
literature gap that exists in the integration of some of these different views. 
The process view works as a vehicle that integrates distinct views and phenomena such as 
organisational design and the management of process, learning and structural decision 
Beginning with Chandler (1962), a long stream of work has linked strategy and structure. 
It is closely associated with the contingency view of organisations and the importance of 
strategic fit. The connection between strategy and processes, however, has remained 
largely unexamined. Even within the strategic process school, few researchers have tried 
to associate variations in strategies with variations in organisational processes, and to 
draw implications for performance (Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986). 
2. M The strategic framework: dynamic capabilities 
The "dynamic capabilities" framework is the appropriate strategic framework to bring 
together the evidences and arguments that trace the advantage of firms down to their 
proprietary patterns of behaviour. It lays the conceptual foundations that give consistency 
to this study. The strategic dimensions of the firm are its organisational and managerial 
processes (which refer to the way things are done in the firm), position (difficult-to-trade 
knowledge assets, reputation, and relationships with both customers and suppliers), and 
paths available to the organisation (opportunities available that are restricted by current 
and previous positions). 
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We posit that the competitive advantage of firms stems from dynamic 
capabilities rooted in high performance routines operating inside the 
firm, embedded in the firm's processes, and conditioned by its history. 
(Teece and Pisano, 1994) 
The real strategic concern of the firm is "to decide upon and develop difficult-to-imitate 
processes and paths most likely to support valuable products and services" (Teece and 
Pisano, 1994). This perspective is clearly distinguished from other resource-based views 
that see advantage in the accumulation of invisible assets, such as technological expertise 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Notions of path of learning and "improvement trajectory" inform the importance of 
managing carefully the development of processes and skills, because rigidities can make 
it difficult or even prevent alterations to the firm's development path. According to Hayes 
and Pisano (1995), a firm might find it very difficult to put in practice a strategy aimed at 
achieving low cost production after it has spent a long time pursuing the proficiency in 
flexibility. 
Neo-classical economics assumptions of rational actor theory and immediate 
organisational response are apparently reinforced by the notion that processes can be 
mapped and redesigned. Business process reengineering seems to disregard the previous 
asset stock of the organisation. However, history does matter and the development of 
behavioural processes provides some insights into the mechanisms of path dependence. 
Ingrained organisational processes cannot be dissociated from the actual nature of firm 
competition. Patterns of behaviour are dependent on the nature of tasks that are 
performed by the organisation. A firm pursuing a flexibility strategy will have different 
patterns of action, at both workers and managers level, from others pursuing cost 
advantage. Communication channels, learning processes, problem-solving approaches, 
interaction across functional borders are shaped by the needs and contingencies the 
organisation has to face (Henderson and Clark, 1990). The redirection of this path of 
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development in a short period of time may not be feasible, as not it only takes time to 
develop the supportive organisational processes but also the mechanisms used by top 
management to accelerate this development are far from clear. Doz (1994) writes: 
To disentangle the integration competencies embedded in these channels, 
filters, rules and approaches is not what most firms succeed in doing. 
Quite to the contrary, most become prisoners of set patterns, and are not 
able to re-aggregate their competencies in a different pattern from that 
in which they emerged. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) and Teece (1982) have argued that many organisational 
routines are tacit in nature. Likewise, Lippmann and Rumelt (1982) argue that sources of 
competitive advantage may be so complex that even the firm may not understand them. 
Reasons for success may not be understood, and their continued validity 
not well assessed. Reasons for success may be missed, or successful 
approach may not be replicable. Uncertain imitability prevails, even 
within the firm. (Doz, 1994) 
Even if the incumbent firm could map its competitor's work processes and implement 
them, equivalent performance would not be assured because the firm would need to 
develop the necessary behavioural processes that are path dependent. Hayes et al. (1988) 
provide the empirical evidence. They report that similar workflows showed varying 
performance in product development because of distinctive personal interaction. 
The dynamic capability perspective goes beyond simply arguing that advantage lies in 
tacit organisational routines. It argues that there is a necessary coherence between the 
various processes in the organisation10 and one level cannot be altered without altering 
the other. Teece and Pisano (1995) argue that it has been demonstrated by the lean 
10 Organisational processes are distinguished from the notions of culture, that is a de facto governance 
method that can substitute other more formal systems, and organisational routines, which they consider to 
be "a little too amorphous to properly capture the congruence amongst processes and between processes 
and incentives that we have in mind". 
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manufacturing paradigm that distinctive practices and processes on the shop floor require 
distinctive higher order managerial processes. They argue that the style of organisations 
may carry the necessary elements to achieve performance. They write: 
Recognising the congruencies and complementarities among processes, 
and between processes and incentives, is critical to the understanding of 
organisational capabilities. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the dynamic capabilities framework offers the 
appropriate conceptual ground for our investigation of the process of capability building. 
It provides the tools and basic concepts to argue on the primary locus of advantage, its 
evolution, and sustainability. 
2.19. Research question and scope 
The objective of this research is to understand the process through which firms 
strategically develop their operational performance. By "strategically", we mean that 
performance improvement should be so significant that it may be a potential source of 
differentiation and competitive advantage for the organisation. The dynamic process that 
results in the improvement of performance should be explained in terms of initial 
conditions and managerial choice (Porter, 1991). The research question focuses on this 
dichotomy. We adapt the question proposed by Schendel (1996) and define the research 
question as: 
Are initial conditions or managerial choices more important in explaining the 
longitudinal problem? 
The question captures the tension between intentionality of managerial actions and 
unintentional outcomes generated by history and random choices. We may also need to 
investigate if other members at the bottom of the organisation can contribute in an 
independent fashion to change the initial conditions. The first step, however, is to define 
what the initial conditions of the organisation are. 
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Change induced by management can follow a path of continuous improvement or 
discontinuous leaps, or a combination of the two. Continuous improvement suggests that 
we will need to investigate the relationship between senior management and lower 
hierarchical levels. Discontinuous leaps of performance suggest the application of best 
practices such as business process reengineering. 
Empirically the issue is to initially use grounded research in our first site in order to 
determine the variables that mediate between the initial characteristics of the organisation 
and its strategic intent. We then test exploratory hypotheses based on the grounded model 
which are aimed at clarifying the nature of the various variables and their mutual 
relationships. The final goal of the research is to produce a model that can explain in 
longitudinal terms how operational performance improves. 
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The remaining chapters of this thesis are organised as follows: 
A) In chapter three we follow the tradition of the grounded research theory and use data 
from our first field work to define the model and its elements. We draw on the relevant 
literature to refine the constructs. Exploratory hypotheses are proposed in order to 
explore the issues that were found relevant during the initial stages of the research. 
B) Chapters four and five define respectively the macro and micro research designs. 
C) Chapter six describes the findings from the four case studies, one for each company 
sampled. 
D) Chapter seven discusses field research observation in terms of cross case analysis and 
addresses the literature gaps (2.16. ). It is an opportunity to link field observations with 
the literature. 
78 
E) Finally, the last chapter is dedicated to the consolidation of the proposed model. We 
discuss the model by testing the research hypotheses and discussing their implications. 
We then conclude by listing the issues that contain contributions from this thesis to 
established theory. 
r, (V-v (10- (IS- 
(ýý- 
-4t tý4 
lý 
f 2e ý2j- 
79 
Chapter 3- Grounded Research 
This chapter complements the literature review. In the tradition of 
grounded research we mix preliminary field observations of one 
research site and the literature from the previous chapter in order 
to propose a model that describes the process of operational 
performance improvement. Each element of the model is 
discussed individually. We also add a general literature review of 
process control and redesign. The reason why this literature was 
not included in the first chapter is because its importance 
became evident only when the grounded model took shape. 
Finally, we formulate the exploratory hypotheses that will guide 
the development of the next chapters. 
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3.1. Searching for a model 
This research cannot follow a research line that already exists in the literature. The RBV 
discusses the fundamentals of competition. It lacks constructs grounded on organisational 
reality. In contrast, the MSM model refers directly to the management of the firm's 
productive resources but is permeated by assumptions that are incompatible with the 
RBV. crksv 
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Although many of the assumptions of the MSM are irreconcilable not only with the RBV 
principles but also with the reality of organisations, it still represents a sound theory. We 
cannot afford to abandon it altogether if our objective is to explain the evolution of the 
firm's operational performance. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the MSM should 
be deconstructed and its parts evaluated and reassembled within the principles laid down 
by the RBV. 
The MSM, the classical school of strategy, and the Tayloristic paradigm have a common 
element. They are divorced from the complexities and ambiguities involved in managing 
human organisations which operate in uncertain environments Our option for a process 
view of the organisation is an attempt to break with these oversimplifications. Jaikumar 
and Bohn (1992) isolate the central characteristics of the Tayloristic paradigm which are 
misleading. We should be careful to avoid any of the following assumptions: 
a) Production technology is known: The design of the production methods defines the 
optimal way of production and consists of selecting from known production 
techniques. The necessary knowledge is transferred from manuals or instructors to 
line employees. 
b) Labour's role is solely to perform procedures: Management specifies and control the 
execution of procedures that employees should follow in which all contingencies are 
anticipated and the appropriate response specified. 
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c) Environment is known and static: In cases where the environment is not static, 
probability distribution that describes it is known. 
d) Homogeneous inputs: Inputs are assumed to be available in perfect markets and to be 
homogeneous. 
e) The goal is known: The goal is profit maximisation, or occasionally a sub goal such 
as maximising output, and all actors in the organisation are pursuing this goal. 
3.2. Defining the model's elements 
In an ideal world there are no constraints on what managers can do. The previous history 
of the organisation and the contingencies it creates are of no importance. The evolution of 
performance is not significantly dependent on time, as the strategic problem is about 
putting together the necessary resources that can be readily acquired from perfect 
markets. If things do not go quite as planned then those in charge of acting, not thinking, 
are to blame. 
Our research question reflects Porter's (1991) consideration that the outcome of the 
strategic process is determined by the interaction between initial conditions and 
managerial actions. The use of the word `action' by Porter seems to suggest managerial 
decisions and thus the exercise of rationality. By reducing to managerial actions the 
elements that will modify the initial conditions, Porter is excluding the majority of the 
members of the organisation. According to this formulation they have no input in the 
strategic process. 
We consider that it is the behaviour of the members of the organisation which will help 
overcome the resistance offered by the initial conditions. We divide the organisation into 
management and other members because the nature of their behaviour is different. 
Nonetheless the behaviour of the lower levels of the organisation is a central factor in 
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explaining the outcome of the strategic process. We can now lay out broad definitions of 
the three categories that comprise the model: 
The initial conditions of the organisation. Any dimension that can be used to describe the 
organisation is a possible category of initial conditions. Organisations are commonly 
described in terms of their organisational structure and systems. They constitute the most 
obvious categories of initial conditions. Structure refers to the positions and roles 
occupied by the members of the organisation". System refers to the systems of reward, 
control, and information. 
The alternative process view of the organisation suggests other dimensions. The 
processes can be divided into business and interpersonal processes. The business 
processes are the tangible production processes of the organisation. They carry inertia 
because they determine the tasks and the sequence in which these tasks are executed. 
Managers and line employees' interpersonal processes are called respectively managerial 
and organisational processes. So, whereas these processes are the elements of 
transformation they also carry an inherent inertia. 
Business 
Processes Managerial 
Processes in 
processes 
the 
organisation Behavioural Organisational 
Processes processes 
Figure 3.1 - The processes in the organisation 
At managerial level, processes should reflect organisational barriers to change such as: 
work group inertia, threats to existing balance of power, and previously unsuccessful 
change efforts (Greenberg and Baron, 1995). At the production level, processes should 
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reflect the behaviour of line employees which influences the effectiveness of the 
production processes. 
Jaikumar and Bohn (1992) quoted above, highlight the fact that production technology 
cannot be assumed as given and available. The organisation has to develop a body of 
"knowledge " of its production processes that is only possible through practice. Although 
these authors do not make the link between the development of production knowledge 
and the development of specific attributes of performance, such as quality or flexibility, it 
is appropriate for us to consider knowledge as one dimension of organisational inertia. 
The assumption we make is that it may be necessary to improve the organisations 
understanding about cause-and-effect relationships in its production processes to achieve 
high levels of operational performance. 
What managers do - Managerial processes. The MSM sees a principal role for managers 
as the definition of gap closing objectives. During the formulation process managers 
define the operational gaps that should be prioritised and the action plans. Can we then 
consider that, once the formulation phase is concluded, what management actually does 
has no effect on the outcome of the strategic process? The answer is definitely no. 
What managers do is unimportant only if we assume unbounded rationality. By doing so 
we are detaching thinking from acting. Once thinking is finished, other members in the 
organisation are assigned to implement the content of strategy. Deming (1982) has 
already made a strong argument against the assumption that managers are perfectly 
rational actors who have all the necessary information and the capability to process it. He 
states that 85 percent or more of the problems in a typical factory are management- 
dependent and not worker-dependent. Garvin (1994) suggests dividing what managers do 
into three broad categories: taking decisions, building support to implement the decisions, 
11 Greenberg and Baron (1995) write: "To the extent that employees are carefully selected and trained to 
perform certain jobs, and rewarded for doing them well, the forces acting on individuals to perform in 
certain ways are very powerfully determined - that is, jobs have structural inertia". 
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and monitoring performance. These three categories will guide our efforts to define 
specific categories of managerial processes. 
What workers do - Organisational processes. Literature which originated from Japanese 
production methods, such as TQM and lean production has moved away from the 
Tayloristic idea that only managers are supposed to think. Now, employees are motivated 
to voice their ideas and to organise themselves into QCCs to tackle production problems. 
The notion that the organisation should evolve gradually, instead of having performance 
leaps, has become generally accepted. 
Continuous improvement means that workers have a major role to play. Hayes and 
Wheelwright (1984) advise firms to commit to continuous improvement. Stage four can 
be achieved only through the accumulation of manufacturing knowledge in small 
changes. The effectiveness of this policy would depend on the firm's "internal 
capabilities" which refer to the quality of management. This emphasis on continuous 
improvement sounds contradictory with the MSM, where management takes a number of 
decisions, in several areas, in order to implement a specific strategy. We can conclude 
that Hayes and Wheelwright saw the MSM as an effective means of moving from stage 
one to stage three, which means that by following the MSM the company would not be 
able to achieve stage four. 
But can we consider the role of workers to be strategic? According to the current view the 
role of workers is important but is not strategic. To be strategic means to be able to 
become differentiated from competitors. Continuous improvement means the 
involvement of line workers with the identification and solution of problems that affect 
the outcome of production processes. It is heavily dependent on the methods of process 
control adopted by the organisation. 
We consider that what workers do can create differentiation. But our perspective goes 
much beyond activities of process control. Strategic importance is located in the 
interpersonal processes that occur at the bottom of the organisation. These are called 
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organisational processes. These processes influence the effectiveness of the business 
processes. 
3.3. Grounded research at CIGNA 
Grounded research at CIGNA is necessary because of the novelty of the approach chosen 
here. From the literature, we have broadly defined what are the main elements of our 
model. Grounded research is necessary for three main reasons: (a) to check the relevance 
of the constructs to a real setting, (b) to certify whether or not we have included all 
relevant elements in our model, and (c) to define and operationalise the constructs. 
CIGNA Health Care UK is part of CIGNA Corporation, a multi-billion pound company. 
CIGNA health care operates in the segment of private health insurance. We chose 
CIGNA because there was available literature from which we could form a picture of the 
turnaround process before visiting the site. In addition, it was a relatively small and self- 
contained site (approximately 250 employees) which made it easier for those involved to 
articulate their experiences. 
After reviewing the literature we were aware of most of th lemen in the model but had 
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not a clear idea of how they fitted together and their exact meaning and categories. 
Managers and workers were asked to describe the turnaround process. Through the 
interview we could further explore any point brought up by the interviewee which was of 
any particular interest to us. 
To determine the sub-dimensions of each categories of organisational behaviour we 
selected these from the literature and then asked workers whether these sub-dimensions 
had any relevance in their routine work. The same was also true of managerial behaviour. 
Through the interviews, we were able to define its main dimensions and refine their 
meaning. Nevertheless, the process of refinement went on long after the grounded 
research. For instance, initially we though that leadership would be best understood under 
the managerial process which we called "management style". Later we found that it 
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belonged under another management process called "behaviour alignment". The 
grounded research is further described under heading 5.3. 
A very important consequence of the grounded research was the inclusion of another 
element of transformation. We found that the management of the firm's business process 
could not be considered as a part of either managerial or organisational processes. It 
represented a category on its own. There are two kinds of interference with business 
processes: process control and process redesign. In CIGNA, process redesign was very 
significant and played an important part in the transformation of the organisation. 
Because it has not been covered by the literature review, we add to this chapter the 
discussion of the important issues that relate to process control and process redesign. 
Under the next headings we discuss the three categories and define the constructs that we 
will be using to conduct the field studies. 
3.4. Initial conditions 
3.4.1. The literature perspective of the importance of initial conditions 
How corrigible are organisations (Barnett and Burgleman)? The evolutionary argument 
posits that current and future states of the organisation can be traced back to its 
foundations. On the other hand, neo-classical principles built in the design school and the 
MSM, see the menu of alternatives available to managers as unlimited. A middle ground 
view is one that recognises the role of initial conditions, but sees adaptive forces acting to 
change them. 
Barnett and Burgelman (1996) contend that although initial conditions continue to have 
consequences for the evolution of the organisation, organisations also learn and act to 
change those initial conditions that are hindering their evolution. They say that one useful 
contribution of the evolutionary perspective is to identify constraints on managerial 
action. These constraints can come from outside organisations, as it is the case with 
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industry structure, laws, or consumer preferences. But they can also arise inside the 
organisation being a result of its history. They conclude: 
Those who take an evolutionary perspective on strategy explicitly 
question how strategic outcomes develop, and in doing so treat 
assumptions of historical efficiency as part of the research agenda. 
Although the debate between historical efficiency and adaptive evolution has been going 
on for sometime, there is a shortage of longitudinal empirical works that can assess the 
effects of both perspectives. Doz's (1996) work is the only one to date that has explicitly 
addressed the role of initial conditions in the evolution of the organisation's abilities. He 
focuses on cases of strategic alliances and sets out to identify the dimensions of initial 
conditions which hinder or foster the outcomes of such alliances. He considers that the 
study of the evolution of co-operation in strategic alliances contributes to clarifying wider 
issues of teleological strategy implementation vs. evolutionary strategic adaptation. This 
could possibly lead to a reconciliation of both views replacing the current somewhat 
simplistic debate. He expected and found strong inertial and adaptive forces in action in 
the evolution of strategic alliances. 
An important contribution of Doz's (ibid. ) work, as noted by Barnett and Burgelman 
(1996), is to highlight the role of managers who should recognise inertial forces, and 
explicitly act upon instead of simply ignoring them. They found that the process was 
neither teleological nor emergent. Initial conditions influenced the process by being either 
of a static type and blocking learning and adaptation, or of a generative type and fostering 
learning and adaptation. In this way, alliances were not completely determined by the 
implementation of initial designs towards set objectives, because their evolution was not 
free from the effects of initial conditions. 
Porter (1991) sees the strategic process as a dialectic process between managerial choices 
and initial conditions. Nevertheless, no piece of literature approaches directly the issue of 
identifying what are the initial conditions that hamper the process of evolution of 
operational performance. The initial conditions are considered here as the organisational 
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characteristics possessed by the organisation at the moment prior to the start of the 
strategic process. But what are these characteristics? Below we ground different works in 
the literature supporting our field observations to propose the relevant dimensions that 
represent the initial conditions. 
3.4.2. The categories of initial conditions 
We entered the field with a good idea of what were the dimensions of the initial 
conditions. As explained herein, we considered the relevant initial conditions categories 
to be the basic dimensions of the organisation (structure, systems and processes) and of 
production knowledge. 
During the grounded research we found that the division between those initial conditions 
that directly affect operational output and those that affect it indirectly would help focus 
the research. We suggest that initial conditions should be considered in terms of first and 
second order. Business processes, knowledge of the production processes, and 
behavioural processes are first order factors because leaner business processes, higher 
knowledge, and more intense organisational processes are directly related to higher 
operational performance. When the state of these variables is altered, it has an immediate 
consequence on operational performance. By developing these elements, the organisation 
will be able to improve performance along one or more performance attributes such as 
cost efficiency, quality, and flexibility. 
3.4.3. First order initial conditions 
Performance improvement demands the evolution of inefficient business processes. 
Reengineering is based on the idea that sometimes business processes are too inefficient 
because they have grown without planning and should be scrapped altogether. In an ideal 
reengineering case, the business processes of the organisation are mapped, designed from 
scratch, and implemented as planned. If such a mechanist view of the organisation 
corresponded to reality there would be no point in considering business processes as a 
relevant initial condition. 
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Although the change processes in CIGNA were defined in the popular press as a case of 
business processes reengineering, we found that although the business processes were 
radically changed they were not re-designed. CIGNA substituted large functions for 
production in teams. Instead of designing the business processes, managers allowed them 
to emerge in the pilot teams. The literature has shown that the application of 
reengineering is far more limited than once believed (Maull et al., 1995). 
Knowledge of the production process is also an important initial condition. Bohn (1994) 
linked the evolution of process knowledge with the evolution of performance. The 
accumulation of production knowledge is dependent on the process control method 
adopted by the firm. The six-sigma paradigm is unable to develop knowledge of what 
accounts for the production processes as a whole. An alternative process control that 
collects information from several points of the process, can contribute to the evolution of 
process knowledge (Mukherjee, 1992). We did not find this to be relevant to CIGNA. But 
we have retained this dimension in the expectation that it may be relevant in other cases. 
Shop floor behaviour is an important inertial factor. The literature often refers to the 
concept of organisational culture to explain the behaviour of workers. Greenber and 
Baron (1995) note that the view expressed by Peter and Waterman, in In Search of 
Excellence, was that the most effective companies were characterised by cultural 
characteristics such as employee involvement and predisposition towards action. But 
culture is a cognitive framework 12. We should be more specific. 
What impacts the performance of business processes is not the cognitive framework 
shared by workers but what they routinely do. The importance of workers' behaviour 
cannot be underestimated. Organisational processes are arguably the most important 
factor in explaining differences in operational performance between companies and 
explaining why similar business processes can deliver different performances (Clark and 
12 Greenber and Baron (1995) define organisational culture as "a cognitive framework consisting of 
attitudes, values, behavioural norms, and expectations shared by organisational members". 
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Fujimoto, 1991). A central challenge to this research is the identification of categories of 
organisational behaviour and its sub-dimensions. We observed in CIGNA that behaviour 
had changed. We identified a number of behaviour patterns (such as, "Do people help 
you when you need? " ) and asked people whether or not they perceived this particular 
behaviour to have changed. 
3.4.4. Second order initial conditions 
Second order factors are those which have a transformational effect on first order factors 
and thus indirectly affect operational performance. Unlike first order factors, the 
alteration of these variables will not have an immediate effect on the dependent variables 
of performance. Second order factors clearly have the effect of transforming first order 
factors, but cause-and-effect relationships between change in second order factors and 
operational performance, cannot be easily determined. 
Since Chandler (1962), the internal focus of strategy is to change structure. Revisionist 
writers, such as Mintzberg (1990), challenged Chandler's notion that "structure follows 
strategy" and preferred to see structure and strategy evolving slowly and supporting each 
other. Thus, independent of their view of the strategic process, authors see structure as an 
essential initial condition that has to evolve. CIGNA promoted a complete review of its 
organisational structure. It changed from a "tall" structure organised in functions, to a 
"flat" one organised in a matrix form. There was resistance of several kinds. For instance, 
senior managers who were responsible for large departments saw that they would loose 
political power in the process. Both senior and middle managers had problems in 
adapting to their new roles. 
The importance of management systems is generally underestimated. The MSM, for 
instance, only reluctantly acknowledges that the firm has to adapt its management 
systems to its strategy. Managerial processes are closely linked with managerial systems. 
For instance, when managers change the way they control the performance of the 
organisation, it is likely that new information systems will be necessary. That is what 
happened in CIGNA. 
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inks the failure of operational improvement strategies to the inertia of 
erial systems. He argues that operations improvement programmes fail 
do not recognise that these change programmes will require shifts in 
management practices and in the companies' structure and systems. He writes: 
Upon recognizing these inconsistencies, managers are struck with how 
unwittingly they have obstructed their own efforts. This is 
understandable: not only are ineffective management practices deeply 
ingrained, but also senior management typically does not get a great deal 
of candid feedback. 
From the beginning, CIGNA recognised the importance of using reward systems. It 
rewarded teamwork to encourage the consolidation of the teams. The MD of Bonas 
Machine13 a successful turnaround story, reported that he wished he could have 
appreciated the importance of changing people's minds from the start and implemented 
the adequate HR systems. He says: 
A lot stems from that. It was the stimulus to set up our HR function and 
has directed many of the improvements since 1992. It sound simple but 
changing people's mindsets did in fact require a considerable amount of 
hard work and took 18 months of effort before we could see positive 
results being achieved. 
Managers that do not see the need to alter their managerial systems are even less likely to 
consider a change in their own behaviour. Management behaviour is likely to be a major 
impediment to the processes of operational performance. Managerial processes are both 
an initial condition and a modifying agent. 
13 The quotation comes from a case study on Bonas Machines performed in connection with the Best 
Factory Award and obtained from their web site. www. bestfactories. co. uk 
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The grounded research confirmed the relevance of the initial conditions categories that 
we had identified before entering the field. We have also added a new category. Market 
position represents a rigidity to the process of change. The markets explored by the firm 
can create .º number of investment commitments and relationships that will make it 
difficult for the firm to achieve the necessary change. CIGNA decided to drop out of 
some markets. to concentrate on only a few products in which it saw better potential. The 
figure below illustrates the longitudinal process of strategy. In the next sections we 
address the drivers that transform the initial conditions into the final state. The table 
below sums up the categories of initial conditions that we have identified. Thus we have 
already the main elements of our model, that is presented in figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 - The strategic process 
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First Order Initial Conditions 
Technological knowledge 
Articulation of cause and effect relationships in the 
production process 
Organisational Processes Descriptors of shop floor behaviour 
Business processes 
The procedures followed in order to perform an 
operational task 
Second Order Initial Conditions 
Managerial Processes Descriptors of* managerial behaviour 
Management systems Systems of incentive and control 
Structure Positions and roles in the organisation 
Market position Market segment targeted by the organisation 
Table 3.1 - First and second order initial conditions 
3.5. Organisational processes 
The lean production paradigm makes a compelling case for the pivotal role of line 
managers and employees in doing most of the thinking that leads to continual 
improvement. In spite of this, little research has been directed at exploring the role of 
these actors (Winterscheid. 1994). We propose that a useful way of understanding the 
role of the bottom levels of the organisation, is to understand the patterns of behaviour 
that can he linked to superior operational performance. 
The Toyota Production System (Woomack, Jones, and Roos, 1990) allowed Japanese 
companies to change the nature of competition by altering accepted trade-offs and 
pushing the efficiency/quality frontier forward. Among the widely acknowledged good 
effects of going lean are the uncovering of had practices and problems, and boosting 
productivity through the elimination of the capital costs of inventories. We observed a 
hidden but immensely beneficial effect of stockless production which is that it promotes 
positive patterns of behaviour. Machine operators separated by WIP buffers are almost 
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completely cut off. The removal of buffers increases physical proximity and makes their 
tasks more inter-dependent. This facilitates great deal of communication and interaction 
among operatives. Superior behaviour makes up for the buffers and seems to constitute 
the basis of good performance. 
From this point of view, the role of workers is more than filling suggestion boxes or 
participating in QCCs. Although the search for small improvements remains a central 
element for the learning organisation, we need to broaden our view of the contribution of 
the bottom of the organisation to the improvement of performance. The question to be V 
answered is: how can a work force make a difference in the evolution of operational 
performance beyond solving local problems? 
Suppose we have two groups of workers who have the same level of skills but have 
worked in different cultures, contexts, and management systems. It is reasonable to 
assume that although they have the same level of skills (like operating a machine) they 
will present different collective behaviour. It is in this distinction that we should look for 
clues about what is strategic in terms of the contribution of the workforce. 
Garvin (1994) considers that behavioural processes are deeply embedded in the 
organisation, and the underlying behaviour patterns are exhibited by most members of the 
organisation, and survive staff turnover and change in leadership. Garvin quotes a study 
by Wheelwright and Clark (1992, pg. 184) to support the importance of underlying 
patterns of behaviour for operational effectiveness. This study compared product 
development processes with similar workflows which had differences in performance. It 
concluded that differences in performance could be traced to specific rich and frequent 
communications between the groups involved. In addition, these groups differed in their 
sense of "shared responsibility" and "mutual commitment to one another's success". The 
difference, the authors suggest, can be traced to certain cognitive frames that result in 
differentiated behaviour. 
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Behavioural processes are `intangible assets'. They cannot be mapped as business 
processes. Garvin (1994) considers that they can be divided into three categories: 
decision making, interpersonal, and organisational learning. Decision making is omitted 
because it is essentially a managerial attribution and we are only dealing with shop floor 
behaviour. 
Learning and interpersonal processes (the latter understood by Garvin in terms of nature, 
quality, and direction of communication flows and the quality of interrelationship 
between group members) provided the initial basis for our investigation of the nature of 
organisational processes. After interviewing a number of staff and management in 
CIGNA, it could be observed that these categories were consistent and very salient. 
The quality of interpersonal relationships and communications were clear manifestations 
of superior co-ordination behaviour. This was supported by management practices such 
as the open door policy and the daily meetings of the team leaders with the manager in 
charge of operations. This was also an opportunity to form a collective strategy to deal 
with contingencies. The quality of the relationship and information flow within the teams 
was of the highest and team members were satisfied with their teams. Continuous 
improvement was everyone's responsibility. Personal development was considered as 
part of continuous improvement activities, and the reward system was designed to foster 
the development of new abilities and training. 
Beyond interpersonal relations and learning, we observed a third category of behaviour 
that was consistently reported to be very significant. This was staff entrepreneurship. As 
a manager said: 
Our staff is miles ahead. That is the key to it... Recently I was over in 
another office of ours in Europe, it was a very small company but they 
had a big problem because the appetite for doing it is not really there. 
Thus behavioural processes are important in three areas: (a) how well the organisation 
co-ordinates their members' efforts to perform tasks (quality of interpersonal 
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relationships), (b) how effective the organisation is in learning, and (c) how strongly the 
organisation pursues (a) and (b) and overcomes implementation hurdles. These categories 
of behaviour correspond respectively to interpersonal processes - understood as co- 
ordination behaviour, learning, and entrepreneurship. We argue that each of these 
behaviour dimensions can be linked to superior operational performance. We use case 
data and various works in the literature, which consider each of the processes 
individually, to define and determine the attributes that should be used to measure it. 
3.5.1. Co-ordination 
The interpersonal processes as defined by Garvin (1994), relate to the communication 
and interrelationships among workers. We associate these patterns of behaviour with 
what Gittel (1995) calls co-ordination. It can be argued that cross-functional co- 
ordination is critical to superior operational outcomes (Gittel, 1995). Hierarchical 
organisations divide the work into functions to facilitate control. However, tasks that 
involve high interdependence of the various functions and require quick co-ordination of 
the workflow, make it difficult to be managed as independent sub tasks. Due to this fact, 
superior cross-functional co-ordination is associated in the literature with superior 
performance in tasks that involve complexity and speed. 
In hierarchical organisations complexity and speed pressures are handled through the use 
of buffers and other forms of organisational slack (Galbraith, 1973). Gittel (1996) studied 
the flight departure process in commercial aviation that "requires a high degree of 
synchronisation under time constraints for its successful completion". She demonstrates 
that while other airlines dealt with late arrival and lost baggage by increasing staffing 
and/or scheduling longer turnaround time at the gate, Southwest challenged the 
competition on the grounds of a superior ability to co-ordinate cross-functionally. The 
superior co-ordination processes enabled Southwest to have the fastest turnaround times - 
15 minutes against an industry average of 35 - as well as the highest reliability. 
Something similar happened in CIGNA. In the beginning, the company operated as 
isolated departments where operators performed only one step of the production process. 
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WIP buffers separated production stages and the average turnaround time was more than 
three times longer than it is now. When a contingency arose, it was very difficult to 
persuade people in different functions to co-ordinate their efforts in order to handle the 
situation. Also, the development of any sort of interpersonal process was made virtually 
impossible by physical separation. 
The creation of teams brought a radical change. People are now individually responsible 
for all tasks, and can ask for immediate help from anybody in their team who works in 
close proximity to them. There are no longer WIP buffers. Team members are strongly 
bonded together and demonstrate high teamwork ability. The communication among the 
teams is highly developed and team leaders are in constant communication through 
formal or informal meetings. Teams commonly volunteer to take on extra workload when 
other teams are having problems with excess work. Gittel associates superior co- 
ordination with superior operational performance in the Southwest case. Likewise it can 
be argued that extraordinary results in CIGNA are linked to its superior ability to co- 
ordinate the efforts of organisational members. 
3.5.2. Attributes of co-ordination behaviour 
Gittel (1996) identifies several dimensions which characterise differences observed in 
cross-functional co-ordination among the main American carriers. She broke down these 
differences into a set of co-ordination behaviour categories deducted from grounded 
research. They are: interdependency, timeliness, and frequency of communication, 
problem solving versus blaming, and helping out. They are largely coherent with 
Garvin's theoretical idea of interpersonal processes. He says: 
... a company's 
interpersonal processes may be based on open sharing or 
hoarding of information, one-way or multidirectional flows of 
information, open discussion or suppression of conflicts, attention to or 
neglect of group dynamics and relationship building, pressures for 
conformity or encouragement of different points of view, an atmosphere 
of fractiousness and contentiousness or politeness and mutual 
supportiveness and fact based opinion and rank-based discussions. 
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We identify and measure co-ordination behaviour based on the dimensions proposed by 
Gittel. Interdependence, timely and frequent communication are prerequisites for 
effective teamwork. The quality of the flow of information can be understood in terms of 
how dependable the information flow is, and how open people are towards information 
sharing. Information can either be hidden to avoid blame, or shared, characterising a 
behavioural trend towards problem solving. Finally, the quality of personal relationships 
is measured in terms of the readiness of employees to help their peers out and by going 
beyond their job definitions to help colleagues carry out their work. The initial attributes 
of co-ordination are: 
" Interdependence 
" Timeliness of communication 
" Frequency of communication 
" Problem solving versus blaming 
" Helping out 
3.5.3. Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship is still an ambiguous term in business literature which leaves a margin 
for different interpretation. It would nevertheless be reasonable to argue that it does not 
refer to one single phenomenon, but instead, to several categories. According to Stopford 
and Baden-Fuller (1994) the literature recognises at least three categories: (a) the creation 
of new businesses within an already existing organisation, (b) the renewal of ageing 
organisations, and (c) a view close to Schumpeter (1934) which sees entrepreneurs as 
introducing novelty, changing the rules of the industry, and appropriating abnormal rents 
until the advantage is replicated. Our view is based on the entrepreneur behaviour of line 
managers and employees who demonstrate spontaneous behaviour towards transforming 
the production function. 
Doz (1994) argues that individuals and small groups are the starting point for collective 
competencies. Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) have shown that organisations differ in 
their entrepreneur behaviour at managerial level. Similarly, we propose that organisations 
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can also be expected to differ in their entrepreneurial behaviour at the bottom level, and 
that this is relevant to strategic outcomes. Individuals who proactively pursue 
organisational learning and co-ordination and overcome barriers to the implementation of 
changes, give the organisation an innate ability to continuously renew its processes. 
Managers in CIGNA attribute their edge to the unmatched enthusiasm of their workforce. 
This was consistently evident in interviews with both staff and management. Based on 
available literature and site observations the main categories of entrepreneur behaviour 
are specified next. 
3.5.4. Attributes of entrepreneurship behaviour 
Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) suggest at least two sets of attributes that are common 
to all types of entrepreneurship and were found by us to be relevant during grounded 
research. The first is team-orientation. We interpret this as an individual's spontaneous 
creation of interpersonal links with other peers within and beyond traditional functional 
boundaries. The bonds that united people within the teams were very strong. They had 
been working together for several years and each team had its own name and had 
developed an individual identity. 
The capability to resolve dilemmas is another dimension of entrepreneur behaviour. 
Every day operations, specifically those activities that involve time constraints, face 
challenges of conciliating conflicting objectives and interests. The willingness to tackle 
these dilemmas, instead of "passing the bucket", and to show creativity in finding 
solutions are clear manifestations of entrepreneurship. Again, this behaviour was clearly 
observed in CIGNA where one person is made responsible for all issues involving a 
group of customers and has to deal with all contingencies. The intervention of the team 
leader or the manager in charge is rarely necessary. 
Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) complement the categories above with two other 
dimensions that emerged from their research. The first dimension is proactiveness which 
can be associated with the willingness to break with past behaviours. This proactiveness 
could be observed in CIGNA where there was an enthusiasm for continuously embracing 
100 
change. This became evident when the firm moved from functional structure to process 
complete cells. Line workers had to "unlearn" most of their old practices and behaviours 
and learn new ones. They embraced the change with total commitment. They also 
actively participated in re-engineering projects that continued to introduce change after 
the teams were already stable. 
The second dimension is aspirations beyond current state. This refers to the aspiration of 
those that participate in the process to find a better combination of resources in their 
pursuit of a goal of continuous improvement beyond what is perceived as adequate. 
Although production function performance was producing superior results in comparison 
to benchmark competitors, and managers were not exerting pressure, workers kept up the 
will to improve. According to managers, teams were disputing about who should get new 
accounts and they kept setting slightly more ambitious goals each time. Staff were also 
visibly concerned about pursuing personal development and were engaged in varied 
kinds of training and courses. Thus an initial list of entrepreneurship attributes includes: 
" Team orientation 
" Ability to solve dilemmas 
" Willingness to break from past behaviours 
" Aspirations beyond current state 
3.5.5. Learning 
Kim (1993) reminds us that the dictionary definition of learning is "the acquiring of 
knowledge and skill". Duncan and Weiss (1979) proposed that the effectiveness of the 
organisation was dependent on its members' ability to continuously determine and carry 
out actions that would achieve desired outcomes. Choices of actions, therefore, were 
based on prior knowledge of action and outcome. Organisational learning was defined by 
these authors as: 
The process within the organisation by which knowledge about action- 
outcome relationships and the effect of the environment on these 
relationships is developed ... in organisational learning we are concerned 
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with the development of the knowledge which would make such change 
possible or indeed necessary. 
Initial conceptualisations of organisational learning referred to an adaptive process 
through which organisations interact with the environment, map cause-effect 
relationships, and then use this knowledge to inform their actions and influence the 
environment. Senge (1990), however, argues that models that emphasise increasing 
adaptability are portraying only the first stage of the process that leads towards this 
learning organisation. He argues that leading organisations focus not only on "adaptive 
learning, that is about coping, but also on generative learning, which is about creating". 
Argyris and Schon's (1978) concept of single-loop and double loop captures the division 
between tacit and articulated learning. Single loop learning occurs whenever an 
organisation implements the solution of a problem into a stable routine. By learning from 
previous experiences, organisations develop a repertoire of standard operating 
procedures, informal and formal control systems. Double loop learning refers to the 
second half of Deming's (1982) cycle: check and act. It is about understanding the cause- 
effect relationships that condition current behaviour. It involves challenging assumptions 
and procedures deeply embedded in the organisation. 
Similarly, Kim (1993) makes a basic distinction between the two types of learning 
efforts: operational learning and conceptual learning. Operational learning refers to "the 
acquisition of skill or know-how, which implies the physical ability to produce some 
action". Conceptual learning is "the acquisition of know-why, which implies the ability to 
articulate a conceptual understanding of an experience". 
At this point, our discussion of organisational knowledge should be narrowed to consider 
only the part of organisational knowledge that concerns the production processes of the 
firm. Bohn (1994) defines technological knowledge as the "knowledge about how to 
produce goods and services". He argues that technological knowledge is directly linked to 
superior operational outcomes. 
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Chaparral steel, a mini mill, was able to double output from its original 
electric furnace and caster. Semiconductor companies routinely increase 
yields on their chip fabrication lines below 40 percent to above 80 
percent during a period of several years. In these cases incremental 
capital investments are minimal. The improvements are instead due to 
multiple changes in the manufacturing process, including different 
procedures, adjustment of controls, changes in raw material recipes, etc. 
Why weren't these changes implemented at the start-up? The reason is 
that the knowledge about the process and how to run it is incomplete and 
develops through various kinds of learning. 
Bohn (1994) goes beyond the dual distinction between tacit and articulated organisational 
knowledge. He proposes an eight-stage scale of technological knowledge that reflects the 
ability of the organisation to articulate the variables of the production process, and how 
their manipulation can produce effects in the production's outcome. 
But how do organisations learn? Many authors observe that they depend on their 
members for learning. Theories of organisational learning (Kim, 1993; March and Olsen, 
1976; Senge, 1990), and assumptions about the development of distinctive competencies 
(Doz, 1994) are based on the development of learning at the individual level. At this 
point it is important to consider the scope and depth of search. 
Mukherjee (1992) argues that the literature under-emphasises the idea that organisational 
search is orientated towards establishing control of the production process. Cyert and 
March, he notes, assumed that search begins locally, and if it fails then it will assume a 
wider scope. On the other hand, the depth of knowledge necessary to control production 
process is likely to be much more shallow than the depth of knowledge necessary to 
understand the cause and effect relationships behind it. Consequently, we can conclude 
that organisational learning efforts that aim to control variations in the production process 
may not necessarily lead to an increase of knowledge. This is because process control's 
search routines are limited in scope and shallow in depth. They are, thus, unable to lead 
to an articulation of the factors that affect the production process as a whole. 
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The scope of the learning behaviour measured here is by definition local because we are 
considering ingrained patterns of behaviour manifested by individuals or small groups. 
The depth of search, on the other hand as observed in CIGNA, was a shallow one. In 
other words, it could lead only to increased know-how instead of know-why. Therefore, 
if learning, as considered here, did not lead to higher stages of knowledge how could 
ingrained patterns of behaviour contribute to the evolution of the organisation's learning? 
The importance of ingrained patterns of behaviour could be observed in CIGNA in terms 
of the ability of the organisation to disseminate new knowledge and quickly adopt new 
practices. Thus the relevant dimensions of learning behaviour are those that reflect the 
ability of the organisation to deal with potential problems that threaten the learning cycle. 
It could also be observed that search routines were intertwined with the control of 
processes. We have to distinguish between search and dissemination routines. We 
understand learning behaviour only in terms of dissemination routines. Search routines, 
considered as random processes through which individuals find solutions to production 
problems, cannot be considered as systematic learning behaviour (Argyris and Schon, 
1978). Relevant search routines are related to the control of processes and will be 
addressed in a later section when the management of business processes is discussed. 
Therefore learning at the bottom of the organisation occurs on two fronts: search routines 
associated with process control and dissemination routines. 
3.5.6. Attributes of learning behaviour 
March and Olsen (1976) identify four problems in the process of transferring learning 
from individual to organisational level. The first is role-constraining which occurs when 
individual learning cannot affect organisational behaviour because the individual or small 
group who develops some new knowledge is not able to influence other people's 
behaviour. When individuals can alter organisation behaviour but do so in an ambiguous 
way audience learning problem occurs. Imperfect learning may also arise when beliefs 
based on untested assumptions influence the perception of the environmental responses to 
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actions implemented. Finally, individuals who do not understand the cause-effect 
relationship between the actions taken and the environmental response learn under 
ambiguity. 
Kim ( 1993) adds to March and Olsen's model. He proposes three other types of 
incomplete learning cycles two of which are important to our study. Situation learning 
occurs when individuals solve problems but do not codify their learning for later use. 
Therefore mental models are not altered and learning is only temporary. Fragmented 
learning occurs when individual learning fails to become organisational learning because 
the lack of networking prevents individuals in the same organisations from sharing 
knowledge. or when individuals who concentrate knowledge leave the organisation. 
Based on potential problems. which may occur during the process in which knowledge is 
transferred from individuals to the organisation, we can propose several categories of 
behaviour. The efficiency with which the organisation closes the learning cycle depends 
on the level of intensity and nature of these behaviours: 
" Readiness to adopt suggestions coming from all levels 
" Group discussion to eliminate ambiguity and create a "common mind" 
" Efforts to articulate knowledge (local vs. general) 
" Willingness to assess environmental response 
" Documentation of experiences 
" Networking throughout the company to share and enrich knowledge base 
" Avoiding the concentration of knowledge on a few individuals (dissemination of 
knowledge) 
LEARN 
DINATION 
NEURSHIP 
Figure 3.3 - The organisational processes of the organisation 
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3.6. Managerial processes 
Garvin (1994) reviewed the strategic management literature and found three broad 
categories of managerial processes: direction setting, negotiating and bargaining, and 
monitoring and control. The most obvious managerial process in the strategic 
management literature, and the only one recognised in most of the operations literature, is 
direction setting. The manufacturing strategy literature was based on the principles of the 
classical school of strategy14. It shares the principles of a long tradition of prescriptive 
literature which can be traced back to Chandler (1962), Ansoff (1965), and Andrews 
(1971) and more recently to Porter (1980,1985). The essence of strategy according to 
this view, is direction setting helped by the use of analytical tools. 
However, revisionist writers on strategy note that there is no mono-causal explanation for 
superior performance and the strategic process. The process, they argue, is adaptive and 
requires other managerial processes than a unidemensional top down intervention in the 
form of defining actions that should be taken in order to close gaps. Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1991) demonstrated that high performance companies have a number of distinctive 
senior management processes grouped into five main dimensions: 
a) Assessing the environment: Understanding that the environment should not be seen as 
a technical exercise, but instead as a process of learning that is not limited to specific 
functions or actors. 
b) Leading change: An effective leadership would be able to cope with the particular 
context in which the organisation is embedded, creating the right environment and 
mobilising the organisational energy to support the change process. 
14 Regarded here as incorporating the design, planning, and positioning school, according 
to Mintzberg's (1990) typology. 
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c) Managing human resources: Selection, training and development, employee relations 
and compensation need to be managed within a long term framework necessary to build 
the right set of invisible assets, knowledge, skills and attitudes that the organisation needs 
i 
to compete. 
d) Achieving coherence in the management of change: Coherence must be achieved 
among strategy goals, incremental response to the environment, functional strategy, and 
the relations of the firm with its customers and suppliers. 
e) Linking strategic and operational change: The core issue here is to manage the 
interrelated analytical, educational, and political dimension of the process. Intentions 
must be broken down to manageable pieces and assigned to change managers. This 
process of clarifying the strategic targets needs the support of redesigned communication 
and reward system. 
We cannot make direct use of the dimensions above because they cannot be understood 
as categories of managerial processes. Nevertheless, these categories are an important 
reminder of the multifaceted activities of managers during the strategic process, and 
suggest specific categories. In contrast, the MSM suggests a unideminsional intervention 
from management. There is plenty of evidence which can be drawn from the adaptive 
tradition of strategy to support the idea that managerial intervention in the evolution of 
operational abilities is somewhat more complex. Skinner had already called attention to 
"production systems" that went beyond structural gap closing, although he did not 
explore the issue much further. 
Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) have suggested that Japanese advantage lies in effective 
infrastructure systems developed in a rather adaptive way. Hayes and Pisano (1995) 
revisited the MSM and considered that infrastructural decisions are more important than 
structural ones. They write: "These systems should be designed to encourage adaptation 
and improvement of an organisation skill base rather than to achieve some 'optimal' 
ýý 
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strategic fit". However, as noted by Wheelwright15 whereas structural decisions are 
supported by hard analysis, soft issues often defy analysis, which makes it more difficult 
to set gap closing goals and requires managerial commitment and leadership. 
Note that although Hayes and Pisano (1995) call for a revision of the MSM, the emphasis 
is still on decisions. We think that the answer to the new strategic questions should be 
found on the infrastructure side. However, what managers actually do, is more important 
than the strategical decisions they take. This is why we consider processes instead of 
decisions. It should also be noted that managerial process encompasses decisions. 
Garvin's (1994) broad division of managerial processes into direction setting, getting 
support and controlling found correspondence in the strategic process experienced by 
CIGNA. Based on the data collected on the behaviour of management during the process, 
more detailed categories can be proposed: 
Gap closing - refers to the content of strategy or, in other words, how management 
identifies the performance gaps and defines action plans to close them. According to the 
manufacturing strategy literature, this is the only dimension of management intervention 
to be considered. In CIGNA, the identification of gaps received great attention and 
management time. Broad action plans were then formulated with the help of the expertise 
accumulated by the parent company which had had similar experiences in the US. 
Management style - refers to how managers go about making, communicating, 
implementing, and adjusting decisions. These dimensions of managerial behaviour were 
observed to be especially important in the shaping of a new internal environment. 
Senior management teamwork - refers to how effectively top managers and their 
respective areas collaborate towards strategic goals. The evolution of operational 
performance was dependent on the collaboration of the whole management team. The 
CEO and the change team dealt with this process carefully. Development of appropriate 
processes of this kind was considered a major issue. 
15Cited in Hayes and Pisano. 
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Performance control - encompasses the metrics and systems used by managers to 
measure operational performance and the actions which management take based on that. 
A consistent set of metrics was developed by CIGNA to follow the evolution of the 
change process. These metrics reflected the strategic directions defined in the gap closing 
dimension and focused managerial and staff attention on those specific dimensions of 
performance. 
Aligning behaviour - refers to leadership and the use of mechanisms such as reward and 
control systems to shape people's behaviour and align the actions of the low hierarchical 
levels to the achievement of strategic goals. Financial rewards were used in the beginning 
to emphasise the importance of team-based performance. It was later substituted with 
greater emphasis on non-financial rewards. Leadership was vital during the three phases 
of the change process (unfreeze, change, freeze), varying in style according to the phase. 
The definition of concepts identified by grounded research is an essential step because it 
forces a more precise definition of concepts that are somewhat intuitive. The issues in the 
literature, which are related to the categories identified, are now reviewed. 
3.6.1. Gap closing 
If we assume the existence of a link between strategic intentions and operational 
outcomes, direction setting is an important managerial process. Sanchez and Heene 
(1995) consider that managers are compelled to adopt strategic actions when they 
perceive a gap in the capabilities of the firm. They write: "A firm's efforts to change the 
state of one of its system elements will be motivated by managerial perception of a 
strategic gap between the desired state of a system element and the perceived state of the 
element". When this gap is big enough to induce action then, "managers will initiate 
some form of gap-closing action to improve the state of that system element. Actions 
intended to close strategic gaps in the system elements are the source of strategic 
change. " 
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According to these authors, such actions may take two different courses: competence 
building and competence leveraging. Competence building involves "creating or adopting 
new capabilities" (new patterns of action) in the use of new or existing assets. Whereas, 
competence leveraging involves the exploitation of new opportunities created by 
competence building, implying a quantitative change in the assets. When formulating gap 
closing action plans, managers may focus on structural and infrastructural issues and 
have different ex-ante cognitive understanding about objectives and the means to achieve 
them. 
3.6.2. Management style 
The managerial processes through which managers determine the internal context during 
the strategic process are the key to strategic outcomes according to adaptive authors in 
strategy. At its most basic, managers can approach the strategic process in a 
programmatic or emergent fashion. In programmatic modes of implementation, the role 
of senior management is to act in military-like fashion as commanders where 
organisational members are subordinates who are not able to provide inputs into the 
process. 
This view is best represented by the design school which relies on formal analysis of the 
environment and inflexible implementation plans (Mintzberg, 1990). Starting with 
Skinner's (1969) original formulation, the majority of the views on the manufacturing 
design process have espoused the Design School's analytic approach (Mills et al. 1995). 
This means assuming perfect rationality of senior management and perfect alignment of 
organisational members to whatever senior managers decide. 
At the other extreme is the emergent mode of strategy implementation termed by Hart 
(1992) as "transactive". This involves a continuous vertical flow of information in both 
directions, in order to operationalise the strategic intent. Senior management is described 
as acting as a "facilitator" because it puts a premium on "learn and improve". It thus 
empowers and enables organisational members to provide inputs into the project. 
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The style of managers should stand somewhere in the continuum between decisions taken 
exclusively by managers and the full participation of lower hierarchical levels in the 
decision making process. 
3.6.3. Senior management teamwork 
One of the core ideas behind the concept of manufacturing strategy is to achieve 
coherence in the strategic efforts of several functions. Special attention is placed on the 
co-ordination of the manufacturing/marketing interface as their combined action will lead 
to the materialisation of the strategic intent dictated by corporate strategy. Hill (1985) 
focuses on facilitating the co-ordination of this interface through the use of hygienic and 
enhancing factors which he calls "order winners" and "qualifiers". He suggests that 
actions aimed at performance improvement in operations should be guided by market 
considerations. Interaction between the two (or more functions) should be limited to the 
definition of the content of strategy. Once function's top managers agree on the course of 
improvement, each function is free to follow its own independent course. 
Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) provide evidence of the strategic importance of 
teamwork at the highest hierarchical level. One of the companies they studied is a UK 
pump manufacturer who introduced revolutionary order processing. They observed that 
interaction between senior management of the various functions in the strategy process, is 
perhaps more important than simply agreeing on basic directions. They write: "The 
system design required inputs from every function over many months and its successful 
implementation required fundamental operating change in most functions". According to 
Garvin (1994) in order to get the job done once the direction is set, workers will need the 
collaboration of organisational members outside their work groups. As these relationships 
lack formal authority, a number of other means, like networking and negotiating, may be 
necessary. The managerial processes used to tackle organisational dilemmas and trade 
offs in order to achieve collaborations among several work groups, are therefore key to 
the strategic process. 
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3.6.4. Performance control 
Managers use critical performance variables to track the organisation's progress towards 
strategic goals. Outputs are measured and compared against pre-set targets (Simons, 
1995). These control systems provide the basis for gap-closing actions. Sanchez and 
Heene (1995) call control loops the "system processes through which a firm monitors and 
adjusts its stocks and flows of assets". They contend that organisations may rely on 
unambiguous "hard" data that may say little about competence building, or in other 
words, on the qualitative change happening in the organisation. Thus to achieve the 
transformation of higher order elements, the organisation will have to go beyond the use 
of hard data and rely on more informal means of data gathering. Benchmarking, 
environmental scanning, and challenging cognitive frameworks are regarded as 
appropriate control loops to guide qualitative changes. 
A possible down side to reliance on control loops is the blindness to other factors. 
Existing control loops focus on the needs of current "path", and therefore exclude other 
valuable information. As explained by Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) "the known 
informs strategic choice: the unknown is ignored", in other words, "what gets measured 
gets done". 
3.6.5. Behaviour alignment 
According to Pettigrew and Whipp (1991), the design of performance and reward 
systems are important elements in the strategy process. Reward systems are part of the 
systems used by the firm to control employees' behaviour. They are used by hierarchical 
organisations in a relatively straightforward way. The reward in such cases is attached to 
the attainment of local functional goals, which can be verified by arm's length indicators. 
Companies that develop lateral integration need to design incentives linked to the 
achievement of broader goals that can be more ambiguous in both whether or not the goal 
was achieved and who contributed to it (Galbraith, 1995). 
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It has been argued that a number of organisational practices can change the way people 
think about their jobs and their relationship with other organisational members, and 
consequently influence or even determine behaviour. Among the organisational practices 
identified by Gittel (1996) as those that influence co-ordination behaviour are: shared 
accountability, qualitative feedback, dedicated co-ordinator, conflict resolution, and 
hiring for teamwork. 
Simons (1995) proposes three other forms of control lever: belief systems, boundary 
systems, and interactive control systems. The need to release formal control to create 
empowered employees who are able to generate new ideas, places even greater 
importance on communicating core values and missions. Belief systems are used to 
inspire employees and communicate the direction senior management wants them to 
follow. Alternatively, boundary systems are stated in negative or minimal terms. They 
tell people what not to do. They are the mechanisms against opportunistic behaviour. 
Interactive control systems are "the informal information systems that managers use to 
involve themselves regularly and personally in the decisions of the subordinates" (Simon, 
1995). Interactive control systems are designed to promote face-to-face communication 
among the several levels of management to evaluate qualitatively constantly changing 
sensitive data in order to explain through debate the underlying assumptions and actions 
plans. 
Throughout the change period, leadership has to deal with and adapt to three distinctive 
phases of induced change processes. According to Lewin's (1952) and Schein's (1972), 
model the three phases are: unfreezing, changing, and refreezing. The first stage 
corresponds to an assessment of the initial state of the organisation, and efforts to break 
previous behaviours in the organisation. The second period is a state of flux where old 
practices and behaviours are gradually replaced. The final stage refers to the 
consolidation of the new practices and their adoption throughout the organisation. 
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Figure 3.4 -The managerial processes of the organisation 
3.7. Process control and redesign 
What an organisation is able to produce is the result of the performance of the sequence 
of business processes involved in the production of goods and services. It has already 
been argued that the effectiveness of these business processes is influenced by the 
organisational behavioural processes. However, these processes do not interfere with the 
tangible sequence of steps. Thus, apart from organisational and managerial processes it is 
necessary to consider the mechanisms through which the organisation shapes production 
business processes. The literature on reengineering says that managers manage these 
processes by redesigning inefficient ones. Also process control, defined by Mukherjee 
(1992) as "the science, technology and art of ensuring that a production system (or its 
subparts ) produced the output that it is meant to produce", is a means of management 
intervention over business processes. 
Managerial processes indirectly affect business processes by influencing the development 
of behavioural processes (learning. entrepreneurship, and co-ordination) but do not 
interfere directly with them. Process control and redesign cannot be included in the 
category of managerial processes because they do not represent ingrained patterns of 
behaviour. Re-engineering projects are one-off temporary change programmes which 
have a heginning and an end. Similarly, process control refers to a set of techniques 
adopted by line management and executed by operatives. 
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Based on Garvin (1994) we have already argued that the view of the organisation as 
structure and systems was replaced with advantages by one that sees the organisation as a 
bundle of processes. We had expected that the patterns of behaviour at both managerial 
and other levels would explain the evolution of operational performance, but field 
experience in CIGNA made it clear that they were not enough. We found that the 
transformation of business processes could not be associated with the activities of any 
group of individuals in isolation. This transformation is better understood as an 
organisational action. Our general model of performance improvement is complete only 
if we treat business processes as different in nature from other organisational processes, 
and therefore explicitly consider how organisations manage their physical transformation. 
The manufacturing strategy literature, particularly the work of Hayes and Wheelwright, 
sees managers indirectly influencing what happens in the production function by defining 
the right systems and structure. By considering the role of process redesign and process 
control, we attempt to integrate these literatures within a broader strategic framework. 
Process control and redesign is, therefore, an important intermediary category, standing 
between managerial and organisational behavioural processes. It fills a gap between the 
highly aggregated nature of senior management processes and the emergent nature of 
work process improvement. The two major paradigms of process control and redesign, 
TQM and BPR, give us the appropriate background to understand the mechanism used by 
management to introduce change in the organisations' business processes. The process 
control literature provides valuable insights into organisational learning. 
Learning has to occur in the factory. This is contrary to the Tayloristic paradigm. It also 
contradicts the assumption that underpins operations research. The basic assumption is 
that knowledge about product and process is complete, and the role of management is to 
define the best way of production and specify what labour should do to execute it 
(Jaikumar and Bohn, 1992). Process control is central to the development of knowledge 
in the production setting. Jaikumar (1988) notes that the kind of knowledge acquired, 
how it is applied, and the issues tackled depends on the process control efforts adopted by 
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the firm. The development of knowledge of a practical as well as a scientific nature is 
critical to the improvement of the production function (Hayes et al., 1988). 
We have split organisational learning into two categories: (a) search and (b) diffusion and 
assimilation. Diffusion and assimilation are embedded in behavioural processes and 
search was found to be dependent on approaches to process control. This view is 
consistent with those of other writers in the field such as Jaikumar and Bohn, and 
Mukherjee. 
3.7.1. Process control and organisational learning 
The management of processes is deeply connected with organisational learning. There are 
striking parallels between the learning literature and the TQM literature. TQM is related 
to the concept of organisational learning advocated by March and Olsen (1975) and 
Nelson and Winter (1982), who regard learning as being produced and used by 
individuals (we could extend this definition to subgroups such as QCC). 
Duncan and Weiss (1979) criticise the view that learning occurs only through individuals 
or small groups because otherwise organisational knowledge would be fragmented and 
only relevant locally. Argyris and Schon (1978) argue that the random learning process 
through which individuals encounter relevant factors and manage to produce useful 
statements of cause and effect is not enough to "provide a basis for describing a 
systematic learning process". 
The duality between local and organisational wide learning can be observed in production 
systems. Factories can either learn at the operator individual level, as it is common, or 
attempt to develop knowledge about key variables (related to product, process, and 
environment) that consider the whole production process and its system-wide effects. 
Capturing this duality Mukherjee and Jaikumar (1995) propose the existence of two 
paradigms that "embody an internally consistent set of goals, skills, tools and procedures 
for process control". The first, called six-sigma paradigm, is rooted in the quality 
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literature and makes extensive use of statistical process control, policy and tools that are 
assumed to improve quality. 
The production theory paradigm, as they call it, "requires plant personnel to identify the 
interlocking set of product, process and environment variables which govern their 
product-process system" (ibid. ). The two paradigms emphasise learning at different 
levels. The six-sigma paradigm advocates that process be broken down into key steps and 
analysed in isolation, thus producing local learning. However the production theory 
paradigm emphasises general learning. 
General learning is produced by plant and R&D personnel undertaking cross-functional 
problem solving over data on product, process and environment which could potentially 
affect quality and productivity. The idea is to understand what the systemic effects of 
these variables are. Control (statistical or not) should then be imposed upon these 
variables. 
The authors argue that the idea of the new paradigm can be related to the stages of 
knowledge proposed by Bohn (1994). It is a useful a way of knowledge development for 
firms at low stages of knowledge, who know little about their product and process' key 
variables and their effects. It is also argued that firms that have achieved higher levels of 
knowledge can identify the effects of secondary and tertiary variables. 
Hayes et al. (1988) note that in order to increase control over process consistency, a firm 
has to learn. Initially learning occurs by controlling abnormal variation. They call this 
reactive control. A second step, they call preventive control, requires an understanding of 
first order causal effects and the elimination of sources of abnormal variation. A third 
stage, called progressive control, requires detailed experiment and analysis, and therefore 
is not the responsibility of line operators as in the first two cases. As Hayes et al. (1988) 
observations and the two paradigms of process control suggest, the scope and depth of 
problem search have implications for behavioural and cognitive change in the 
organisation. 
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3.7.2. TQM 
TQM, as well as BPR, became a very influential concept in a relatively short period. So 
influential was the idea that the regaining of competitiveness by companies such as Ford 
and Motorola is perceived as due to the implementation of the concept. Juran (1993) goes 
a step further and credits TQM with the restoration of the competitiveness of the whole 
American economy. 
TQM is said to have originated from a course on statistical quality control for Japanese 
managers set up by a committee appointed by the Japanese government. The techniques 
for quality control were then applied within the philosophy developed by Deming (ibid. ) 
and Juran (ibid. ). The rise of Japanese manufacturing firms in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, which showed the superiority of Japanese manufacturing, greatly increased the 
profile of the so called "Japanese techniques". The benchmark of these techniques 
developed into what is now called TQM. Some of the most popular perspectives are: 
Deming's 14 points, the Juran trilogy (1992), and Crosby's 14 quality steps. 
Considering the principles set by these seminal works on quality and also by the criteria 
on which quality awards (e. g., the Baldrige Award) are based, it can be inferred that 
TQM is a philosophy that focuses on meeting customers' requirements. Its central 
characteristics are: term planning, contin os mprovement, human resource development 
and increased importance of workers, benchmarking, redesign, and team-based problem 
solving (Powell, 1995). Compared with the Tayloristic paradigm of scientific 
management of production, TQM philosophy represents a revolution. Knowledge that 
was previously regarded as being the province of managers has now extended to the 
workers (Mukherjee et al., 1995). It would be instructive to summarise the main ideas of 
the quality gurus to understand the ideas and practices behind TQM. 
3.7.3. Quality gurus 
Deming (1982) puts forward the idea that quality has a positive relation to cost, instead of 
being part of a zero-sum game where one dimension can only be improved at the expense 
118 
of the other. He also suggests that 85 percent of the quality problems that a firm 
experiences are the responsibility of management who fails to develop appropriate 
systems and processes. Management should first eliminate the common causes of quality 
problems provoked by poor design, poor standards of the material supplied, inadequacy 
of the equipment, and lack of training and supervision. Workers should concentrate on 
the causes that are peculiar to their processes. It is the responsibility of the operative to 
eliminate the problem(s) that cause variation in the output. 
However, Deming does not consider that superior quality starts and finishes on the shop 
floor. He calls for a deeper change in the organisation. It should develop appropriate 
supervision style, internal communications, performance measures, and commit itself to 
quality, innovation, and training. 
Crosby (1979) coined the phrase "Quality is free", and urges companies to pursue the 
ultimate goal of zero defects. He concentrated on managerial processes and gave 
secondary importance to the role of operators. The firm, he advised, should implement a 
"management maturity grid" to improve communications among management layers. 
Using the grid managers would be able to express their perception of the state of quality 
in the firm. Following the assessment step, the organisation would be able to commit 
itself to a 14 steps programme. 
This programme, the aim of which is to detect improvement opportunities, requires the 
establishment of performance indicators in each area of the company. It is supported by 
the ability to perform cross-functional co-ordination of the quality efforts, and training of 
supervisors among other things. Quality is regarded by Crosby as conformance to design 
requirements. 
Juran and Gyrna (1980) defined quality as "fitness for use" and argued for the 
optimisation of quality costs. They recommend that firms develop a data system which 
enables them to measure the costs incurred by defective output and the costs of 
preventing those defects. The idea is to operate at the conformance quality level which 
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would minimise the cost of quality. Although in theory a firm could benefit from 
reducing its conformance quality levels, Juran and Gyrna believe that these would be 
very special cases and the bulk of companies should reduce their total costs by increasing 
the preventive costs. 
When failure costs are very high, Juran (1992) considers that the organisation should 
consider a breakthrough project. Key projects should be identified with the help of Pareto 
analysis, and multi-functional steering and diagnostics committees should be assembled. 
Diagnostics committees then analyse the problem and collect the relevant information in 
order to propose solutions to problems which can be divided into management- 
controllable (what should be 80 percent of the total) or operator-controllable problems. 
The steering committee should concentrate on overcoming resistance to change. 
Key controls should also be implemented to follow the development of the project. Costs 
and benefits of the changes should be assessed, and management should use 
communications and training to institutionalise the changes. If the organisation has 
achieved the optimal cost point, operators should concentrate on controlling the processes 
and targeting eventual abnormalities. The organisation should also make use of an annual 
quality programme focused on determined objectives. The key points of the quality 
literature are summarised in the table 3.2. 
The Taguchi method is in essence different from the rest of the quality literature because 
instead of controlling the sources of variances in the manufacturing process it argues that 
poor quality is primarily caused by product design. It should therefore be cheaper to 
design products which are robust enough to withstand noise factors rather than trying to 
control them. 
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Deming's 14 points Juran trilogy Crosby 14 quality steps 
Constancy of purpose 1. Quality Planning Management commitment 
Adopt the philosophy Set goals Quality improvement teams 
Don't rely on mass inspection Identify customers and their needs Quality measurement 
Don't award business on price Develop products and processes Cost of quality evaluation 
Constant improvement 2. Quality control Quality awareness 
Training Evaluate performance Corrective action 
Leadership Compare to goals and adapt Zero-defect committee 
Drive out fear 3. Quality improvement Supervisor training 
Break down barriers Establish infrastructure Zero-defect day 
Eliminate slogans and exhortations Identify projects and teams 
Provide resources and training 
Goal-setting 
Eliminate quotas Establish controls Error cause removal 
Pride of workmanship Quality Planning Recognition 
Education and retraining Quality councils 
Plan of action Do it over again 
Table 3.2 - Quality Gurus. Adapted from Powell (1995) 
3.7.4. Reengineering 
With its promises of dramatic improvements, and numerous success stories associated 
with reengineering projects constantly appearing in both the popular and academic press, 
it is no wonder that reengineering has become a top priority for many CEOs. But what is 
reengineering anyway? 
Hammer's (1990) ground-breaking article "Don't Automate, Obliterate" is said to be the 
spark that initiated the reengineering movement. In that article he defines reengineering 
as "the use of modern information technology to radically redesign business processes". 
The emphasis on information technology was later reduced, being replaced by an 
emphasis on the human factor. As a Rover manager cited in Maull et al. (1995), puts it: 
"95 per cent of BPR is about the human factor". Maull et al. also report that among the 
several companies they investigated, only one had its project driven by IT considerations. 
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Champy (1995) when compared with Hammer and Champy (1993) also identifies this 
change of emphasis from IT to human resources as the main engine behind BPR. 
A common feature of the several definitions of BPR is that it should begin with a "clean 
sheet of paper". Its aim is to achieve breakthrough improvement in an activity that can 
influence the competitive position of the firm. But does reaction or opportunity drive 
BPR? The popular press normally associates BPR projects with performance crisis. 
However, Dixon et al. (1994) found that out of the 15 reengineering projects they studied, 
only three were driven by reaction to crisis. This suggests that firms may employ BPR in 
a more proactive way than initially assumed. However, the alignment of BPR efforts with 
business strategy, even when driven by opportunity instead of reaction, should not be 
taken for granted. 
Maull et al. (1995) report that they initially assumed an alignment between BPR projects 
and business strategy. However, during their research they perceived that although 
alignment was important "it could not be assumed to exist". Indeed, some companies 
were having "considerable difficulty in achieving such alignment". The lack of alignment 
between strategy and processes leads to local improvements that, although successful, 
cannot alter the competitive position of the firm. They write: 
Processes were mapped, analysed and improved incrementally on a 
project-by-project basis. Little or no attention was paid to the overall 
strategic direction of the business. Consequently, while improvements 
were undoubtedly made, very few substantial changes to the company's 
cost base or level of service were achieved. (ibid. ) 
Reengineering projects are also distinguished by reliance on teams and strong leadership 
from a process champion. Teams are the central features of reengineering design and 
implementation. Firms are advised to set up cross-functional teams to be integrated with 
experts and line managers. The project champion, who many times happens to be the 
CEO, symbolises the direct involvement of senior management in detailed operational 
matters. 
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Several authors have proposed critical determinants for the success of BPR programmes. 
Hall et al. (1993) and Maull et al. (ibid. ) suggest that successful BPR programmes have a 
number of defined characteristics. Based on these factors and on the literature covered 
previously, we can identify those issues which are more likely to characterise a process 
redesign project: 
a) Kaizen or breakthrough -A Kaizen-based improvement project is characterised by a 
plan-do-check-act approach while a breakthrough would scrap the existing processes. 
b) Alignment with business strategy - The management of processes can consider or not, 
the general business strategy to inform its development. 
c) Size and cross functionality - The project can encompass the whole business unit and, 
therefore be cross-functional, or be inter-functional and more limited. 
d) Process architecture -A systematic approach necessary to define the relevant processes 
and to identify inefficiencies. 
e) Leadership - Senior management can be involved in detailed operational levels. 
f) Performance measurement and control -A project can use milestones and ratios in 
order to control the evolution of the process, or can be absent on these matters. 
g) Change in improvement direction - The project can follow an incremental or `strategic 
leaps' approach to develop capabilities along the same lines as the previous improvement 
trajectory followed by the firm, or attempt to alter such a trajectory. 
h) Time frame considered - An organisation could only be temporally involved in the 
project, or commit itself to a long-term period. 
i) Staff commitment - The level of credibility and commitment of staff personnel are 
relevant variables. 
j) Information technology - IT can be regarded as the important issue in the project, or 
only an enabler. 
3.7.5 TQM and BPR 
The literature on quality distinguishes two types of projects: Breakthrough and Kaizen. 
Imai (1986) recognises the need for eventual innovations that should be supported by 
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continuous improvement. Innovation alone, he argues, would not be able to sustain the 
levels of performance and after a great improvement it would gradually decay. He 
suggests a dichotomy between Kaizen and innovation projects where the first has long 
term effects and relies on people, and the second has short-term effects and relies on 
technology. 
BPR has a great deal in common with breakthrough projects in the quality literature. 
Indeed, Dixon et al. (1994) argue that Juran's conceptual project-orientated process of 
quality planning, control, and improvement aimed at achieving breakthrough 
improvement, is quite consistent with working definitions of reengineering. 
Mukherjee and Jaikumar (1995) studied a quality award winner company that 
implemented both Kaizen and breakthrough projects. Kaizen projects are reportedly 
based on Plan-Do-Check-Act methodologies, led by foremen or supervisors, and are 
interdepartmental in scope. The problems they focused on were internal product failure 
and process capability, safety, housekeeping, ergonomics, maintenance, and productivity. 
The participants initially define the problem and set a goal. Then, issues that should be 
tackled are identified through discussion over the analysis of the data generated through 
the use of the seven statistical tools. Solutions are proposed and implemented, and the 
results are analysed, possibly leading to another cycle of refinement. 
Breakthrough projects are interdepartmental and aim at major improvements. Here the 
structured method for problem solving given by TQM methodologies is of little use. As 
the authors explain: 
In other words, well defined problem solving methods often do not exist, 
conflicting trade-offs have to be made, solutions cannot be recognised 
until they are reached and not all problem transformation and states are 
known. (ibid. ) 
According to Garvin (1994), both TQM and BPR movements suggest (a) the redesign of 
processes, using flow charts to show the steps of the process and identify inefficiencies 
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and (b) the use of senior managers as "process champions", to ensure integration and 
overcome functional orientation. However, while the quality movement (Kaizen) sees 
improvements as the result of incremental steps, BPR calls for radical change. TQM 
experts argue that for the improvement of existing processes, measurement and control 
are achieved by statistical tools, documentation, and the establishment of control points. 
Reengineering experts consider the existing process as ultimately useless and start to 
redesign from a blank page. As Garvin states: "They are virtually silent about 
measurement and control. " 
Dixon et al. (1994) conclude that the main difference between reengineering and 
continuous improvement process is not the commonly cited factors such as: project size, 
improvement rate, cross-functionality, IT role, top-down management. Instead, what truly 
differentiates both approaches is that reengineering projects involve "changing direction". 
Not only the processes are changed but also the direction of improvement. Reengineering 
projects may be necessary in order to break path-dependencies. Together both 
perspectives presented here can capture the dynamics of change experienced by the 
organisation's business processes which can be either evolutionary or radical in nature. 
We can now present the cross sectional model that complements the longitudinal model. 
The intensity of the drivers of change vary at different points in time as the organisation 
moves from its initial conditions to its final state. This indicates that the importance and 
activity of the several drivers should vary along the process. After performing the case 
studies we should be able to understand these relationships better and refine the model. 
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Figure 3.5 - Cross sectional model 
3.8. Hypotheses 
3.8.1. Research outline 
Empirically the central issue of this research is to produce insights into the evolution of 
operational performance. The initial case was used to generate a model where initial 
conditions and the dimensions that drive the evolution of operational performance are 
considered. Constructs were built from the field study in the tradition 01' rounded 
research. Other cases are added in the next chapter in order to challenge and refine the 
initial model. By writing-up the four case studies based on the model initially proposed, 
we engage in theory building and theory testing (Leonard-Barton, 1990, Yin, 1984). 
In this section. exploratory hypotheses are developed. Their aim is to shed light on 
specific aspects of the evolutionary process. They are designed to focus our attention on 
issues where the advice of different paradigms is conflicting or simply absent. The 
overall research was designed in order to take advantage of the two strong points of 
theory building through case study noted by Einsenhardt ( 1989). The first is to juxtapose 
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different, and often contradictory, views so that the likelihood of creative insights is 
increased. Second, the emergent model creates "constructs that can be readily measured", 
because they are likely to have been measured during the first phase of theory building. 
We are also likely to have a "hypothesis that can be proven false" because the proposed 
theory is already produced in a way that it can be tested. 
The criteria of sampling companies that had been awarded important recognition of their 
operational abilities were adopted as a safe way to sample companies which are more 
operationally effective than their competitors. But to be awarded a prize was a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition. Available benchmark indicators of operational performance 
(e. g., CIGNA takes 4 days to pay a claim when the average in the market is 14 days), 
customer perception (e. g., TNT increased customer loyalty dramatically), or business 
performance (e. g., SERASA multiplied several fold its output and revenue, while cutting 
price and keeping the same workforce) were also taken into consideration. An important 
fact is that all of the companies considered moved from losses into profit during the 
strategic process. 
The cases offer an additional benefit of representing polar cases of the speed with which 
business processes were changed. This ranges from radical (CIGNA) to continuous (TNT 
and Toshiba) change, while considering an intermediary case (SERASA). The sites also 
differ in size. CIGNA and Toshiba (the air-conditioner plant) are small and TNT (the UK 
parcels division) and SERASA are relatively big companies. 
3.8.2. Exploratory hypotheses 
As it has been noted above, the hypotheses are designed to draw theory building from 
issues about which the branches of literature considered here are either vague or have 
competing points of view. Our hypotheses directly address the literature gaps, but the 
intention behind them is to focus the research on elements of the grounded model. The 
link with the literature gaps will be made indirectly. Data collection and analysis shaped 
by the hypotheses should produce the necessary factors to address the literature gaps. 
ý. ýa 
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Hypothesis 1: Strategic operational performance improvement requires the evolution of 
all initial conditions that hinder the evolutionary process 
In his study of projects in strategic alliances, Doz (1996) found that successful projects 
were those where the partners went through interactive cycles of learning, revaluation, 
and readjustment, while the failed projects were found to be highly inertial. The strategic 
processes were found to be determined neither exclusively by the implementation of 
initial objectives, nor by the initial conditions. This was better understood as a 
combination of the effects of the initial conditions and the learning process that allowed 
the partner organisations to act upon and adapt the initial conditions. 
Closely related to the evolution of initial conditions is the Sanchez and Thomas' (1995) 
distinction between capability building and capability leveraging processes. Capability 
building leads to a qualitative internal change in the organisation, while capability 
leveraging refers to the expansion of the elements that already exist in the organisation. 
Thus there can be operational improvement based on capability leveraging, for instance 
resulting from the upgrading of equipment, but this is unlikely to provide an edge 
because capability leveraging alternatives are available to all competitors. 
Because a quantitative change is not sufficient, there should be a qualitative change in the 
organisation. We link qualitative change to the evolution of initial conditions. A firm can 
only be considered to have changed qualitatively by the end of the strategic process when 
its initial conditions are significantly different. This hypothesis extends this notion by 
saying that the change should reach all initial conditions. The importance of the word 
"all" is central. It implies that change should occur in all dimensions of the firm. One of 
the implications is that operational performance improvement does not relate only to 
what happens on the shop floor. Instead, it may be dependent on other elements of the 
firm that have never been considered before. 
Hypothesis 2: The relevant drivers of strategic operational performance improvement are 
(a) the organisational processes: co-ordination, entrepreneurship, and learning: (b) the 
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managerial processes: gap-closing, anagement style, senior management teamwork, 
performance control, and behaviour alignment, and (c) activities related to process 
control and redesign 
This hypothesis tests the relevance of the elements of the model. A model that explains a 
process should be one in which variation in the state of its elements will affect the course 
and outcome of the process 16. The case studies and the within case analyses are organised 
to describe the relevance of each element of the model. In this way, they will 
automatically test the significance of each of the elements of the model. Because the 
model was defined through grounded research we should expect it to have a strong 
grounding on reality. However what is relevant to the pilot case may prove to have no 
significance in explaining other cases. 
Hypothesis 3: The drivers of strategic operational performance improvement are mutually 
dependent and supportive 
Beer and Eisenstat (1996) argue that a long stream of research has shown that hard and 
soft elements of the company must be aligned if managerial intervention is to succeed. 
Nevertheless, actual interventions tend to be uni-dimensional, because managers and 
consultants choose interventions that are consistent with their personal abilities or values. 
These interventions tend to fail because "harder" elements of technology, strategy, and 
structure are not aligned with softer elements such as people, values, and leaders. In their 
dynamic capability theory, Teece and Pisano (1994) are more specific and consider the 
need for achieving coherence between processes and systems as a prerequisite for 
performance. They argue that what may be regarded as the style of the organisation, is 
not really discretionary, but in fact encompasses elements that are necessary to achieve 
performance. They write: 
16 In chapter 5 (micro-research) 
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Recognising the congruencies and complementarities among processes, 
and between processes and incentives, is critical to the understanding of 
the organisational capabilities. 
The need to tune management processes, management systems, and organisational 
processes can be argued to be a possible explanatory cause of why many companies fail 
to reap benefits of top down implementation of TQM and re-engineering projects. Line 
workers may be given the tools and taught the principles of TQM, but if management 
does not change inappropriate patterns of behaviours and organisational systems, the 
programme is likely to fail. 
Majchrzak and Wang (1996) studied organisations which had abandoned functional 
structures to create process complete departments. They concluded that managers spend 
most of their efforts redesigning the organisation but fail to rethink their own role and 
continue "to act like functional chiefs even though the functions no longer formally 
exist". In cases where that was happening the units were under-performing as compared 
with those where managers have developed a collective sense of responsibility. Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect that the organisational processes at the bottom of the organisation 
are dependent on higher order managerial processes. Teece and Pisano write: 
[findings in the literature] suggest that productive systems display high 
interdependency, and that it may not be possible to change one level 
without changing the others. This appears to be true with the `lean 
production' model... 
The learning literature also recognises the necessity for systems' coherence. Fiol and 
Lyles (1985) see strategy, structure, and culture as interdependent elements in the 
creation of a learning organisation. Similarly, Senge argues that successful leaders, who 
create learning organisations, are systemic thinkers who are able to see interrelationships 
and processes, instead of things and snapshots. Leonard-Barton (1992b) also found that 
practices, values, and systems are mutually dependent on a delicate balance. 
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We have proposed above that organisational behavioural processes can be understood in 
terms of co- o dination. entrepreneurship, and learning. Evidence from the literature 
(which is largely unconnected) substantiates the idea that these categories are linked to 
superior operational performance. 
The MSM does not see any strategic importance in the contribution of shop floor 
individuals. An exception can be made with Hayes and Wheelwright (1984), who are 
closer to the lean production perspective, and argue that companies that achieve stage 
four are those that are committed to continuous improvement. Nevertheless, the role of 
individuals involved in continuously finding better ways of producing things, is 
fundamentally different from the strategic role given to organisational members in this 
research. 
The lean production paradigm sees organisational members' contribution to performance 
improvement in terms of continuous improvement activities. Similarly, the resource- 
based literature sees individuals contributing to the creation of capabilities by conducting 
search processes that will lead to organisational learning (Doz, 1994). The view here is 
different. We consider the search routines that lead to continuous improvement, in terms 
of process control activities. The important contribution goes beyond that and is 
fundamentally different in nature. The strategic contribution of organisational members 
to operational performance is to be found in ingrained behaviours that belong to the 
organisation. These intangible assets at the bottom of the organisation understood as 
learning, entrepreneurship, and co-ordination, determine the efficiency of tangible 
business processes. Therefore active organisational processes are a necessary condition 
for the firm's business processes to deliver a differentiated outcome. 
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Thus, this hypothesis advocates that these processes are the key to achieving performance 
and explains the real contribution of organisational members towards the evolution of 
operational performance. 
Hypothesis 5: Leanness is a necessary outcome of the process of strategic operational 
performance improvement 
One of the key differences between strategic operational performance improvement and ý`nr^ 
operational performance improvement is that the organisation should go leaner at the 
same time as its operational performance improves. For instance, it is possible for an 
organisation to become more flexible without becoming leaner. It may be a matter of 
assigning more resources to close the gap between current flexibility and desired 
flexibility. To be strategic, operational improvement has to be based on transformation 
which allows the organisation to use fewer resources while delivering an improved 
output. 
Organisations use buffers to deal with speed and complexity (Galbraight, 1995). We see 
buffers as a wider concept than only the physical stock of row material, WIP, or finished 
goods. Gittel (1995) argues that because the other airlines cannot count on developed co- 
ordination processes such as those exhibited by employees of Southwest, they have to 
rely on buffers such as increased staff and schedule turnaround time at the gate. This 
difference is the key to Southwest operational advantage. Gittel writes: 
Southwest challenged the industry by providing inexpensive on time 
services with speed turnaround that increased aircraft utilization and 
lowered costs, assisted by superior co-ordination of the departure 
process. 
Superior organisational processes eliminate the need for buffers. However, as argued in 
hypothesis 3, superior processes are dependent on the evolution of compatible managerial 
processes. They may also depend on the redesign of business processes because superior 
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behavioural processes cannot result in superior performance when business processes are 
hopelessly inefficient. 
A sequence of events leading to the desired strategic outcome of the development of an 
operational performance which is able to affect positively the competitiveness of the 
organisation has been proposed. It begins with the evolutionary adaptation of its initial 
conditions, and develops managerial processes that are systemically consistent. This 
allows behavioural processes to become very active, resulting in high performing 
business processes which will enable the organisation to shed its buffers. 
This sequence of events is likely to be self-reinforcing. The elimination of buffers 
facilitates (or in some cases allows) the evolution of managerial processes because 
interrelationships become more visible and consequently more manageable. 
Organisational processes should also benefit because fewer buffers facilitate more and 
better interpersonal relationships. 
In this chapter we have: 
" Based on grounded research, proposed a model of the process through which 
organisations achieve improvement in operational performance, taking into account 
the process drivers and the initial conditions that hinder the process 
9 Defined the categories of organisational process and argued for the importance of 
their role in creating competitive advantage. We then defined the attributes of each 
process based on the literature and observations from the field. 
" Defined the categories of managerial process in a similar fashion while emphasising 
the correspondence of each process to established areas of the literature 
" Defined the role of process control and redesign. We also added the relevant literature 
review in the field which had not been covered in the first chapter 
" Defined the exploratory hypotheses which are based on observations from grounded 
research and underpinned by elements of the literature 
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Chapter 4- Macro Research Framework 
We begin this chapter by considering the implications to 
research design of a study aimed at identifying the origins of 
advantage. We speculate on the relevance of the division 
between research on process and content. We then identify the 
challenges that occur in process research, and consider the first 
major research design choice between qualitative and 
quantitative methods. We arrive at the decision tree that defines 
the research framework. after examining issues related to the 
overall objectives of the research and the epistemological view 
adopted. 
Finally, validity and reliability issues that our research framework 
should be tested against are considered. 
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4.1. Introduction 
The appropriate research methodology has to consider the idiosyncrasies and challenges 
of integrating literature traditions in strategic management and operations management, 
namely the resource-based theory and the manufacturing strategy and lean production 
paradigms. In the literature review we have discussed the incompatibilities of both 
literatures. 
The rcsource-based literature (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; WVernerfelt, 1984; Lippman 
and Rumelt. 1982; Itami 1987; Barney, 1986; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Teece, Pisano, 
and Schuen, 1990) has made a strong case for the importance of organisation specific 
production resources in driving competition. It has also found great acceptance among 
managers (Prahalad and Hamel). Because research has been mainly based on refutation- 
oriented large sample studies it has largely failed to produce managerial advice (Doz, 
1994) for decisions regarding strategy in operations. 
In contrast to the RBV which regards the soft aspect of the organisation as the only base 
on which to build sustainable advantages, the manufacturing regards it as of secondary 
importance. Authors such as )[ayes and Wheelwright (1984), who address the soft side of 
strategy. do it in a way that is vague and problematic, on two counts: (a) They see the 
organisation in tcnns of structure and systems, and limit managerial intervention to 
content of stratcgy. (b) They regard the contribution of organisational members, apart 
from senior managers. in the evolution of operational abilities in terms of their 
participation in process control efforts, or in random processes of search and learning. 
To adopt a view of the organisation in terms of its processes is an important step towards 
operationalising research that bridges the two perspectives (Garvin, 1994). By viewing 
the organisation in terms of a bundle of processes, instead of structures and systems, we 
can investigate the strategic importance of what managers do. This method is also a 
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vehicle for understanding the lower levels of the organisation as the locus of firm specific 
and not transferable advantage. 
Business strategy literature theory about the origins of advantage and the relevance of the 
distinction between strategy process and content, has direct consequences for the macro- 
research design adopted in this research, and is discussed here. We then describe the 
characteristics of quantitative and qualitative research before defining the research design 
that is most appropriate for our research objectives. Finally, the chosen research design is 
tested against validity and reliability considerations. 
4.2. The origins of advantage 
This research is located within the field of operations management but it is also 
influenced by parallel discussions taking place in the broader field of strategic 
management. In parallel with the issue of evolution of operational performance 
considered here is the strategic management discussion of the origins of competitive 
advantage. 
Porter (1991) believes that the answer to the question of how competitive advantages 
develop is to be found on two fronts. Ile suggests that the available literature is 
reasonably developed and can explain the particular causes of superior performance at a 
certain point in time. The "cross-sectional problem" addresses "what" constitutes a 
position of competitive advantage. It is mainly a static analysis which has to be separated 
from a dynamic one termed the "longitudinal problem" which examines "how" 
competitive positions arc created. Before discussing Porter's argument we should 
consider if there is any relevance in the dichotomy between content ("what") and process 
("how"). 
4.2.1. The distinction between strategy content and process 
In order to disentangle process and content we need to establish a connection between 
intention and outcome. If there were no connection between what is intended and the 
137 
outcome there would be no need for content. We should then consider the various 
perspectives of the strategy process in the literature because not all see a connection 
between strategy and outcome. According to Mintzberg (1990), managers base their 
actions on trial and error learning accumulated from their daily interaction with other 
organisational members and the environment. 
An associated research stream which also focuses on the decision process is the Carnegie 
tradition developed by Cyert and March, and Simon (cited in Chakravarthy and Doz, 
1992). It assumes a basic premise that managers wish to avoid uncertainties and search 
for new solutions only when they face problems. Schendel (1994) notes that to espouse 
the view that strategy emerges from daily activities of managers is to assume that 
managers "do not engage in a deliberate search process for strategy", but instead it 
emerges from random and collective action. This leads to the conclusion that strategy 
"does not result from a perceived need for change". 
Schendel notes that shaping and implementing cannot be considered the same unless we 
share Mintzbcrg's assumption that there is no connection between managerial intentional 
search process for strategy and outcomes. Good strategy, Schendel argues, requires ex- 
ante understanding of both "what' the elements of a winning position are, and "how" they 
should be achieved and sustained. 
The answers to the "how" question, it is argued, are to be found in the working of 
organisational administrative processes. These processes shape strategy. Different 
processes are necessary to make use of the strategy. Therefore, there are different 
organisational processes concerned with finding, using, and executing the strategy. 
Schendel says: 
The strategy process sub-Geld is concerned with how effective strategies 
are shaped within the firm and then validated and implemented 
efficiently. (Schendel. 1994) 
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Although in practical terms the consequences of the "what" questions certainly affect the 
"how", and vice-versa, it is concluded that we can consider the process of strategy as an 
independent research matter. 
4.2.2. The challenges in process research 
Porter suggests that the cross-sectional problem has been largely solved, and the success 
of organisations at a certain point in time can be explained by a privileged position in an 
attractive industry. The cross-sectional problem is alternatively explained in the RBV by 
the possession of organisation specific superior production resources. This debate was 
already addressed in chapter II and is therefore omitted here. 
The longitudinal problem, it is argued, should be explained in terms of the dialectical 
interaction between managerial choices and initial conditions within a period of time. 
Whereas pure choice would "lead to the assembly or creation of the particular skills and 
resources required to carry out the new strategy", initial conditions in the form of 
reputation, skills, and in-place activities "clearly influence feasible choices as well as 
constrain them". 
There arc four principal issues that should be part of an explanation of the longitudinal 
problem: sing frameworks or models, dopting qualitative or quantitative methods to 
test the theory, determining the appropriate chain of causality andithe time frame 
involved. The first two are discussed here while the last two will be considered later on. 
Initially one should choose between models which are mathematically rigorous but can 
only handle situations that are narrow and limited in complexity, and frameworks, which 
in turn, are able to deal with broader domains and encompass a bigger number of 
variables but arc less mathematically rigorous. 
"Frameworks" was the approach adopted in theory building in the field of strategy 
because it can inform practice. The practicality of frameworks comes from their ability to 
highlight variables that would otherwise be omitted by models, and to tackle the diversity 
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of competitive situations, the range of actually available strategic choices, and the 
unstable character of the main parameters. Knowledge, Porter argues, is embodied into 
strategy frameworks in many different ways: 
... in the choice of included variables, the way variables are organised, 
the interaction among the variables, and the way in which alternative 
patterns of variables and company choices affect outcomes. (Porter, 
1991) 
Porter rules out the possibility of using statistical methods to test frameworks. He uses 
many in-depth case studies in his treatment of the cross sectional case as a means of 
specifying variables and exploring relationships between them, while controlling industry 
and firm specific approaches to strategic choices. He then concludes that the longitudinal 
problem cannot be approached by any other means than through the use of in depth-case 
studies to carry out empirical theory testing. 
4.3. A distinction between qualitative and quantitative research methods 
A number of issues highlight the distinction between quantity and quality in research. 
Three main dimensions arc used here to characterise this distinction: (a) The nature of the 
involvement of the researcher, (b) the kind of data collected, (c) how generalisations are 
established. 
The relationship of the researcher with the subject in quantitative research may be very 
superficial and brief or may not even happen. This is the case where the researcher relies 
on postal questionnaire survey or laboratory experiments. In contrast, qualitative research 
relies on interviews and possibly direct observation, and entails an extensive degree of 
personal involvement and interaction between interviewer and interviewee. 
Consequently. whereas the researcher is an outsider in quantitative research, s/he should 
attempt to become an insider in qualitative designs because these designs demand an 
understanding of the perspective of those being researched. The researcher should 
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develop a sense of what is relevant and even the jargon used in the setting of the 
empirical research. 
The objective is to allow the qualitative researcher to develop a greater awareness of what 
happens in reality (Glasser and Strauss, 1967) and to "weed out" those variables that do 
not. The researcher may even begin the study without identifying what the variables are. 
The reasons for adopting qualitative research thus support Porter's (1991) justification of 
the superiority of frameworks over mathematical models as instruments of research into 
complex and little understood issues. 
The kind of data collected is a direct consequence of the nature of the involvement of the 
researcher and the picture s/he attempts to build, whether considering limited variables 
under particular conditions. or understanding a greater number of factors and the 
relationships among them. The nature of involvement is therefore seen as the key issue 
which differentiates both styles of research (Bryman, 1989). 
Whereas quantitative data is described as "hard, rigorous, and reliable", qualitative data is 
described as "rich". These different adjectives highlight the different nature of data 
collection. Quantitative researchers are concerned with identifying systematic procedures 
that can be readily checked and used by other researchers interested in replicating the 
research. I lowcvcr. qualitative research makes use of greater contact with the object of 
research to create a more complex picture of the interrelations that are involved. 
Quantitative researchers have their research design defined before the first interview. 
They know which kind of data has to be collected in order to test the proposed theory. 
Conversely qualitative researchers often engage in a lot of preliminary fieldwork before 
they define an appropriate research design. Qualitative researchers are even encouraged 
to keep their research strategy open early in the field study because exposure to data may 
help them to refine the theoretical research framework. 
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A quantitative approach assumes a theory from which we can derive an explanation about 
a certain phenomenon. Hypotheses arc formulated from the theory in a way that they can 
be tested. The results of the tests are indicative of the validity of the theory as well as 
standing as isolated knowledge of the phenomenon studied. Qualitative data is only 
knowledge when inserted into a theoretical framework. 
Quantitative and qualitative research correspond to a dichotomy between nomothemic 
and ideographic modes of reasoning {Tsoukas, 1989). The former approach reflects an 
effort to establish generalisations that are independent of the place and time of the 
research, while the latter places its findings in the context of specific time and place. 
Nevertheless it should be noted that, in practice, quantitative research normally fails to 
have unrestricted generalisation whereas qualitative research can be designed with the 
objective of enhancing generalisability. 
4.4. Choosing the research design 
Any research aimed at understanding how advantages based on "invisible assets" are 
developed. is faced with an obvious problem: ambiguity. The sustainability of 
competitive advantage depends on three factors: (a) environment change which can make 
that specific advantage obsolete. (b) availability of substitutes (c) the inimitability of the 
development process (Peteraf. 1993). 
Hypotheses (a) and (b) are unlikely to happen in cases in which advantage is based on 
perceived superior operational performance (e. g., higher quality of service, or flexibility 
of response to customers' demand for manufacturing). Then, the sustainability of 
advantage is largely dependent on how observable is the process through which inputs 
are transformed into a superior outcome. Considering inputs and the process to be 
identifiable. is to consider that advantage depends solely on the availability of the inputs 
in perfect markets. Therefore. if the same resources are available to all organisations, we 
cannot cxpWn performance heterogeneity among firms. 
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The resource view adopted in this research assumes that the causes of advantage are 
essentially unobservable and ambiguous. It suggests that the research objective here 
cannot be aimed at building a normative theory of how to develop outstanding 
operational performance. Instead our goal should be to provide insights into the process 
of evolution of outstanding operational performance by creating a dynamic framework of 
the drivers of this process. In their investigation of strategic change and competition 
Pettigrew and «'hipp (1991) argue that: 
The process of strategic change is not likened to a linear, sequential 
assembly line of investigation. choice and implementation. In practice 
knoN ledge. decisions and actions are simultaneously linked. 
Our definition of this research has led us away from a traditional view of the 
organisations as structure and systems. If we were to explain the evolution of operational 
abilities as determined by managerial choices of structure and systems, and by the 
acquisition of external resources, then such changes could be observable and readily 
imitable. 
But the process of evolution depends on factors that are closely parallel to Reed and 
DeFillippi's (1990) description of invisible resources which are tacit, diffused through the 
organisation. and/or socially embedded. Operational advantage, according to the model 
presented in this research, emerges from the action and interaction of managerial 
processes and systems, organisational processes. and the control and redesign of work 
proccsscs. 
We would not be able to prescribe through a `grand' theory how organisations should 
proceed in order to develop superior abilities because cause and effect relationships are 
not observable. The ambiguity problem inherent in this research highlights the 
impossibility of establishing causal links between identifiable inputs and superior 
Outcomes. 
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Research 'hich does not set out to determine causal linkages needs to be positioned in 
the debate between positivists. w ho consider this kind of research as a tool for making 
predictions, and realists, who acknowledge that it might inform us about the deeper 
nature of reality. This discussion has clear implications for theory testing. 
In this section we select our research design in terms of its consistency with the 
objectives of the research and the epistemological view espoused. In the next section the 
capacity of the chosen design to resist logical tests of validity and reliability is assessed. 
4.4.1. Implications of unobservables to theory testing 
Because we cannot empirically observe cause and effect relationships in this research we 
are led away from a positivist view of science. Below, we summarise the principal 
approaches and argue that Popper's approach to theory testing is the most suitable for this 
research. 
The central idea in positivism is that, in order to be meaningful, a theory must be 
empirically observable. A direct consequence of this idea is that knowledge is only 
advanced when a theoretical proposition can be verified by an empirical observation. It 
draws the line bet wween what positivists regard as science and what they do not. The 
emergence of a number of well established theories such as Quantum mechanics, which 
defies empirical observation, forced positivists into a more flexible position ? 
(intrumcntalism, Did model) «hilc remaining sceptical about the ability of these theories 
to tell us something about reality. 
The basic diffcrcnce between a realist and a positivist view of science is that the former is 
willing. under certain conditions, to accept the existence of unobservable elements 
whereas the latter would regard a theory based on unobservable elements as non- 
scientific, or at the most, as a useful explanation tool. Realists argue that all modern 
scientific endeavour is based on theories that contain unobservable elements, and if we 
consider them to be metaphysical, we are considering all progress made by technological 
know ledge to be a product of metaphysical theories. 
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Realists assume that w should at those theories that are `approximately true as if they 
were true'. A theory is true if it is able to explain a set of phenomena better than others. 
The wider the range of phenomena that it can explain the more reasons we have to 
believe that it is true. The coincidence argument is explained by Godfrey and Hill (1995) 
as follows: " It would be an absurd coincidence indeed if a variety of different kinds of 
phenomena were all explained by a particular theory, and yet that theory were not true. " 
The realists have abandoned the formal theory of truth, which assesses a proposition by 
its syllogistic form, in favour of assessing whether a proposition corresponds to the real 
world or not. In this sense, Popper's (1972) "common sense approach to knowledge" 
argues that the truth about theories which are based on elements that cannot be observed, 
is dependent on standing up to repeated attempts to falsify it. Although we can never be 
absolutely sure about the propositions, they remain true until they can be proven false. 
We test the theory proposed here using Popper's approach by attempting to falsify the 
initial hypothesis. The sampled companies are of different sizes, trade in different 
industries and, above all. have undergone processes of change that vary in their degree of 
transformation. The sample was designed to extend the range of phenomena that the 
theory sets out to justify thus improving the chances of refutation of the hypotheses. If the 
theory stands the test, we have more reasons to believe that it corresponds to reality than 
We would have by sampling similar companies. 
Our adoption of a realist position is not common in operations management research. The 
field of operations has hardly rccognised unobservable factors as relevant to the 
development of theories in the field. This is not surprising if we consider that it has its 
roots in the scientific management of the factory and is in many ways close to 
engineering. The manufacturing strategy framework is about identifying desirable 
outcomes and gathering necessary structural inputs. Thus the manufacturing strategy 
paradigm expects clear causal linkages among structural changes, infrastructural 
decisions and the desired outcome. 
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The new paradigm of competitive advantage leads to the recognition that the 
infrastructural side of strategy is more important than the structural one in creating 
competitive advantage (Hayes and Pisano, 1995). Cause and effect relationships in 
infrastructure cannot be observed as easily as in structural terms. This suggests that a 
realist view is more appropriate than a positivist one. 
4.42. Choosing between qualitative and quantitative methods 
The objective of this research is to shed light on the intra-firm mechanisms that allow 
firms to develop operational performance differentiation. This parallels the strategic 
management debate over the origins of advantage. It has been stated earlier that Porter 
(1991) sees the debate over competitive advantage as two different problems: the "cross- 
section problem" and the "longitudinal problem". 
The longitudinal problem is concerned with "how" outcomes are achieved, and 
constitutes the focus of this research. In order to investigate the "how" question we need 
to open the "plack box" of the firm. This research addresses the way in which strategy is 
shaped, validated, and implemented. Consequently, unlike content researchers, process 
researchers cannot afford to keep a distance from the actual processes which perform 
these three activities. 
Considering the need for involvement of the researcher, together with the basic 
characteristics of quantitative and qualitative research methods, we can conclude that 
qualitative methods are a more appropriate choice. Bryman (1989) proposes four 
important research designs. Because the objectives of this research exclude quantitative 
methods, the use of a survey research is considered incompatible with the objectives of 
this research. 
There are three qualitative modalities of research: Experimental research, action research, 
and case study research (Br man, ibid. ). Experimental research presupposes that the 
researcher is able to interfere with the independent variables and observe the effect that 
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they have on the dependent variables. This is clearly misconceived, because dependent 
variables such as management behaviour or techniques of process control (which were 
defined during the field research) cannot be controlled by the researcher. Also, the data is 
collected ex-post to events. 
In action research the participation of the researcher goes beyond that of observer and 
data collector. S/he also advises the organisation on possible lines of action. The research 
includes observations of the effect of the researcher's suggestions on the organisational 
problem that is being examined. This is clearly not the case with exploratory research in 
which the concepts are initially little understood by the researcher. In addition, action 
research presupposes that the research cannot be undertaken when the events have 
already taken place. 
Therefore we are left with only one research methodology appropriate for the 
investigation of the evolution of operational performance. This is case study research. It 
has the advantage of facilitating a study of events where the research depends on the 
participants' perception of reality and where s/he has little or no control over the process. 
It gives the researcher the opportunity to be involved in reality, which particularly suits 
theory building, especially in cases where previous knowledge is limited (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
4.4.3. Chain of causality 
Two challenges to the study of the "longitudinal problem" identified by Porter refer to the 
definition of a chain of causality and the appropriate time horizon that the research should 
consider retrospectively. Given that the evolutionary process should be understood in 
terms of initial conditions and managerial choices, the adoption of a starting point that is 
a long way back in the chain of causality may cause some of the initial conditions to 
become managerial choices. This can render the problem intractable. On the other hand, 
considering events late in the process may jeopardise the research results. 
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In this research, watershed events were chosen to determine the starting points in a chain 
of causality that could be studied. Ten years was also considered to be a time limit as 
beyond that. managers and workers would not be able to recollect and make sense of 
actions and events that could have influenced the process. 
4.4.4. Number of cases 
According to Yin (1994). case studies can be designed to involve single or multiple cases. 
Ile argues that a fundamental choice must be made between single and multiple cases 
before any attempts are made to collect data. Using the same rationale as the one that 
justified single experiments, single cases may be appropriate in specific circumstances: 
(a) In cases where the theory is well established and has specified the circumstances 
under which the propositions are assumed to be true (a single critical case which meets 
all the conditions foreseen by the theory may be a useful way to challenge and extend the 
theory), (b) in rare cases which represent extreme or unique cases, (c) and in revelatory 
cases that have never been considered in the theory. A more complex design is justifiable 
when there are sub-units of analysis that can be incorporated, because single cases can be 
enhanced by the adoption of embedded cases. 
The weakness of single case research is that there is little opportunity for challenging the 
initial framework. Single case research is not therefore appropriate for this research 
study. 
A central consideration in multiple-case designs is which sites to select. The choice of 
case study sites should not follow a "sampling logic" but instead a "replication logic". 
"Sampling logic" requires the use of statistical procedures to select a specific subset of 
the overall population to be surveyed. The resulting data is assumed to represent the 
entire population within confidence intervals. In contrast, "replication logic" is based on a 
rich theoretical framework that can predict the conditions of a phenomenon. 
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The number of cases selected will depend on the particularities of the research. It is 
important to consider the disparities between the competing theories. If these are subtle a 
bigger number of cases may be necessary. If there is huge disparities between the 
explanations provided by the rival theories then a lower number of cases is sufficient. 
The decision tree sums up the key decisions that have defined the overall shape of the 
research design. 
Theoretical Theory testing Specific technique Sampling 
framewcork modality 
Model Experimental 
Quantitative Single 
Framework Action research 
Qualitative Multiple 
Case-study 
Figure 4.1 Research design decision tree 
Because the theories considered here (the resource-based theory, manufacturing strategy, 
and lean production) do not provide clear cut contrasting explanations for the 
phenomenon. we opt for the maximum possible number of cases, considering the depth 
of analysis and the constraints of Ph. D. research. We judge that the appropriate number 
of cases should tour Some of the key issues that contributed to the shape of the 
research design are: 
Issue Implications 
Ambiguity Impossibility of establishing causal links. Need for realist view 
Theory testing Popper's "common sense approach to knowledge" 
Chain of causality Careful definition of initial point to avoid exogenous variables to 
become endogenous and vice-versa. 
Number of cases Four. As theories are not strikingly contrasting we consider as 
many cases as it is recommendable in in-depth case study research 
Table 4.1- is+cs Inv ob rd In research design 
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emergent theory, or they may be chosen to fill theoretical categories and provide 
examples of polar types". 
This research used grounded research in one initial case to define the research hypothesis 
and then selected cases that were likely to predict similar results. The companies had in 
common the fact that they had been through a process in which their operational 
performance had dramatically increased and they showed a number of indications that 
they had actually achieved differentiation at the operational level which had given them a 
competitive advantage over their competitors. This is discussed in more depth under 
sampling. 
The patterns observed in the grounded research phase were expected to be repeated in all 
other cases. Given that all cases turned out as predicted, the initial propositions could 
then claim support from the evidence and the resulting framework was able to state the 
conditions under a hich the phenomenon was likely to occur. 
Apart from demonstrating its validity. a study should also be reliable. This means that all 
the steps of the research should be demonstrated to be replicable by other researchers to 
producc the samt results. 
The quantitative part of the research does not have reliability problems as other 
researchers can use the questionnaires. The questionnaires used in this research are 
presented in the appendix. 
The qualitative interviews did not follow protocol for reasons that we have already 
explained. Iloacvcr they followed clearly defined lines of questioning. The questions 
were formulated to reveal variations in the state of the variables. In the next chapter we 
explain how ae defined very carefully what we meant by process. It reinforces the fact 
that another researcher would obtain the same answers. All interviews were tape recorded 
and transcripted in full. 
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In this chapter we have: 
(a) Considered the challenges and particularities of research aimed at understanding how 
advantage evolves 
(b) Defined the decision tree that leads to our macro research framework 
(c) Confronted the chosen framework with validity and reliability criteria 
In the next chapter we define the micro-research design. 
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Chapter 5- The Micro Research Framework 
In this chapter we explain the micro research design. We begin 
by describing the sample companies and explain how grounded 
research was used to build our research model. The data 
collection in this research involved both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Because qualitative data collection was not 
based on rigid questionnaires, the meaning of process and the 
adopted theory of process are discussed. We then describe the 
actual steps taken during the qualitative data collection phase. 
Quantitative data collection involves the design of the 
questionnaire and statistical tests to ensure the scale's validity 
and reliability. 
From data collection we move to data analysis. Explanation 
building was the chosen analytic strategy. We discuss why 
explanation is built in terms of relationships instead of cause and 
effect explanations, and define the analytical focus and the goals 
of the research respectively as outcomes and prediction. We 
close the chapter by describing how case studies were used to 
treat the data. 
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5.1. Defining the micro-research design 
We concluded in the previous section that the most suitable macro research design was 
qualitative and based on multiple case studies. In this section we analyse the choices 
involved in determining the micro research design. We explain how the sample was 
defined, how grounded research was used, and how quantitative and qualitative data were 
collected, analysed and treated. 
Research goals are defined in terms of three objectives, to provide: (a) description, (b) 
theory testing, and (c) theory building. Definition of the research in terms of one of these 
goals has direct consequences for the research design. Description of the phenomenon 
only would be unsatisfactory while theory testing is not an available alternative because 
the constructs are ill defined. Thus theory building is adopted here as a research goal, of 
which the final product is a conceptual framework (Eisenhardt, ibid. ). 
In the previous chapter we adopted a realist view and discarded theory testing in terms of 
observable causal relationships. Consequently we have to discuss the validity of 
scientifical claims grounded in a realist proposition. based on "adequate explanation" of 
the phenomenon and its consequences for theory testing. Finally, necessary choices in 
terms of analytical focus and research goals help to define the approach to data treatment. 
In sum, this research is essentially an interactive one between data and analysis, as is 
normally the case with case study research aimed at theory building. It attempts to profit 
from the strengths of this modality of research which are defined by Eisenhardt as: (a) the 
juxtaposition of contradictory and paradoxical evidence and literature in order to unfreeze 
thinking, (b) the generation of constructs that can be measured and hypotheses that can be 
proven false, which are specially suitable for a realist view adopted here and (c) the 
likelihood that the method is valid because the research was built on a tight iterative 
process with field evidence generated by grounded research. 
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5.2. The sample 
The key sampling criterion was that a selected company would have undergone a process 
in which its operational performance was improved at a rate that would be enough to alter 
the competitive position of the firm. Indeed the cases selected here all have dramatic 
ratings of improvement and their current competitive position is radically different from 
the point where they had started the strategic process. 
It is our intention to argue that these companies developed differentiation in terms of 
operational performance. In some cases there is objective evidence that key processes, 
such as claim turn around time for a health insurer like CIGNA, have considerably 
superior performance ratings than their industries' overall standard. In other cases, where 
benchmark data were not available, other evidence indicates that the company enjoyed a 
position of advantage. We then can argue that this newly found position of advantage is 
due to operational performance improvement because the industry structure has hardly 
been altered since the beginning of the strategic process. 
To ensure that we could find companies with the desirable characteristics we decided to 
select them from among those which had been given prestigious awards. This is a further 
indication that these companies had an edge in their industries. CIGNA Health Care was 
the 1995 national award winner for Service Excellence, and TNT received the 1995 and 
1996 European Quality Award Prizes in addition to the UK Quality Award in 1994. The 
Toshiba air-conditioner plant in Plymouth was awarded the 1996 prize for the best 
manufacturing plant in their industry. Finally, SERASA was the winner of the Brazilian 
National Quality Award (PNQ) in 1995. 
Thus these companies have in common a dramatic improvement in their operational 
performance and consequent market expansion. The average price of SERASA's main 
product fell by 52 percent while the lead time fell from 27 days to 7. There are plans to 
reduce it to one day by the end of 1998. The quality improvement of its interface with 
customers was reported to be dramatic. 
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The strong customer orientation, attested by the national quality award which SERASA 
received in 1995, did not exist when the company was producing only for the captive 
market of its shareholders. The market expansion achieved by the company resulted in a 
jump from a little more than 500 clients to more than 14000. The company also boasts an 
increase from 7 millions to 70 millions in the amount of information supplied, with the 
same basic human and physical resources. 
The medical costs for CIGNA's clients have increased at a rate far below inflation in 
medical care in the UK, without sacrificing the quality of treatment given to the 
customer. Claim turnaround time is down from 15 to 4 days, quality rose 55 percent, 
service level is up by 52 percent, new business quoting time was reduced from 17 to 2 
days, savings of 870 million pounds were achieved in the first two years of the 
implementation of a team structure. 
TNT evolved from a situation of crisis in which it could retain only 8 percent of its new 
clients, to a completely different competitive position. Now, about 99 percent of 
deliveries are on time even considering circumstances beyond TNT's control such as the 
weather, which is unlikely to be matched by its competitors because customers' surveys 
consistently rate TNT as the most reliable for parcel delivery. None of its 20 major clients 
have defected in the last three years and 16 of them have been trading with TNT for more 
than five years. In the meantime, revenue has grown from £144 million to £230 million 
since 1993. 
Toshiba started from scratch and achieved quality levels on a par with its Japanese 
mother plant and very competitive cost levels. Since November 1991, production has 
grown more than 400 percent with an increase of the workforce from 120 to 290 
employees. In the last 12 months, productivity has grown by 40 percent with little capital 
investment. The best factory award earned by the company in 1995 was awarded on the 
basis that the company presented an operational performance superior to its competitors. 
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Day and Wensley (1988) see positional advantages in terms of superior customer value 
and/or lower relative costs which lead to performance outcomes indicators such as 
satisfaction, loyalty, market share, and profitability. Whereas market share and 
profitability may be affected by other factors, such as the structure of the industry and 
past performance, loyalty and customer satisfaction are more sensitive to current 
operational performance. 
Customers would not be loyal to an unreliable service or a poor quality product. The fact 
that the companies in our case studies have very high rates of customer satisfaction and 
very low rate of customer defection are strong indications of the existence of a 
competitive edge. Also the companies studied have had their profit and market share 
significantly increased since the beginning of the process with cases of very strong 
market expansion. The final indication already cited above, is the prestigious awards 
linked to operational excellency that they have received. 
5.3. Defining the theoretical framework - grounded research 
As the constructs could not be defined prior to the beginning of the field work, we made 
use of the grounded theory research (Glasser and Strauss, 1967) to identify the relevant 
factors involved in the evolution of operational performance which are the independent 
variables in this research. Successful evolution of outstanding operational performance 
was defined as the dependent variable. 
Initially a questionnaire was developed to be used as a reference to open-ended 
interviews in the first organisation. Managerial and organisational processes were only 
vaguely defined at this stage. Initial data collection forced us to rethink and reshape our 
typology of managerial processes. Evidence also uncovered the need to add a category 
independent from managerial processes which referred to the ways the organisation 
interfered with its business processes. 
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A number of pre-concepts that were implicit in the literature or which we thought were 
reasonable hypotheses had to be discarded in the first contacts with field reality because 
no correspondence was found with reality. The link between the perception of operational 
strengths and marketing actions, bottom up drivers as the main variables in the evolution 
of operational performance, and a direct relationship between the evolution of 
performance and climbing to higher stages of knowledge are some examples of issues 
that we discarded. 
The grounded research also served to identify the relevant organisational processes. As 
expected, it was found that co-ordination and learning were important dimensions of the 
intangible processes that were supportive of business processes. It was also found that 
both managers and workers regarded entrepreneurship understood in terms of specific 
categories of spontaneous beneficial behaviour as an important factor to explain 
performance evolution. 
It also revealed the need to differentiate between the ability of completing the learning 
cycle successfully and problem spotting and solving. Both are facets of learning but 
problem spotting and solving are regarded by us as a part of process control activities and 
therefore distinguished from learning as organisational processes. 
To sum up, from the data of the first case grounded theory was the key to identifying and 
defining the meaning of the constructs which make up the theoretical framework. Lyles 
and Mitroff (1980) describe the technique: 
Grounded theory (Glasser and Strauss, 1967) is a process for conducting 
research that attempts to start with a initial guide to collecting and 
verifying data but allows the researcher to be aware of other 
contingencies that will affect the original hypothesis. Hence, the theory is 
grounded on the data but is not rigidly bound to it and the researcher 
can go beyond the original plan and original theory. Grounded theory is 
particularly useful for exploratory research where you cannot have a 
rigid and well connected experimental design. 
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5.4. Data collection methods 
Case studies can combine a number of different sources and tap into both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence. Archives, interviews, and observation are examples of qualitative 
research whilst survey questionnaires are examples of quantitative research. Yin (1994) 
argues that case studies can profit from quantitative methods, which can yield a 
synergistic relationship. This is because quantitative methods can uncover relationships 
that are invisible to the researcher and challenge his/her observations. This results in 
better defined constructs and hypotheses. 
Survey research was not used in the strict sense of triangulation because it cannot focus 
on the same issues as the open-ended interviews. The quantitative method was used to 
gather information on the patterns of behaviour of front line workers. It was 
complemented by a number of open-ended interviews with workers and also 
observations. 
The quantitative measurement of the dependency category (how dependent was one's 
task or the tasks executed by other members) provided triangulation with direct 
observations of the leanness of the production systems and thus helped cross checking for 
internal validity (Jick, 1979). Data collection by the different methods was largely 
parallel but nonetheless allowed more confidence in the results. 
The qualitative data collection was informed in broad terms by the definition of what we 
meant for process and a theory of process, as discussed by Van de Ven. The choices 
involved are explained below. 
5.5. Qualitative data collection 
Above we have concluded that our research question has to be answered through a study 
of the strategy process. But the meaning of process is not as straightforward as it appears 
at a first glance. Van de Ven (1992) suggests that very different views of process are 
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adopted in the literature and they depend on implicit assumptions made by authors. 
Different assumptions, he argues, result not only in different views but also in different 
questions to be asked. 
He then suggests a typology of the process meanings commonly used in the literature: (a) 
explanation for variance theory, (b) category of concepts, and (c) developmental event 
sequence. How we conduct the interviews should not be informed only by a clear 
understanding of process but also by the explanation logic that underpins our view of the 
process. 
5.5.1. The meaning of process 
The first category attempts to explain the model input-process-sequence in terms of a 
causal relationship between inputs and their outcome. It is suggested that, typically, a 
number of "restrictive and unrealistic" assumptions about the order and sequence of 
organisational events may be made in order to support the explanation. This kind of 
research does not open the `black box' in order to observe processes directly. Instead it 
relies on building a logic that can satisfactorily link inputs to outputs, and therefore it is 
unsuitable for the nature of our research. 
Another category sees process in terms of a sequence of events that explains the 
evolution of events over time. Van de Ven considers it to be the least understood of the 
three categories. Instead of examining changes in the variables over time, as is usually the 
case with process research, its description is not based on variables but on stages, 
activities, or incidents that can describe the process in a historical perspective. Although 
this kind of research is suitable for longitudinal studies that suggest their models through 
induction, it is unsuitable for our case because one of the central propositions of this 
research is to identify the variables that are responsible for operational improvement. 
A third category refers to process in terms of a category of concepts linked to actions of 
individuals and organisations. It is the most common meaning of process. It uses 
concepts such as communication frequency, work flows, and decision making techniques, 
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which are operationalised as constructs that are measured as variables. The variables have 
only one pattern of action which means that they can vary from low to high. This view of 
process can only measure the different values of the variable at different points in time 
but cannot explain what caused the variance. This is the view adopted in this research. 
5.5.2. The theory of process 
Van de Ven widely researched disciplines as diverse as biology and geography in search 
of explanations for change process. The result was four basic families which represent 
basic explanations logic or "underlying generative mechanisms or laws" that describe a 
particular sequence of events in function of existing determined contingencies. The 
schools are: Life cycle, teleology, dialectic and evolution. Each of them deserves a 
detailed examination. 
Life cycle theory argues that the initial stage of the organisation contains a set of rules or 
genetic code that will guide the development of the organisation through several 
development stages. The characteristics of the initial stage undergo a process where each 
stage presupposes the other and in which they progressively evolve from being 
homogeneous and simple towards becoming differentiated and complex. Although the 
external environment may play a role in defining the process the final outcome is largely 
determined by the organisational genetic code. 
The evolution process theory is more than just another process perspective and 
constitutes a school of management thinking. Authors that share this perspective are 
divided into Darwinists, who argue that traits can be inherited only through 
intergenerational processes (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Nelson and Winter, 1982); and 
Lamarkians, who argue that it is possible to acquire traits within one generation. The 
progress of the theory to date has not favoured the Darwinist view and has failed to 
operationalise a line of research which is able to demonstrate the mechanisms of 
organisation generation produce a vehicle for intergenerational transmission. Empirical 
evidences favour the Lamarkian view where organisations learn and imitate. 
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The process of change is determined by three drivers: (a) variation, the creation of new 
organisms by chance; (b) selection, the survival of the fittest; and (c) retention, the 
inertial force that opposes variation and selection and works towards retaining the 
existing species. As Van de Ven (1992) puts it, "evolution explains change as a recurrent, 
cumulative, and probabilistic progression of variation, selection, and retention. " 
Teleology process theory represents the approach of strategic planning of the classical 
school of strategy. It assumes that organisations are pursuing purpose and will go through 
adaptive phases to reach that goal. Similar to manufacturing strategy, the organisation 
chooses a goal and then selects from a range of alternatives a route best suited to 
achieving that goal. This selection process is what differentiates teleology from life cycle 
theory. Life cycle theory advocates a "one best way". Its progress towards the rest state 
can be observed because we know what the end state is. After reaching a resting stage, 
external or internal contingencies may launch the organisation into a new process of 
evolution. 
The dialectic process theory sees the process happening in a world where competing 
forces, values, and events struggle among themselves for domination. Conflict may arise 
from internal factors such as conflicting goals or rules of development or may be external 
to the organisation where it conflicts with other entities. This theory recognises and 
admits stages of stability where competing forces are balanced and the status quo is then 
maintained among the competing parts. When, for some reason, an unbalance arises a 
new dynamic process is created. The specific patterns chosen to solve or mediate this 
imbalance of forces will determine one of the three possible final stages: equilibrium, 
oscillation between opposites, and moving away from equilibrium into a process of 
revolutionary change. 
All families of the theories described above share the fact that they are composed of three 
distinct stages: defined starting conditions, emergent process of change, and a functional 
end point. However the theories emphasise different aspects. Dialectical and evolutionary 
theories concentrate on the change process; life cycle theory concentrates on the initial 
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conditions, and teleological theories concentrate on the functional end or final goals of 
the change process. Life cycle and teleological theory are predictive theories because 
they acknowledge the necessary evolutional stages, while dialectical and evolutionary 
theories cannot predict results but provide us with constructs to understand the process of 
change and evolution. 
We consider two facts to choose our view of process: (a) grounded research revealed that 
senior management engaged in a search for desirable end states, and (b) Porter's 
proposition that the process of evolution has to be understood as a dialectical process 
between initial conditions and managerial choices. Thus, one school of thought in 
isolation cannot represent our view of the process and we have chosen one that combines 
the predictive characteristics of teleological theory and the dialectical view. 
5.5.3. Data collection 
By the second stage of the data collection which followed the grounded research phase, 
we had already defined the main elements of the theoretical framework. We then returned 
to the first site, CIGNA, to conduct another set of interviews with management and also 
to distribute the questionnaires for the line workers to complete. 
The next step was to decide who should be interviewed. Like other cases CIGNA was a 
case in which the evolutionary processes had been completed because the independent 
variables were either already steady or changing very little. The basic criterion was to 
select managers who had been in the company since the initial point of the process, or 
who had arrived shortly after. 
In order to set the criteria it was necessary to consider the exact starting point. Porter 
(1991) calls attention to the importance of defining the time frame, because variables 
which are considered indogeneous in the long term, may be considered exogenous within 
a shorter time span. In cases considered here, the starting points are quite evident. 
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In the case of CIGNA the starting point was the shutting down of the English facilities 
and transfer of operations to Scotland. TNT's starting point was the crisis faced by the 
company in the aftermath of the 1988 postal strike, which almost paralysed its operations. 
Toshiba's process began when the micro oven plant was shut down and to give way to 
the air-con manufacturing. SERASA's turnaround process began when the management 
team was removed to make way to the new CEO appointed by the shareholders. 
Middle managers were selected using the criteria that they had already been in that 
position function for a relevant period of time. Exceptions were made when information 
on specific issues was lacking, such as process control. Middle managers were important 
because they could contribute an independent perception of senior managers' processes 
as well as their own processes. Where necessary, a number of team leaders were also 
interviewed to collect more information on issues that had been left incomplete by 
managers. In sites that had been through re-engineering projects we talked with one of 
the middle managers directly involved with the re-engineering project. 
Prior to interviews, the available archival data were requested. Because the organisations 
were award winners, case studies and other articles were obtainable. Although not always 
of academic standard, this material was important to identify a road map prior to the 
interviews and allowed more time for specific questions. 
The foci of the interviews were the individual's first hand experience with the change 
process, their initial feelings, direct participation and role, understanding of and 
commitment to the transformation of the organisation and of the production process. The 
questions also stressed their interaction with other actors from the same and other 
hierarchical levels. Interviewees were also asked to single out the events that they had 
found the most important and to describe them in detail. 
A typical interview would include one phase in which the interviewee was asked to 
recollect what had happened during the whole period. The intention was to develop a 
general understanding of events and of different perceptions and feelings about them. 
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Some questions would direct the interviewees to comment on the effects of initial 
conditions already identified and to unveil other categories of initial conditions. 
The questions of the second phase reflected our adopted meaning of process and focused 
on the variations of the variables identified during the grounded research. Thus, the 
questions were aimed at uncovering variations in those processes over time. Questions 
could not follow a set protocol because they had to be adapted to the particularities of 
each case and were contingent on the answers obtained during the interview. 
Archival data and/or previous interviews were used to refresh the interviewees' memories 
and perceptions in order to avoid potential selective retrospective bias (Doz, 1996). The 
processes were divided into distinctive phases in order to avoid confusion or the 
concentration of the interview on only one specific time. It was also useful in the sense 
that the participants could compare different phases and define alterations in behaviour. 
SERASA and TNT sites are geographically scattered over the whole national territory of 
Brazil and the UK respectively, which made it impossible to track the events in these 
branches. A trade off was made to concentrate only on the heart of the operations which 
was at the headquarters. In TNT's case that meant receiving parcels from the depots, 
sorting them overnight and sending them back to the delivering depots. In SERASA's 
case it meant the collection of documents sent from the branches and the producing of 
reports and financial analysis. 
Interviews were always performed on site. There were at least two visits to each site. 
Plymouth and Greenock were sites, which we visited. We spent 4 days collecting data in 
each site. Each managerial interview would last two hours on average, although some 
were allowed to last a bit longer. Interviews with other members of the organisation 
would average about one hour. On each visit, a considerable amount of archival data was 
also collected. 
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5.6. Quantitative data collection 
Quantitative research paralleled the qualitative data collection described above. A survey 
questionnaire was sent out to be filled in by line employees and team members. The 
questionnaire was designed to measure the intensity of certain bottom process 
behaviours. Interviews were used to measure management processes while survey data 
were used to measure organisational processes. 
Although we used different data sources they were not solely aimed at corroborating the 
same phenomenon. There were overlaps. The leanness of production systems, for 
instance, was evaluated in terms of qualitative (open-ended interviews) and quantitative 
(survey question on dependency) measures. 
5.6.1. Questionnaire design 
As described above the categories of behaviour were identified in the grounded research 
phase when the dimension of entrepreneur behaviour was added to co-ordination and 
learning. Also in this phase, a number of workers were interviewed in order to eliminate 
those items from the item pools that described the behaviours, which although grounded 
in the literature had no connection with the reality of the workers' routine work. 
Before formulating the wording for the questions we had to decide if we were designing a 
descriptive or an analytical survey. Analytical surveys attempt to uncover a causality 
relationship which can vary from a simple mono-causal "A leads to B" relationship, to 
complex multi-causal models where several causal factors may be interdependent. In our 
case, there was no attempt to establish a causal relationship or explain anything. 
Rather, this research aimed only to measure the intensity of categories of behaviour by 
asking people how often they observed those particular behaviours occurring in their 
daily activities. As Oppenheim (1992) explained it: "The job of such survey is essentially 
fact finding and descriptive, it cannot answer the why question". Therefore it is important 
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to note that from this data we cannot establish the causes underlying these categories of 
behaviour. 
We attempted to minimise the risks to validity and reliability of the scale posed by 
careless wording of the questions. Inappropriate wording of questions and questionnaire 
constructions are the usual causes of weak validity, but in the case of factual questions 
this is not as important as in attitude questions, because what we are measuring is not 
within the respondent. Instead, the respondent is instead an observer of an external 
phenomenon which we want to understand. 
The problems of validity may be intensified if the object of the question is not clear to the 
respondent (Oppenheim, ibid. ). Our questions about the degree of change of the 
behaviour in question and the difficulty of implementing that change, are endangered by 
the fact that respondents have to compare actual behaviour with recollections of past 
behaviour which may not be immediately apparent to them. 
The reliability of factual questions may suffer from the fact that people may be poor 
descriptors of their behaviour, providing answers in line with wishful thinking rather than 
relating what had really happened. 
A scale needs to have a single underlying continuum, and thus we can determine a 
scaling approach which ensures linearity and uni-dimensionality. If the scale adopted is 
considered linear then we can treat the scores as integers and apply statistical techniques 
used to analyse interval-type scales, such as: mean, variance, standard deviation, analyses 
of variance, correlation coefficients and so on. Similarly statistical significance tests, such 
as t-tests and F-tests, can also be applied. The use of a Likert scale satisfies these 
conditions. 
Questions were formulated to be answered from one to five according to the Linkert 
scale. In the Likert scale, respondents place themselves in an attitude continuum which 
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runs from `strongly agree' to `agree', `uncertain', `disagree' and `strongly disagree'. For 
scoring purposes these positions are given weights of 5,4,3,2,1. 
Similarly, in this research we made a statement about a particular behaviour and asked 
the respondent to answer how frequently that organisation's members exhibited that 
behaviour. Weights of 5,4,3,2,1 were given to `it always happens', `it happens very 
frequently', `it eventually happens', `it rarely happens', `it never happens'. Similar scales 
were produced to measure the degree of change in each behaviour and the difficulty 
associated with the change process. 
5.6.2. Scale validity and reliability 
Reliability refers both to the measurement instrument and the conditions under which it is 
applied. To increase reliability means to reduce the error component that is associated 
with any sort of measurement. The tactic used to increase reliability was the reduction of 
categories of behaviour such as learning into a pool of items. 
The logic of using many items instead of one is explained by the fact that each answer 
has a part that corresponds to real measurement and one that corresponds to error. The 
part that represents real measurement adds up when there is more than one item while the 
error in each item does not. The result is that the more items we have (up to a practical 
limit) the smaller the total proportion of error is. 
An indication that the items are measuring a single homogeneous variable is the degree to 
which items correlate with each other. This is a statistical test that indicates the 
homogeneity of the scale. Cronbach's Alpha coefficient represents an estimation of the 
proportion of the total variance that is not due to error and is a good estimation of the 
global reliability of our scale. 
In the appendix 2 we show the calculations and results. The shown calculations refer to 
the "purified" scale, although the results differ very little from those obtained with the 
original pool of items (alpha = 0.8576 and standardised alpha = 0.8558). The Cronbach's 
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Alpha obtained is 0.8639. Oppenheim (1992) considers any result above 0.80 to be 
satisfactory. 
It is not possible to ensure concurrent validity because an external acknowledged gold 
standard is not available to judge our results against. In the same way we are prevented 
from establishing predictive reliability because there is no similar research that we can 
compare our results with. The only piece of research that we can refer to is Gittel (1996). 
She found that Southwest had considerably more intense co-ordination behaviour than its 
rivals. However, her research is limited to co-ordination, whereas we investigate also 
learning and entrepreneurship. Thus we are restricted to base validity on construct 
validity. 
One important step to ensure the validity of the constructs is to demonstrate that they are 
based on solid conceptual grounds indicating that there is a correlation between the 
constructs and the abstract concept that has been measured. In previous chapters, the 
connection between the items used in the measurement and the categories measured is 
well grounded in the literature. 
When external references of validity are not available the researcher should concentrate 
more on content validity and in making the measurement reliable. In this sense validity 
and reliability become related to each other (Oppenheim, ibid. ). To increase reliability 
and validity, we performed factor analysis to ensure that the items had something in 
common that could be called respectively, co-ordination, entrepreneurship and learning. 
Initially the five items that measured co-ordination behaviour loaded on two factors. The 
first item loaded very strongly on factor 2 while the others loaded on factor 1. When the 
first item was deleted, all items loaded only on one factor, and thus we concluded that we 
should "weed out" this item. This item was measuring a dependency that, we concluded, 
was more dependent on the contingencies of the business processes than on shop floor 
behaviour. 
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The item pool measuring entrepreneurship had all its items loading on only one factor 
and thus there was no need to alter the original scale. The learning item pool, however, 
had the items loading on two factors. Most of the items loaded on factor one. We then 
decided to eliminate the only item that loaded more strongly on the second factor. The 
eliminated item (number five in the results) represented the behaviour of documenting 
routine solutions. 
In fact, it is more appropriate to consider documenting under activities related to process 
control and redesign due to its close connection with ISO standards, than as an 
organisational behaviour category. With this item eliminated, the items measuring 
learning behaviour loaded on only one factor. 
With our scale "purified" by the elimination of those two items we tested the three 
behaviours together. The results showed that the item loaded on three factors as would be 
expected. The consistency was reinforced by the fact that the items showed a clear 
pattern of loading more heavily on the same factor according to the behaviour they 
represented. Items representing co-ordination, entrepreneurship, and learning loaded 
respectively on factors three, two, and one. 
We then tested our improved scale for the Cronbach alpha coefficient and the result 
obtained represented an improvement on that obtained before the "purification" of the 
scale, which was already good enough. The new results were alpha = 0.8639 and 
standardised item alpha = 0.8631. Normally alphas above 0.80 are considered a good 
indication of reliability. 
5.7. Data analysis 
In order to perform data analysis we had to choose a specific analytic strategy. Yin 
suggests four alternatives: pattern matching, explanation-building, time series analysis, 
and program logic models. The analytical strategy chosen in this thesis is explanation 
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Milles and Huberman (1984) consider that Hume's rules can be greatly extended. 
Features such as local emphasis, causal complexity, temporality, retrospection, variables 
and process should also be considered. They call attention to causal complexity. Unlike 
the "billiard ball" idea, causation cannot be assumed to be unilateral. They quote Weick 
(1979) who considers that when there are two related events it cannot be assumed that 
one is the cause and the other the effect, because ensuing events may modify what 
originally is the cause, which then becomes the effect. 
Researchers usually address this problem by creating a "cause network" in which the 
variables are organised in terms of cause-effect loops. Doz (1996) defines the evolution 
of partnership alliances in terms of a loop where learning is facilitated or hampered by 
initial conditions and revised conditions. In turn, learning allows the re-evaluation of 
initial conditions, thus closing the loop. 
5.7.2. Explanation as relationships, not causality 
Dubin (1969) notes it is implicitly assumed that a statement of relationship may be taken 
as a statement of causality. When developing laws of interactions among units, scientists 
have to determine which units (B, C,... ) can be linked to a given variance of unit A, and 
then have to link the variance in A to variations of the values of the other units (B, C,... ). 
Consider the case of volume expansion of a gas. It can be said that there is an inverse 
relationship linking Y, the measured volume of the gas, and the measured pressure on the 
gas, X. 
An early scientist could plot the relationship on a scatter diagram. He could then draw an 
average fitting line defined by: Y=a+ bX. He would notice that actual values would 
result in considerable error. He would then probably notice that there were other variables 
that also affected the outcome of Y. After many experiments he could discover that other 
variables should be considered. By controlling pressure and the mass of gas, he could 
obtain more accurate results. His findings could then be enunciated as: At a constant 
temperature, a constant mass of gas occupies a volume that is in inverse ratio to the 
pressure it supports. This is, in fact, Boyle's law. 
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The law above gives us a precise statement of the relationship between the units' volume, 
temperature, and pressure. Dubin (ibid. ) calls the attention to the fact that "only the 
values of units are measured in a relationship, never the form of the relationship itself". 
The only thing we know is the value of the variables. We know nothing about the 
relationship of the variables. Still we can predict the outcomes very accurately. Thus 
there is a statement of relationship, not causality, linking inputs to outputs. 
We conclude that explanation building is not necessarily about setting observable causal 
links between the variables and the outcomes. This path, as already discussed, is not 
available to us. Instead, we set out to explain the phenomenon by determining a statement 
of relationship between the state of the variables and the outcomes. 
5.7.3. The power and precision paradox and the goals of data analysis 
Any scientific endeavour which addresses theories of social and human behaviour has 
two possible goals: (a) prediction and (b) understanding. Dubin (ibid. ) argues that in 
terms of theory building in behavioural sciences, "understanding and prediction are not 
often achieved together". He proposes the following classification: 
Goals 
Understanding Prediction 
Analytical focus Interaction  
Outcomes  
Figure 5.1- Focus and Goals of the research. 
Prediction is defined in terms of (a) the ability to foretell the value of one or more units 
making up a system and (b) whether the condition or state of the system as a whole can 
be anticipated. Both (a) and (b) focus on the outcome. On the other hand, understanding 
focuses on the interaction between the variables which make up the system, and concerns 
the way in which these interactions occur. 
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It would be logical to expect that it would be necessary to understand the nature of the 
interactions of the variables in a social system before we could predict any outcome. But 
in fact we can make precise predictions by treating social systems as a black box and 
ignoring how the outcomes have been produced. Even with incomplete knowledge of the 
systems functioning it is possible to draw accurate predictions about when system 
changes occur, which state will succeed the other, and the values of variables. This is the 
precision paradox. 
In contrast the power paradox argues that models of social systems behaviour may be 
powerful in creating knowledge about a social system but they may be very poor at 
predictions. Dubin (ibid. ) suggests that this happens because models of interaction are 
often compromised in three areas: (a) the analytical attention has to be focused upon a 
rather limited realm of phenomena, and therefore it produces meaningful understanding 
about the facts that happen inside that specific scope, (b) scientists may opt for 
controlling or holding other variables in order to clarify understanding, and the 
simplification may increase understanding while certainly decreasing the prediction 
power (c) research may also focus on broad relationships and therefore become very 
vague as an outcome predictor. 
An example of how research geared towards explaining how the relationship between the 
variables has a weak prediction power is Gittel (1996). She explores and enhances 
understanding about the relationship between several systems' elements involved in 
crossfunctional co-ordination. The resulting model shows how an organisation's systems 
and managerial practices contribute to altering the way people think about their jobs. The 
alterations of the cognitive framework of employees impact on operational performance. 
However it is very unlikely that this can predict that all companies which have similar 
systems and practices will achieve superior operational performance. Assuming 
operational performance as dependent only on the co-ordination behaviour of employees 
is to limit the realm of the phenomena, and to hold other variables constant, such as the 
behaviour of top management or the control and redesign of business processes. Gittel 
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(ibid. ) created an option for understanding the relationship between the variables, rather 
than predicting outcomes. 
In this sense, the above paradox has profound consequences on the structure of the case- 
studies write-ups and the data analysis. A study should have a clearly defined goal. It 
should either focus on understanding the relationships among variables or on making 
predictions of outcomes from the value of the variables. 
This study's objective is to predict outcomes and consequently data analysis is 
concentrated on measuring the variables. This is consistent with the meaning of process 
adopted. Conclusions should be drawn in terms of a notion of relationships rather than a 
notion of causality although eventual relationships among the variables can be used only 
as a substitute for conclusions. 
The quantitative data in this research feed into the qualitative research. The survey was 
designed to measure the intensity of organisational behaviour in the organisation and the 
degree to which it had evolved. By using a Likert style scale we treated our results as if 
they were integers. We calculated descriptive statistics, such as the distributions mean 
and histograms, and measures of spread, standard deviation. The range was defined as 
between 1 and 5. 
The next phase consists of carrying out tests to observe differences between the different 
companies and their various behaviours. Therefore we had a matrix of test cases of 4 by 
3, where 4 was the number of companies involved in the study and three, the number of 
behaviours considered. For instance we wanted to know if a certain behaviour, say 
learning, differed among the companies, or alternatively we tested for differences 
between behaviours in one specific company, say Toshiba. 
As our distributions were approximately normal, we used ANOVA (analysis of variance) 
to compare the means. The analysis of variance told us whether we could reject the null 
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hypothesis (Ho) or not, the null hypothesis meaning a significant difference between the 
means. 
We then used a graphical analysis to evaluate the significance of the differences because 
although differences can be considered statistically significant they may have no practical 
relevance (Fink, 1995). If the means and confidence intervals do not overlap in the chart 
a difference can be assumed to exist. When the intervals overlap but not the means, then 
nothing can be asserted, and a new test, this time comparing the two means in question, 
has to be performed (Fink, 1995). We used two tailed t-tests (alpha = 0.05) where the 
distributions could be assumed to be normal, or otherwise chi-square tests. 
5.8. Data treatment 
Case study analysis is the most difficult part of doing case studies (Yin, ibid. ). Although 
there are no pre-set recipes to treat the data, the adoption of general strategies to organise 
and analyse the data is a necessary step for quality case studies. Data were organised in 
case write-ups which were written according to theoretical propositions and arranged 
according to constructs set earlier in the research. The case study write-ups reflect initial 
data and insights, the literature, and the research issues. This strategy is classified by Yin 
as the most desirable. 
The explanation-building strategy adopted here, is based on establishing a relationship 
instead of demonstrating cause and effect links. Although different sites represent 
different situations, the objective in explanation-building in multiple case studies is to 
build a general explanation that fits each of them. 
Eisenhardt highlights a number of elements that are particular to building theory from 
case study research. Beyond the implications for sampling and methods of data collection 
which were already discussed, theory building demands other specific adaptation to case 
study design. 
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If relationships are uncovered, the research should be able to explain through the 
literature why that relationship exists. The comparison of the findings with the literature 
is the key to the internal validity of the findings. Eisenhardt argues that it is crucial to 
consider a broad range of literature that increases the possibility of conflict between the 
literature and the findings. Where the relevant literature is contradictory, then the chances 
of deeper insights are increased. 
She concludes that by anchoring findings in the existing literature the researcher 
increases internal validity, generalisability, and the theoretical level of theory building. 
Our findings are discussed in terms of manufacturing strategy and lean production 
literature, which should contrast with the resource-based literature. 
Cross case analysis was also performed. The goal of this kind of analysis is to search for 
patterns among the sites. It lessens the inherent danger of the researcher reaching 
premature conclusions which are not scientifically sound. The four cases are analysed for 
possible similarities and differences, and the results assessed against the hypotheses. 
In this chapter we have: 
" Explained the sample of companies chosen in this research 
9 Defined qualitative and quantitative data collection methods 
" Defined a scale of performance for the qualitative data collection and tested it for 
reliability and validity 
" Defined a strategy of data analysis 
" Defined the method used to treat the data 
In the next chapter we begin the analysis to date. The within case analysis of the four 
cases is described. 
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Chapter 6- Within Case Analysis 
In this chapter we perform the within case analysis. The analysis 
presented here resulted from a compilation of the case studies 
that we have produced on each company. It is organised 
according to the evolutionary drivers that we have proposed In 
item 3.2. We describe the state of each of the variables in the 
strategic process. Qualitative data was gathered to understand 
the state of the managerial processes and process control and 
redesign. Quantitative data is used to measure the intensity of 
the organisational processes and the intensity of change they 
have suffered during the strategic processes. The final state of 
the variables together with the account of their variation, produce 
a picture of the strategic process. 
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6.1. Case 1- SERASA's background 
SERASA is an independent company created by Brazil's principal banks in response for 
their demand for an organisation responsible for gathering and processing all necessary 
information on credit risk management. Since then, it has grown to become the biggest 
financial database of South America, holding information on 4.2 million companies of all 
sizes. 
6.1.1. Case 1-A brief overview of the evolution of operational performance 
When the marketing division was added to SERASA's organisational chart in 1989, Elcio 
de Lucca was appointed as its first director. The shareholder banks pressed for a complete 
restructuring of this organisation which they regarded as having obsolete processes. The 
process of change gathered pace in 1991 when the old management team left the 
company and Mr. Di Lucca was appointed as the new CEO. The challenge was to 
transform an inward looking company that had little concern for operational performance, 
into a company that could tap into the opportunities and knowledge from outside as well 
as develop outstanding performance. 
The process of change that followed was based on a tripod: Organisational redesign, a 
new strategic planning system, and the development of quality principles and practices. 
6.1.2. Managerial processes 
6.1.2. a. Gap closing 
The gap closing took place at two different levels. At the macro level the new CEO, with 
the collaboration of a couple of new senior managers, envisioned the main features of the 
new organisations and took the necessary steps to ensure that it happened. At micro level 
the new planning system allowed the organisation to identify clear operational goals each 
year and allocate the necessary resources through careful planning. Unlike the macro 
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planning, micro planning directly targeted operational issues such as the transformation 
and improvement of the production processes. 
The CEO is a great believer in planning. He said that the organisation had had a master 
plan from the beginning which had not changed substantially. The master plan was 
devised around three broad goals: (a) to reinforce ethics in business, a particularly 
sensitive issue for firms in the information business and a heritage of the previous 28 
years of history, (b) to develop entrepreneurial behaviour which should function as the 
engine for continuous change and (c) to achieve dramatic evolution of the business 
processes. 
These three goals were to be pursued through the implementation of three concrete key 
plans: (a) the redesign of the organisational structure, (b) the implementation of a quality 
programme, and (c) the development of a strategic planning system. 
The new organisational design eliminated 3 to 4 hierarchical levels, depending on their 
function. Now there are five hierarchical levels: CEO, function's director, manager, team 
leader and member. 
The new organisational design introduced a parallel area for each of the four main areas. 
Operations, IT, administration (which includes HR and finance departments), and 
marketing and sales have a smaller parallel area and were headed by a different director 
responsible for anticipating changes to the main function. 
For instance, while the managers in operations concentrate on running the current 
operations efficiently, managers in the parallel area were incorporating new technologies 
of credit analysis, and performing tests before the implementation of new ideas in the 
main area. Thus the parallel area performed the role of R&D, absorbing new trends in the 
market and avoiding obsolete operational production processes. 
181 
An external consultant was hired to set up an internal quality department and initiated the 
implementation of a quality programme. The gradual development of openness for 
change at the bottom of the organisation was the foundation for the successful 
implementation of the quality programme. 
Among the most significant changes achieved through the programme were: (a) change 
of the prevailing Tayloristic mind set. Middle managers changed their management style, 
to encourage the development of an empowered and participative work force. They also 
changed by giving priority to the quality of the outcome instead of demanding volume of 
production. (b) Metrics were developed and became very sophisticated. Presently, all 
important organisational processes are measured and their performance is tracked. (c) 
QCC groups were set up and gradually evolved into an informal avenue for suggestions. 
The third of the key macro actions planned by management was directly related to micro 
gap closing processes. The idea behind the strategic planning system was to ensure that 
ideas would flow from the bottom to the top and back again, allowing a great deal of 
ownership and input from those actually responsible for implementation. The strategic 
and action plans of the organisation are currently decided in three forums. 
In the first one, called RENASCER, all members spend one day in order participating in 
group dynamics where problems and possible solutions are discussed. The resulting 
propositions are screened by middle management who also contribute their own 
suggestions. In the next stage the management team gets together and discusses the 
strategic orientation of the business. In the third and last meeting, top and middle 
managers assess the results of the previous exercises and devise concrete action plans. 
Problems are examined at a detailed process level. The material collected is transferred to 
flip charts and hung on the walls to facilitate discussion. Targets are defined with the 
agreement of everyone involved in the project. Managers distribute their available 
resources to cover the various projects. Senior management ensures that the projects 
conform with the strategic line they have devised. Although senior management can 
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discuss the projects in detail they will allow other managers to exert discretion over 
targets and project details. 
Managers report that they feel ownership over the projects and that the resources 
committed are firmly grounded on reality because they are determined after extensive 
lateral interaction. The result has been a high level of successful project implementation. 
6.1.2. b. Management style 
The quality programme was successful in changing the behaviour of middle managers. 
As a first step, they assessed their department's processes. This exposed poor 
performance. Senior managers and the quality department then told them that continuous 
improvement would only succeed if they listened to and empowered employees. Middle 
managers who had long been in the job for many years were set in their ways. Initially 
there was resistance to change. 
A number of factors contributed to create a widespread conviction that the process of 
change was irreversible and an environment more receptive to change: (a) talks and 
training courses that introduced the concept of quality to the whole organisation, (b) the 
use of facilitation techniques, such as neuro-linguistic training, employed by the quality 
department to help managers confront their fears of change, and (c) the effect of the 
dramatic increase in performance in the first areas to embrace change. As a middle 
manager commented: 
It was more traumatic for us than for the employees. We had to prepare 
ourselves because we were going to be the administrator of quality in our 
area and that demanded a great deal of involvement... The idea was that 
we were sleeping and if we wanted to survive we would have to change 
things. 
Senior management embraced unconditionally the participative style. As explained 
previously, the action plans received inputs from all members and were reviewed jointly 
with middle management. An example is the experience of a group of middle managers 
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from the marketing function who proposed a turnover target and a marketing strategy. 
The plan was approved during the strategic planning phase and fully accepted by senior 
management. The actual turnover achieved was very close to the one proposed. 
6.1.2. c. Senior management team work 
The old management team left the company when the new CEO was appointed. The 
shareholders perceived that radical change in the organisation would require the new 
CEO to have the freedom to appoint new directors. These directors came into a new 
structural design where functions were to be secondary to business processes and overall 
results of the organisation. 
This created a strong sense of collective responsibility for the overall results of the 
organisation, avoiding senior managers becoming inward looking in their functions. The 
senior managers were reported to have a strong sense of collective responsibility and 
collaboration towards the strategic goals of the organisation. 
The secondary importance given to the functions' boundaries was reflected in the high 
degree of networking at the lower levels of the organisation. When managers needed the 
collaboration of people in other functions they tended not to be limited by the functions' 
boundaries or the need to respect hierarchy. The planning system worked as a strong 
incentive to lateral initiatives. Senior managers did not directly participate in the 
formulation of action plans. These were defined cross-functionally by those who 
implemented the project. The CEO commented that planning only succeeds if the concept 
of area and functions is not considered important, he said: 
How you plan is key... companies usually make plans in function of areas 
interests, it is a power struggle... who is more powerful gets more. That 
doesn't happen here. We plan function of where we want to go... I've 
never allowed people to talk terms of areas. 
6.1.2. d. Performance control 
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SERASA has developed an extensive range of metrics that measure the performance of 
practically all relevant processes and results. It is commonly said in the company that: 
"What is not worth measuring is not worth doing". Initially implemented as part of an 
effort to establish TQM principles of measurement and control, 1500 different metrics are 
currently in use, keeping track of the performance of elementary production processes in 
relation to client satisfaction. The great number of metrics is explained by the fact that 
managers were given the freedom to implement whatever measurement they thought to 
be relevant. In each area a management information system (MIS) controls the 
performance of each indicator and the progress of ongoing projects. 
Indicators are used to track and rank individual and team performance. Managers can 
identify people whose performance is below average and who need help to improve 
performance. Teams' performance is assessed against each other and also in terms of how 
they are rated by internal customers. At senior management level each director has 15 
indicators that are checked daily. From all the indicators chosen by the directors, the CEO 
selects 15 to follow periodically. 
The geographically dispersed branches have their performance controlled as if they were 
independent companies and are assessed in terms of profit and loss. Production and sales 
are given points and measured against costs of administration. A performance considered 
normal receives no points, which implies no extra reward to the manager in charge. 
6.1.2. e. Behaviour alignment 
Like any Tayloristic organisation, SERASA suffered from the fact that the goals of its 
organisational members were local and detached from the strategic goals of the 
organisation. Leadership was key to breaking old behaviours and promoting a 
realignment of behaviour throughout the organisation. 
The CEO and a few other senior managers exercised leadership by carefully observing 
the managerial style of middle managers and acting to eliminate managerial processes 
that did not conform with the new environment defined by TQM principles. If they 
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identified managers who were concentrating responsibilities and thus failing to use a 
participative style, senior managers intervened. 
The CEO was the champion of the new paradigm of behaviour and all the interviewees 
associated his leadership with the change process. His communication abilities were fully 
utilised. He said that insistence on the message, which was grounded on solid argument 
and coherent behaviour, was the necessary factor in promoting change. The CEO 
considered that the current task of leadership was to create an organisation open to 
knowledge from outside. The organisation should be able to identify best practices in 
global and local terms and integrate them with its own processes and practices. 
The change process targeted the individual. The mission statement of the HR function 
reflects actions taken by management in order to involve individuals in the evolution of 
the organisation: "To ensure the involvement and commitment of all members to both 
overall and individual results by creating the environment, tools and mechanisms, that 
facilitate involvement as well as personal development and satisfaction. " 
A particular example of the management vision of individual development was the use of 
neuro-linguistic training to address psychological aspects of group behaviour and inter 
personal communications. A series of courses and talks introduced techniques of 
effective communication and discussed the difficulties of adopting new modes of 
behaviour. Middle managers reported that these techniques helped them to overcome 
fears provoked by the new responsibilities. 
The introduction of the quality concepts was regarded as a key step in aligning behaviour 
because it clearly showed the link between the internal process carried out by the 
organisational members and the performance of the organisation. Also it defined a new 
"modus operandi" for managers, especially line managers. The quality programme was 
given absolute priority and the necessary time was allowed for people to voluntarily 
engage in it. 
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The approaches to individual development and practices subsequently adopted were later 
synthesised around the concept of SerSERASA (which can be literally translated as 
SERASA been). This represented the basic principles that should underpin a culture 
shared by all members: customer focus, concern for constantly improving processes, 
respect for ideas independent of ranking, and continuous personal development. 
The support and openness to change found at the bottom of the organisation were 
certainly helped by the fact that members perceived that they also benefited from the 
changes. In spite of the immense growth in productivity, nobody was made redundant. 
Instead, there was a very significant increase in the average earnings. This was made 
possible by the strong market expansion and consequent revenue increase. Members and 
middle managers said they had nothing to fear from the changes that the organisation 
might experience in the future. 
The development of entrepreneurial behaviour at all hierarchical levels was a strategic 
goal from the beginning of the change process. The planning system and the QCC 
programme allowed managers and members to identify improvement projects and 
implement them. The alignment of the reward system with individual performance was 
regarded as a way to direct entrepreneurship towards the strategic goals of the 
organisation. 
One important example of this use of the reward system was the manager-entrepreneur 
programme applied in the branches. The managers responsible for these branches had 
part of their income dependent on the performance of their branch. Later, the programme 
was further developed by giving different weights to particular actions that were 
perceived as benefiting strategic objectives of the organisation, such as attracting specific 
customers, or even temporary tactics. 
In spite of the strong intentional element involved in the process of change senior 
managers recognise that managerial rationality and action are limited. This reflects the 
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importance of dealing with the soft aspects of the organisation in order to achieve 
successful transformation. A senior manager said: 
The CEO doesn't run the company. Culture, systems, and history do. 
We have to understand history because the company is a reflex of it in 
some sense. 
6.1.3. Process control and redesign 
Before the change process started, SERASA had no control over the performance of its 
business processes. With introduction of quality principles processes were mapped and 
they began to be measured. This was followed by the reengineering of the processes 
involved in the production of the main product (FICA). All the line managers were 
involved in the examination of the processes and helped design changes that could be 
readily implemented, such as the elimination of unnecessary checks and more efficient 
routing of the workload. These initial changes cut the process time by half, from 24 days 
to approximately 12 days. 
Automation of the collection and storage of documents achieved extra gains. Although 
the organisation was achieving improvements, production was organised in large 
departments, whose sequential tasks were buffered by WIP. Thus the next major step was 
the introduction of cell production. Pilot cells were introduced and these helped create 
acceptance of the new organisation of production among workers. A few months after the 
introduction of initial pilot teams, production was completely organised in cells. There 
were two sequential departments in which the cells performed different tasks. 
Cell production dramatically improved efficiency. Members reported that, prior to 
ownership and because they were physically separated, there was no feedback. As a 
consequence, there was no change to learn from mistakes. Now, when there is a mistake, 
it is automatically corrected inside the cell, avoiding the formation of WIP for rework 
jobs and highlighting recurrent mistakes. 
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The gains in terms of individual improvement have been dramatic because members who 
are more experienced respond to individuals' queries on the spot. The creation of team 
leaders has greatly improved the flow of information and the identification of training 
needs of the members in the cell. 
The performance indicators and the feedback from the quality assurance department are 
used to identify the root cause of production mistakes associated with technical 
deficiencies of members. When mistakes are recurrent suggesting that training is needed, 
a panel with more experienced analysts is quickly set up. 
6.1.4. Organisational processes 
Co-ordination Mean SD 
a. Flow of information 3.38 0.76 
b. Frequency of communication 3.68 0.79 
c. Openness 3.68 0.75 
d. Helpfulness 3.74 0.83 
Co-ordination general 3.62 0.79 
Degree of change 3.35 0.93 
Entrepreneurship Mean SD 
a. Breaking from past behaviour 3.65 0.78 
b. Striving for continuous improvement 4.23 0.79 
c. Developing personal links 3.58 0.83 
d. Tackling problems and dilemmas 3.60 0.84 
Entrepreneurship general 3.77 0.81 
Degree of change 3.27 1.04 
Learning: Mean SD 
a. Individual influence 2.91 0.79 
b. Eliminating ambiguity 3.29 0.76 
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c. Testing 3.37 0.84 
d. Articulation of knowledge 3.88 0.78 
e. Knowledge flow 4.25 0.81 
f. Knowledge concentration 3.60 0.79 
g. Challenging assumptions 3.08 0.85 
Learning general 3.48 0.91 
Degree of change 3.06 1.00 
Overall result Mean SD 
Intensity 3.59 0.87 
Degree of change 3.19 0.98 
Number of respondents = 65. 
SERASA scores high in terms of its organisational processes. Members were asked about 
the frequency of organisational behaviours. The resulting overall score of 3.4 (SD = 0.95) 
indicates that these behaviours tend to occur on a very frequent basis. The score of 3.2 
(SD = 0.98) indicates a strong evolution of these processes since the beginning of the 
change process. Personal open-ended interviews with staff and line managers corroborate 
this significant degree of change. 
A number of factors have clearly influenced and fostered the development of high 
performance organisational processes. The creation of teams, for instance, brought people 
physically close and helped develop strong personal links. The flow of information was 
also greatly improved by the creation of teams. As a result, both co-ordination and 
knowledge behaviours benefited. 
Entrepreneurial behaviour was also very salient, highlighting the push of all members 
towards continuous improvements and their commitment to the evolution of the 
organisations' performance. Learning scored high on most items. Knowledge flow was 
highlighted. This was supported by an organisational concern for personal development 
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and training. This organisational design favours learning because the development 
function fully tests suggestions and new concepts before they are ready to be 
implemented. 
The ability of individuals to influence their own and their colleagues' work practices 
scored a relatively weak average. This was a concern expressed by some members who 
perceived management as giving relatively low importance to their opinions. The fact 
that the computer systems were not very flexible, because alterations needed to be done 
to the mainframe systems, also contributed to making individual influence more difficult. 
6.2. Case 2- CIGNA's background 
CIGNA Health Care UK is part of CIGNA Corporation, a multi-billion pound company 
employing 50 thousand people and generating a turnover of approximately 15 billion 
pounds. CIGNA UK has around 250 employees and a turnover of 80 million pounds, and 
operates in the segment of private health insurance. 
6.2.1. A brief overview of the evolution of operational performance 
CIGNA UK embarked on the process of change as a reaction to a deep crisis. A few years 
after being acquired by the CIGNA corporation, when was trading still under the name of 
crusader insurance, it suffered severe losses, a declining reputation among customers and 
a high turnover of employees. Management considered its survival chances to be very 
slim. Dramatic action was taken. The English facilities, where most of the back office 
operations were located, were shut down and reopened in Greenock, Scotland. 
Few of the old employees accompanied the move. The events that followed resulted in a 
completely different company from the one that had started the change process. Location, 
people, structure, management team, management style are all different from those of the 
initial operation. The company is back into profitability and boasts huge operational 
improvements such as: claims turnaround down from 15 to 4 days, quotation time for 
new businesses down from 17 to 2 days, quality up by 55 percent, and service levels up 
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by 52 percent (the explanation of these categories is given on the section on performance 
control). 
6.2.2. Managerial processes 
6.2.2. a. Gap closing 
The gap closing process had two distinct moments. Initially management could see no 
objectives or end state. The sole objective was to ensure the survival of a business that 
had no competitive edge over its rivals and was suffering heavy losses. CIGNA UK 
dropped the pension life business and moved to Scotland in an attempt to lower 
operational costs. The former operations director stated: 
By the end we had re-engineered the whole company, but people did not 
necessarily set out on a march like that. If we are completely honest, we 
decided to survive, which meant moving to a low cost area, sorting out 
our business priorities, dropping certain line of the business and picking 
up new ones, and changed the way we worked so that we reduced the 
overhead. As it happened, we changed the culture of the company and 
now we have a very gung-ho empowered work force throughout the 
organisation 
A second phase started a few months after the company began operating in Scotland. The 
management team was slowly beginning to engage in the search for goals that should be 
pursued by the organisation. At the same time, the US headquarters, which had been 
through an extensive reengineering process, wanted its British subsidiary to follow suit. 
A change team was assembled. This shared no members with the management team. It 
was led by a person sent from the parent company who had participated in other 
reengineering projects within CIGNA. 
Management engaged in formal assessment of the environment to establish what was 
important to its potential customers and how the company was performing on those 
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dimensions. Questionnaires were sent out to customers and personal interviews were held 
with current and former customers. 
The result was a compelling and detailed picture of the relative competitive position of 
the organisation and its desirable future state. It provided objective gap-closing objectives 
and guided plans for reengineering. It became clear to management that there was a deep 
incompatibility between the organisation's systems and processes and the desirable end 
state. Managers realised that gradual change would not be enough. 
After the gap-closing objectives had been clearly identified, the change team started 
interviewing the management team in order to evaluate their openness to change. A series 
of talks and training were promoted in order to prepare for a climate of change at the 
bottom of the organisation. When the time was ripe, pilot teams were launched and the 
organisational structure changed from a hierarchical structure to one with only three 
hierarchical levels organised in a matrix form. 
The parent company appointed a new MD in place of the authoritarian style MD who 
initiated the change process. Having been the HR manager, the new MD had a profile 
more suitable for handling the soft elements of change. The change team coached the 
pilot teams and helped them set the initial performance goals. Increasingly the teams 
began to set these goals by themselves. 
6.2.2. b. Management style 
The strong transformation of the internal context, which was considered necessary for the 
success of the reengineering project, meant loss of power and change of behaviour for 
both senior and middle managers. 
The change team knew from previous experiences that a lot of ground work would have 
to be laid before the actual change process could start. An intensive strong job of 
consensus building lasting four months preceded the first concrete actions. This 
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communicated the need for change and made the project, the goals, and how progress 
should be tracked, very clear. 
The success of the teams depended on the transformation of the middle managers' style. 
The old supervisors were trained for the new role of team leaders. Many could not adapt. 
To absorb them a function responsible for auditing output quality and managing control 
and redesign of processes was created. By not making redundant the line managers who 
could not become team leaders, the organisation avoided losing technical expertise. A 
team leader commented: 
The old type of supervisor is that kind that would say do this, do that. 
The facilitators' role is fairly different. Some people couldn't adjust. 
They are still in Cigna as technical department. 
As the flat structure based on team production was being consolidated, a widespread 
conviction that there was no turning back from the change process grew stronger. 
However, the new philosophical framework that had been firmly implanted at team level 
still faced resistance at senior management level. Most of the senior managers insisted on 
retaining all powers of decision for themselves. After attempts to integrate them into the 
new culture failed, they had to leave. 
It is one of those things. You rebuild the company and the culture 
underlying it, but if you don't fit that it eventually washes you away... If 
you are not up to the fight of doing it and if you can't live with the new 
environment, it reaches you very quickly and you get washed away. 
Today teams are empowered to take almost every decision that refers to paying a claim. 
Teams also define their own targets with input from team members. 
To get a decision [in other insurance companies] was virtually 
impossible. Now we've got two layers. If the teams cannot handle it 
themselves they come to me, and that is it. 
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6.2.2. c. Senior management teamwork 
The change team sent by the parent company expected to find the main obstacle to 
change in the ability of senior managers to work together, especially during the process 
of implementing change. 
The big thing in that particular [initial] six months was the question of 
whether [senior] management would support change or not, because that 
is the hard part. 
Senior managers were carefully interviewed prior to the implementation of changes so 
that the change team and the MD could gauge of their ability to jointly support the 
changes. A powerful message was delivered that nobody was above the change process. 
The MD attempted to engage resistant senior managers in a joint effort: 
The easiest thing to do with senior managers that don't like 
reengineering is to go around them... But we have actively sought to put 
people most resistant to change in some of the projects first positions. 
Gradually other managers who were better suited to the new environment were 
substituted for the original management team. Today, senior managers report that the 
members of the management team are considered to be mutually very supportive. Middle 
managers and members also acknowledged a great deal of teamwork from senior 
managers. 
The transformation of the hierarchical structure into a matrix based one, contributed to 
the collaboration of managers who shared responsibility for overall results. The political 
importance of big functions (which were disbanded) was eliminated. Big functions had 
fostered the development of local goals and power struggles. 
6.2.2. d. Performance control 
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A number of metrics were developed during the reengineering project in order to track its 
progress. The same metrics are still applied to control current operational performance. 
These metrics are used to track and benchmark the performance of the various teams. The 
metrics are: 
"Quality: Measured in terms of team audit results, or the proportion of the sample of 
audits that are correct. It evolved into considering different weights according to the 
potential damage provoked by a mistake. The number of claims paid and the ratio of 
complaint per unit received are also considered. 
*Productivity: Average number of claims processed per person per week, and the 
average number of units in WIP per week. Targets of productivity acknowledge the 
difference in the amount of work performed by teams which cater for only a couple of 
corporate clients compared with those which deal with individual policies, because 
the teams dealing with individual policies have far more paper work to do. 
"Level of service: A mix of the proportion of renewals per new business policies 
processed, and administration post processed. 
"Premium in arrears: The cumulative reduction in volume and value of arrears. 
Customer satisfaction is also scanned on a regular basis through individual interviews, 
focus groups, and customer satisfaction surveys. Performance of the above items is 
monitored closely and weekly results are discussed at a Friday meeting between team 
leaders and the operations manager, where team leaders set the targets for their team. 
The strategic objectives set during the planning phase - responsiveness (turnaround time), 
quality (consistency or conformance to standards) and productivity - determined the 
definition of the control metrics and focused efforts to improve performance. 
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We were measured against them [the metrics] and set targets that 
although were not easy could be achieved... we set our own goals and 
objectives with the help of a facilitator... For instance, we wanted to have 
a claim paid within 5 working days. At that time we felt that it was 
unattainable. At the moment our team is achieving two or three days 
turn around time. I have dealt with today's mail already. 
6.2.2. e. Behaviour alignment 
In previous reengineering experiences, CIGNA Corporation had not worked on the soft 
side of the organisation but had concentrated on redesigning the business processes. 
Having learned from a number of flawed experiences, CIGNA recognised the importance 
of using a reward system and target setting by the teams to generate commitment and 
ownership by them, Kozik says: 
In Cigna's first reengineering project in the US we did not discuss 
reward systems early enough. We had introduced teams but not team 
goals. Whether teams will go the extra mile for the customers depend on 
monetary and non-monetary rewards. 
The change in behaviour in the organisation as a whole was very much dependent on the 
leadership of Roger Dockett. The new MD represented a change in the style of leadership 
from the previous MD's authoritarian style. He was a key figure in changing the culture 
of the bottom of the organisation by championing the change process and dealing with 
internal resistance. A senior manager observed: 
There are needs for different skills and leadership styles at the beginning 
and at the end of the change process. 
The new MD assigned top organisational priority to coaching and supporting the pilot 
teams. Senior managerial involvement helped to create openness for change at the bottom 
of the organisation. After the success of the first two teams, staff members demonstrated 
interest in becoming part of a team. Those who were not a part of the initial teams, felt as 
if they had been forgotten by management. 
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Management initially set team performance targets and part of the individual income was 
dependent on the achievement of those targets. The scheme went until it members no 
longer perceived it as an incentive. Nevertheless, at the beginning it was very useful in 
creating team spirit and aligning behaviour with operational objectives. 
The teams were measured and rewarded individually. That provoked a 
healthy competition between the teams to see who was the best team. 
That also helped to form the group. That ran for one and a half year and 
was substituted three years ago... The new system focuses on developing 
the individual but not on performance. 
The new schemes differentiated payments based on the development of new skills 
through an individual's voluntary engagement in a training programme inside and outside 
the company. Non financial rewards were also used as "successful people campaign" that 
acknowledge those who made fewer mistakes in paying the claims, and those voted the 
most helpful were given a special internal reward. Letters of praise from satisfied 
customers were also published. 
6.2.3. Process control and redesign 
The redesign of processes in CIGNA UK experienced two significant stages. The first 
and by far the most important was the move to team production. The second was when 
the new processes were already stable and an effort was made to increase the efficiency 
of the processes by eliminating unnecessary operations and replacing them with more 
efficient ones. 
The move to team production meant that processes which had previously been performed 
by six different areas (credit control, new businesses, renewal, post, claim payment and 
files) had to be performed by only one team. Instead of adopting a programmatic 
approach and attempting to design the new business processes, which had been 
unsuccessfully attempted in previous experiences, management left members of the pilot 
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teams to develop the processes on their own, following a "do it, test it, fix it" philosophy. 
A team member described this phase: 
Most of the procedures existed before in the two different departments 
other procedures have been added as a necessity, as a check to see if a 
claim has been paid in ten days, how do you check that. These are 
situations that were brought up through time. Most of the procedures 
have came about as departments expanded, as the drive for quality and 
quantity increased and became more focused, then more checks and 
balances are necessary to make sure that you are hitting your targets. 
Management carefully coached the initial teams, sorting out personality, technical, or 
other problems that could arise. Teams were expected to evolve through a process in 
which they start off as new teams and ended up as mature teams. At this point, the 
process was successfully completed. The difference between the two was that new teams 
were concentrated only on meeting the workload, improving quality, and team 
development, while a mature team was focused continuous improvement and problem 
solving, and did not depend on management to control and set targets. The transition 
between the two stages was estimated to take more than eight months. 
We help they train, then we let them practice working as a team solving 
problems. We watched what was happening so that we can help build up 
teamwork. Then we let them watch over some businesses. It was chaos at 
the beginning. People did not know what to do, they got fed up because 
management had to come and tell them what to do every day. You have 
to let people have ownership of their work, to be empowered, but is 
chaos because they don't know what to do they never worked together 
before. You have to coach them through all of these problems until it 
starts picking up, slowly. 
After all the teams had reached maturity the business processes were standardised 
through the adoption of the ISO 9000 standard. Then a second reengineering phase 
followed. Cross-functional teams were created to identify inefficiencies and propose 
improvements along two core business processes. 
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The first project was aimed at the business processes which dealt with billings and 
commissions payment. Similar processes from companies such as BT and Barclays were 
benchmarked and the cross-functional team interviewed team members involved in the 
process, to gauge their opinions. 
The processes were mapped to understand the complexities involved and the hands-off 
incurred. Implementation of changes which involved not only the processes but also the 
computer system was approved. The implementation took two years to be completed. The 
second project, aimed at the claim payment processes was initiated in August 1995 and 
was completed in the second half of 1996. It followed a similar path. 
6.2.4. Organisational processes 
Co-ordination Mean SD 
a. Flow of information 3.00 0.71 
b. Frequency of communication 3.82 0.95 
c. Openness 3.94 0.90 
d. Helpfulness 3.94 0.90 
Co-ordination general 3.68 0.87 
Degree of change 2.65 1.18 
Entrepreneurship Mean SD 
a. Breaking from past behaviour 4.24 0.56 
b. Striving for continuous improvement 4.35 0.61 
c. Developing personal links 4.24 0.75 
d. Tackling problems and dilemmas 4.35 0.49 
Entrepreneurship general 4.29 0.60 
Degree of change 2.64 0.78 
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Learning Mean SD 
a. Individual influence 4.12 0.70 
b. Eliminating ambiguity 3.76 0.75 
c. Testing 4.12 0.99 
d. Articulation of knowledge 3.71 0.99 
e. Knowledge flow 4.24 0.44 
f. Knowledge concentration 3.19 0.98 
g. Challenging assumptions 3.71 0.99 
Learning general 3.84 0.90 
Degree of change 2.50 1.11 
Overall result Mean SD 
Intensity 3.92 0.87 
Degree of change 2.58 1.15 
Number of respondents = 16 
Cigna scored extraordinarily high indicating that the behaviour items listed above 
occurred "very frequently". A significant number of behaviour categories stayed between 
"very frequently" and "always" (respectively 4 and 5 in our scale). It should be noted that 
all categories of behaviour associated with entrepreneurship scored above four. All 
members and team leaders personally interviewed reported outstanding entrepreneurial 
behaviour. 
One manager said that if there was one thing that would set the company apart from the 
competition, it was the entrepreneurial spirit of its members. As an example, a manager 
reported that when an important new corporate client joined the company, team members 
came to see him volunteering to take on the new account. A team leader said that all team 
members pulled their weight. 
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The reported tight bonds which linked team members presumably contributed to co- 
ordination. Individual influence - which testifies the great level of empowerment of the 
team members - testing and knowledge flow, are three dimensions of learning that scored 
above 4, indicating a high profile of learning activities. 
6.3. Case 3- TNT's background 
TNT is a multinational transportation group that operates worldwide and has 8000 
employees in the UK who operate 3000 vehicles moving 220.000 parcels for more than 
26 thousand customers. Apart from the core Express division responsible for the 
deliveries of parcels within the UK, other divisions specialise in the logistics of daily 
press and car parts supply to manufacturers. TNT Express is made up of a network of 
depots situated all over the UK connected by a distribution centre called PDC (Parcels 
Distribution Centre). The basic operation consists of three different stages. First, parcels 
are collected by the depots during the day. In the evening the parcels are sent to the PDC 
where they are sorted overnight, and shipped back to the depots for early morning 
delivery. 
6.3.1. A brief overview of the evolution of operational performance 
The process of evolution in TNT started in the aftermath of a UK postal strike in 1988. 
During that time, the parcels division accepted all sorts of freight into its network. The 
overflow and the incompatibility of much of the freight brought its operations to the 
verge of collapse. This was the climax in a period of declining competitiveness. Growing 
competition was hurting profits and margins and internal employee morale and 
satisfaction were very low. 
The turnaround process had two distinct phases. Initially, management engaged in formal 
strategy formulation and adopted broad strategic lines around customer focus, 
employees' satisfaction and continuous improvement, and initiated a change of market 
orientation. This last action produced structural changes in operations and helped the 
second phase of the process in which the emphasis changed from sales to operations. In 
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the second phase the EFQM17 model was formally adopted, resulting in the achievement 
of the 1994 UK Quality Award, the 1995/96 European Quality Award, and the 1997 
Service Excellence Company of the Year award. 
Some of the outcomes of TNT's new competitive position include a revenue growth from 
£144 million to £230 million since 1993 and the fact that none of TNT's 20 major clients 
has defected in the last three years. From those, 16 have been trading with TNT for more 
than five years. 
6.3.2. Managerial processes 
6.3.2. a. Gap closing 
The postal strike of 1988 exposed the fragility of TNT's competitive position. The 
operations were brought to the verge of collapse and called attention to a situation of 
deep crisis. Increasing competition in the industry caused profits to decline. The 
company's lack of competitiveness, evidenced by alarming figures such as a retention 
rate of new customers of only 8 percent, called for urgent change. 
The CEO engaged all divisions, but especially the core TNT Express division, in a 
reaction process that had to concentrate on three central points: customer focus, employee 
satisfaction, and continuous improvement. A wide employee survey was performed and 
provided managers with many clues as to what was wrong in the company. A senior 
manager said: 
If you go back to 88, when we looked to our business, profitability in real 
terms was reducing. Wasn't going forward... We actually did an 
employee survey called project 2000, because we received feedback from 
the depots that all wasn't well within the business, and so we did this 
employee survey to find out what our employees felt. That brought out a 
lot of things. They said that we have too many right schedules in the 
market and it was confusing our customers, we have too many 
17 European Foundation of Quality Management. 
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consignment notes, and we weren't particularly honest with our 
customers, we had surcharges, etc. 
Based on general lines set by the CEO and the employees' perceptions of the problems, 
the basic strategic principles of the business were organised around the following seven 
points: 
"Service driven (Top quality service) 
"Revenue Quality (Reflect the service we offer) 
"Innovation (new product, new system technology based) 
"Customer focus 
"Cost control (not just cost cutting) 
'Investment in technology (consistently looking at what is available) 
. Honesty and Integrity (with both customers and workforce) - "We were not so honest 
before" 
Action plans focused on two distinct areas. First, customer interface had to be simplified. 
TNT operated 52 possible schedules and sales people were entitled to apply for discounts 
that ranged from 1 percent to 60 percent of the published price. This resulted in more 
than 3000 possibilities for the customer causing confusion and a great number of 
enquiries. Also, the high discounts were giving an impression of expensive pricing. The 
sales processes were redesigned. Discounts were eliminated and one simple form 
replaced the previous 17 forms available to customers. A new IT system performed most 
of the steps automatically. 
The second target of the action plans was to redefine its market niche. TNT had 
pioneered next day delivery in the UK, but by 1988, this represented only a fraction of its 
total business which still operated the three day delivery. The kind of freight that would 
be most suitable for TNT's network was carefully identified and the sales contracts 
adapted to pursue it. However the decision to gradually move to this market niche faced 
great opposition from the depot managers who did not want to lose revenue by 
eliminating the three day traffic. 
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We were saying to depots that they should get rid of 3 days revenues. A 
depot would want to loose any revenue because he would see the knock 
on effect is has in the costs. It doesn't affect their costs. We were trying 
to convince them. We were saying we don't want this traffic. But that is 
not enough you have to convince them and you don't do that by bringing 
everyone to a big forum. You do that on a one to one basis. You convince 
people that will convince other people. 
The move to next day delivery produced an effect that was not envisaged by 
management. As more and more parcels were being delivered the following day instead 
of remaining in the network for three days, buffers were eliminated. By 1992 when TNT 
was consolidating its next day delivery market, it had moved to sorting all of its freight 
overnight. Parcels are now moved in an almost continuous flow from the point where 
they enter the network to the delivery depot. This marked the end of the first phase. 
The second phase began with a new strategic process based on the formal adoption of the 
EFQM model, focused on the excellence of operations. There was a strong push for the 
adoption of a management style compatible with TQM principles and operations were 
targeted for improvement. Extensive customer surveys identified the most important 
service attributes from the customer's point of view. Since then, metrics to measure 
operational performance have been developed and monitored to ensure the focus of 
attention on the performance evolution of the most important service attributes. 
The headquarters set to all depots gap closing targets for cost and service attributes of 
performance. Depot management is left free to determine what will be done to achieve 
those targets. An important structural action was to upgrade the machinery and software 
in the PDC to support the growth in volume handled by the network. 
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6.3.2. b. Management style 
Senior management was keen on promoting the necessary changes when the organisation 
was facing the crisis situation but they were less keen on changing their own management 
style. In fact, the CEO pointed out that the biggest challenge he faced was to convince 
senior managers to change their management style. He commented: 
There were people running this organisation that would sack a general 
manager at the drop of a hat. And the general managers were treating 
people bellow them in the same manner. That cannot be a long-term 
strategy. It can be very effective sometimes, but only in a short span. 
Gradually senior management changed from an autocratic style - defined by a manager as 
"just get on with it and don't ask questions" - to a new approach in which they would 
seek to explain the rationale for their actions and allowed people to question it. The 
CEO's direct line is now open to members of any rank so that they can deal with him 
directly if they feel they need to do so. The posts of regional director were created to 
facilitate communication with the managers of the depots. 
From 1992 change of managerial attitude began to filter down through the ranks. The 
CEO, to senior managers, and then to the depot managers. Depot managers developed 
more ownership of their work and changed their attitude towards their subordinates. But 
in the PDC, things were moving in the wrong direction. The change from day shift 
sorting of three days traffic, to overnight sorting of the next day traffic, accelerated 
operations and imposed shorter time limits, contributing to increase tension between 
management and workers. 
An authoritarian manager opposed strong union activity in the PDC. By the beginning of 
1995, senior managers in the Express division became increasingly concerned about 
promoting a culture of continuous improvement in a climate where there were adversarial 
relationships between management and workers. To overcome this problem, a manager 
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who supported participative behaviour replaced the authoritarian manager in the PDC. He 
said: 
Initially they were saying why does he ask so many questions, this is the 
only way we know about how to do it. Soon they started to think and 
realise better ways of doing things. The management bellows me started 
to make changes themselves. Why have you changed that? Because you 
are going to bloody start to ask me to change, would be the answer. 
LOBs were suggesting better ways of doing things and when asked why 
they hadn't suggested before they would say that nobody was prepared 
to listen to them. 
Senior managers wanted middle managers to develop a different attitude and embrace 
continuous change. Specific courses were designed for these managers as a way of 
developing new skills and encouraging their support of continuous improvement. The 
next step was to develop a course for foremen. Although they had their job description 
changed to section leader, they were still performing the same tasks of supervision. A 
training program, called Top Gun, was implemented which aimed at developing skills 
such as briefing and team working, which were necessary for a team leader. 
Shop floor members had observed a significant change in management attitudes but are 
still resentful about years of bad relationships with management and line supervision. A 
section leader who was an LBO not long ago commented: 
When management started implementing a more participative culture 
you get the resentments of the years before when you were told what to 
do. The resentments are still there... At the moment we are starting to 
change people's attitude. LBOs are starting to have an interest about 
things. Before they would say I wouldn't give you anything, you are 
management. 
6.3.2. c. Senior management team work 
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The success of the change process was dependent on the teamwork of senior managers. 
The particular strategy of eliminating unsuitable traffic in order to develop a premium 
market faced fierce opposition from depot managers. When profits temporarily declined, 
depot managers openly criticised the strategy. Nevertheless the champion of the 
initiative, the sales director, received full backing from the CEO and the MD. He said: 
I personally would have a one off chance. If you do a U-turn in your 
strategy you will lose the credibility of the staff, you would show your 
strategy wrong, and you would have to leave the company. You've to 
make sure that it is right. The CEO in this period is key because if he 
weakens and doesn't give you the support you are doomed to failure. 
The increasing drive for improvement of operational performance highlighted the 
importance of closer co-operation between sales and operations. Previously, sales and 
operations directors had never co-ordinated their actions. Now they have a fine tuned 
relationship because, although TNT is still a sales driven company, there is an 
understanding that market actions have a direct effect on operations' ability to deliver 
price efficiency and quality levels. The offices of the MD, sales director, operations 
director, and the manager responsible for the PDC are located side-by-side. Their offices 
are very close to one another and they communicate frequently and informally. 
The senior operations manager controls a number of variables such as tonnage and 
number of parcels moved. When an alteration of any variable causes costs to increase, 
the operations manager, with the sales manager, takes the necessary action to correct the 
cause of the problem. For instance, in a particular week an increase in the tonnage of the 
traffic of 10 percent was registered, which caused unit costs to rise in a higher proportion. 
The operations manager immediately asked the sales manager to kill the undesirable 
traffic, which was causing the tonnage to go up. By quickly instructing the sales people to 
refuse particular kinds of parcels, the sales manager helped the unit costs to return to 
normal levels. 
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6.3.2. d. Performance control 
After the company had formally adopted the EFQM model, there was an effort to develop 
metrics of the performance of the service attributes that were identified as the key to 
customer satisfaction and operational costs. Today these measurements represent the 
main lever of control over the network of depots which management uses to evaluate the 
performance of individual depots and of the network as a whole. 
Service quality is measured in terms of percentage of delivery on time, the number of 
failures to deliver, misroute, number of missorts, and the number of late line hauls 18 . The 
importance of directing organisational attention to specific service attributes cannot be 
understated. Delivery on time, which was identified by numerous customer surveys as the 
single most important buying criterion, has improved dramatically since measurement 
started. "It is a matter of driving people's attention to it", said one manager. Today about 
99 percent of the customers receive their consignments on time. This number accounts 
also for situations beyond TNT's control such as bad weather or customer mistakes. 
A parallel indicator is customer satisfaction, measured in terms of level of insurance 
claims, speed in answering a call, and percentage of perfect transactions. Perfect 
transaction was introduced in 1995 as a means of attracting attention to the quality of the 
service at the interface with the customer. Perfect transaction happens when: (a) 
consignments are collected on time, (b) they are delivered on time, (c) they arrive in 
perfect conditions, (d) the consignment note is fully completed, (e) an accurate invoice is 
produced, (f) cash is collected on time. Since its introduction, the percentage of perfect 
transactions has increased from 57 percent to 87 percent at the beginning of 1997. 
Other important indications of depot performance are its ability to retain customers and 
its performance in customer surveys. Every other year, the principal 4000 customers are 
asked to rank the service they have received according to 20 attributes using a1 to 5 
likert-like scale. The result ranks the performance of the 33 depots according to its 
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customers and highlights the main strengths and weaknesses of each of them. Customer 
feedback is also sought through a general satisfaction survey that is sent out to 7000 
customers every three months. 
6.3.2. e. Behaviour alignment 
Leadership exercised by the CEO was the key to change in behaviour in all hierarchical 
levels of TNT. The CEO visualised a customer oriented company which required its 
managers to adopt a different management style and empower its employees to deliver 
quality service. A central aspect of leadership was its work with other members of the 
management team to transform their approach to management. 
The CEO set the general strategic lines for improvements and retained a high level of 
commitment to and involvement with the transformational process. Some of the key 
actions sponsored by the CEO included the introduction of quality initiatives such as the 
adoption of the ISO standard and later, the EFQM quality model. 
Although leadership was very important in the creation of a culture of commitment and 
continuous improvement, both managers and workers stated that the most significant 
cultural change occurred at managerial level while the culture of "getting through" had 
always been present at the bottom of the organisation. Nevertheless mission statements 
hanging from many walls are a remainder of the basic strategic principles of the 
company's culture adopted in 1988. They include: "On time every time", "We can always 
improve", "Honesty and integrity" 
The first customer care programme, called "expressing excellence", raised the issue of 
customer care. The attention of managers and employees was directed to the importance 
of understanding what customers wanted and what they thought of the service they 
received. Customer interface activities such as handling telephone call were brought to 
the top of the priority list. The ensuing programme, called "expressionism", concentrated 
18 It refers to the trucks that come from the depots. Each of those has a limit time to reach the PDC. 
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on the need to improve operational performance. It has succeeded in creating a drive for 
continuous improvement. 
In line with the "expressionism" programme, the organisation is increasingly linking 
financial rewards to well defined operational goals. For instance, in the PDC the most 
important indicator of performance is the time it takes to finish sorting because it directly 
affects the ability of the whole network to achieve on time delivery. Three o'clock is 
considered a critical time to finish sorting allowing the network enough time to complete 
delivery before 9 a. m. An incentive to finish on time is provided to PDC workers in the 
form of bonuses that can increase the average salary by up to 50 percent, based on the 
time they finish their work prior to the deadline of 3 a. m. The sooner they finish the 
bigger is the bonus. 
Since the system has been implemented, there have been successive records of 
performance in the PDC. Drivers also had their pay system revised. They are rewarded 
less in terms of hours spent on the job and more in terms of the amount of tasks executed 
and the quality of the work. The PDC manager commented: 
The guys in the PDC are motivated by money. When I came they were 
reviewing the bonus for a million years, there were thousands of reports, 
but it was going nowhere. We were paying people to do the wrong things. 
We were paying people to unload trailers and hoped that it was done in 
time. What do we want? We want people to be finished by the time and 
how they do it is up to them. If you do that I will give you money. That 
took a while it was a long way to convince them that it was the right way 
to move forward. 
A number of non-financial rewards or rewards in which the financial element is not the 
main incentive have also been deployed. The operational teams in the depots (depot 
manager, traffic operator, supervisors, and administrative people) are rewarded if they 
can achieve performance targets above their second best ever. Although in financial 
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terms the rewards are not very significant, managers feel compelled to engage in 
continuous improvement to meet the competition from other depots. 
Individuals also receive performance prizes such as the "regional customer care 
programme", which is awarded at a big ceremony; and the "I made it happen for TNT" 
prize which is awarded to individuals who go out to handle an unexpected situation. 
Finally, a further incentive is the promotion system. Almost the totality of the managers 
have began their careers in the shop floor. Even the most sceptical worker recognises that 
there is potential to be promoted to the highest rankings. 
6.3.3. Process control and redesign 
The biggest change to the process of TNT did not happen intentionally but instead was 
caused by sorting all traffic overnight. Prior to the re-organisation freight spent three days 
at some point in the network. With the re-organisation came the elimination of this period 
of storage. Considering the size of daily traffic, which was around 35.000 parcels, the 
amount of WIP eliminated was enormous. 
There was a lot of money in parking up the freight either at the PDC or 
at the depots... We always thought we were busy. We thought: we must 
be making money. But we were actually losing money. If you walked 
here at the same period of the day you would be seeing lots of parcels 
being loaded and unloaded, now you don't see anything. Now the parcels 
are either in the vehicles going to the customer or in the vehicle that has 
collected it from the customer to be sorted today. We don't store it 
anymore and that was a big change. 
Shop floors processes in the PDC were later mapped and redesigned. The shop floor was 
painted to indicate the direction of the flow from infeed to outfeed. Also a policy called 
"clean floor" was implemented by which non-compatible traffic, that was moved 
manually, was moved straight from the trailer from where it is being unloaded to the 
destination trailer without being left on the floor in the interim. This was the final step 
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towards creating an operation free of buffers where the parcels moved straight from the 
inbound trailer to the outbound trailer in a continuous flow. The rare interference of 
senior management in the depots' processes were due to the introduction of new 
technologies. The depots' processes were also affected by the introduction of the ISO 
9000 standard which helped the organisation to achieve a standardisation of processes 
throughout its network. 
There is no application of process control (such as the six-sigma paradigm) by operators 
on the shop floor. Macro-processes, such as the arrival of line hauls in the PDC, are 
controlled for variation. When process variation occurs, the network quality manager is 
responsible for spotting the root causes for the variation and proposing a solution. There 
has been an effort to codify knowledge that can be readily used when routing problems 
occur. For instance, if a trailer faces a blockage caused by snow on a specific road, the 
driver calls a 24 hour help desk in the PDC. If the problem has occurred before, a 
computer database will indicate the previous steps taken to solve the problem. Any 
successful problem solving experience is added to the database. 
The issues highlighted by customer feedback are dealt with in the depots by volunteer 
groups of around six people who select the project and have one of their members sent to 
the headquarters to learn problem solving techniques. The responsibility for 
implementing the project belongs to the employees themselves, who have to produce a 
weekly report for the operations senior manager on the progress of the project. 
6.3.4. Organisational processes 
Co-ordination: Mean SD 
a. Flow of information 3.52 0.89 
b. Frequency of communication 3.83 0.91 
c. Openness 3.52 0.97 
d. Helpfulness 3.68 0.80 
Co-ordination general 3.64 0.90 
Degree of change 2.85 1.11 
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Entrepreneurship Mean SD 
a. Breaking from past behaviour 3.93 0.84 
b. Striving for continuous improvement 4.24 0.80 
c. Developing personal links 3.90 0.74 
d. Tackling problems and dilemmas 3.88 0.76 
Entrepreneurship general 3.99 0.79 
Degree of change 2.79 1.19 
Learning: Mean SD 
a. Individual influence 3.24 0.85 
b. Eliminating ambiguity 3.36 0.73 
c. Testing 3.33 0.79 
d. Articulation of knowledge 3.50 0.83 
e. Knowledge flow 3.93 0.75 
f. Knowledge concentration 3.49 0.84 
g. Challenging assumptions 3.24 0.73 
Learning general 3.44 0.81 
Degree of change 2.54 1.15 
Overall result Mean SD 
Intensity 3.64 0.86 
Degree of change 2.68 1.16 
Total number of respondents = 42 
The tables above show very active bottom processes. The overall result approaches the 
number 4 on the scale, which indicates that the categories of behaviour considered here, 
tend to occur very frequently. The high scoring of frequency of communication indicates 
a high level of interpersonal processes among shop floor workers. The importance of 
developed co-ordination behaviour cannot be underestimated in a business that operates 
under a tight time schedule. 
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People on the control bridge, those that drive the trailer to the correct infeed, and the 
teams on the shop floor who often need to cover for each other, have to co-ordinate their 
actions. In the depots there are only a few hours to complete the deliveries before 9 a. m., 
regardless of contingencies that occur. 
Entrepreneurship is also a very developed behaviour. In the aftermath of the removal of 
the authoritarian manager, the workers from the PDC proposed a great number of small 
improvements. The new manager said that it was as if "a lid had been removed", which 
had formerly prevented people to engage in continuous improvements. 
He also recognised that the majority of the changes that had occurred since he had taken 
over were influenced directly or indirectly by suggestions from shop floor workers. A 
machine that automatically weight and labels parcels in the origin depot, and a line 
painted on the back of trailers to prevent workers who are unloading from walking 
backwards and falling out, are examples of employees' initiatives. 
Some practices such as the adoption of the ISO standard and the investors in people 
model, are helpful in creating a knowledgeable environment by fostering testing and flow 
of knowledge respectively. The individual influence and the consequent openness of the 
organisation to suggestions from all levels, are illustrated by an experience of an LBO: 
We had a problem with freight reaching the depot too late. So I met the 
depot manager and the depot manager to discuss what could be done. 
They discussed with the people from the Northampton hub and in 48 
hours the problem was solved. Now we have four trailers coming in as 
before we had only two, it makes things a lot easier... We also had to 
change the working hours of the LBOs in consequence. 
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6.4. Case 4- Toshiba Consumer Products UK's background 
Toshiba Consumer Products UK belongs to the giant Japanese electronic goods 
manufacturer. On the same site where it currently manufactures air-conditioners, another 
Toshiba division used to assemble microwave ovens. From the microwave oven assembly 
operations it has retained most of the workforce and the English management. Toshiba 
also has a television set manufacturing facility in Plymouth. 
6.4.1. A brief overview of the evolution of operational performance 
Toshiba headquarters opted to terminate its microwave assembly operations in the UK in 
1990 when the demand for its microwave ovens collapsed. This was due to health scares 
linked to microwave cooking coupled with large retailers creating their own brands using 
cheaper Korean products. 
Instead of making the workforce redundant, workers were temporarily assigned to the 
neighbouring television plant. Many of them were later sent to Japan to develop new 
skills related to manufacturing air-conditioning units. They returned a few months later to 
initiate the assembly of Japanese SKD19 kits. 
Workers from local shipyards were also hired and sent to Japan to learn the 
manufacturing processes of copper parts. In November 1991 the first air- conditioner 
units containing in-house manufactured parts rolled out of the production line. The first 
year demanded intense learning not only from assembly workers, whose new work cycle 
was 5 minutes instead of 25 seconds in the microwave plant. Local management and 
engineering also had to adapt to the methods and standards of the Japanese headquarters 
and the new plant senior managers. 
19 Semi Knocked Down. 
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6.4.2. Managerial processes 
6.4.2. a. Gap closing 
A retrospective look at the evolution of the expertise in Toshiba shows three distinct 
phases of the evolution of performance in the company. An initial focus on the quality of 
the product was followed by a concentration of efforts and available resources on the 
improvement of productivity. Finally, efforts were directed towards increasing both 
delivery and product range flexibility. 
Although flexibility became a priority much later, the early decision of reducing 
dependency on suppliers by manufacturing as many parts in house as possible, was a very 
important step towards becoming more flexible to customer demand. When demand 
peaked, it represented a strategic advantage over other Japanese competitors who also 
had plants in Europe but were more dependent on external suppliers and thus less flexible 
in their ability to react to variations in demand. 
Senior Japanese managers were initially concerned with developing work force skills 
necessary to meet rigid quality standards. Every unit produced was carefully tested. 
Those which presented a problem, even a small one, were stripped down to identify what 
the problem was. 
The gap closing objective set by management was to match the quality level of the parent 
plant (Fujy works) products. Management made sure that everyone understood what the 
objectives were. This phase lasted for about one year. Meanwhile, the sales company, 
TUK, was not marketing Plymouth's products. Consequently the plant was not under 
pressure to increase output. By the end of the first year of operations quality levels had 
reached Japanese standards and the plant was ready for the second phase. 
With that [matching Japanese quality levels] achieved, it was time to go 
for the second objective: increase the factory's productivity. 
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Pushed by more aggressive marketing of its products by TUK, demand began to go up. 
To keep up with demand a second shift had to be organised. This meant a large intake of 
new workers. Quality standards fell, but were compensated by stricter final quality 
checks to avoid affecting the quality of the final product. The increase in production 
volume accelerated the learning curve. Processes' bottlenecks, which were not apparent 
before, were becoming evident and were being dealt with by the engineers. 
In the low volume (55 units) the bottlenecks weren't becoming obvious, 
but as soon as the demand increased you have to eliminate them and you 
need to consider further capital investments. And some are very 
expensive. 
Managers took two key actions to improve productivity. First, the maintenance 
department was merged with the manufacturing department. Through the principle of 
preventive maintenance, faults were logged in a data base which provided a checklist 
which operators went through periodically. 
Senior management not only encouraged the formation of small improvement groups on 
the shop floor, but also got personally involved in the setting up of initial ones. These 
groups were similar to QCCs but geared towards increasing productivity. Furthermore, a 
number of extra engineers were appointed to speed up the rate of improvements. In spite 
of having a very active role, management avoided direct interference. `Tom' Nynomia 
said: 
I have appointed additional engineers to improve productivity and they 
have to handle by themselves. They have to find out how we can improve 
with small investment, changes in the processes, changes in the jigs, etc. I' 
sometimes suggested to them but if I demand they will adopt a 
submission attitude and be waiting for me, instead getting some 
improvement by themselves and that is not good to put productivity up. 
After the achievement of compatible levels of productivity and a returning to operating a 
single shift, the Japanese senior member felt that the time was appropriate to set a new 
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strategic objective: to become more responsive to customer demand. In other words, the 
attention of managers and workers should be directed to finding ways to reduce the 
difference between production and demand. 
The management team responded to the new strategic direction by reducing the batch 
size from 100 to 25. The size of the batches was reduced within a short time span and 
immediately caused the levels of WIP to go up in the parts shop. Team leaders argued 
that it was virtually impossible to produce the number of parts for only one batch at a 
time because the set up times were too high. They therefore adopted a defensive attitude 
and began to produce parts for more than one batch at a time. 
This led to an intensive learning about how set up times could be reduced. Operatives 
were sent on external courses on set up reduction and the processes were checked for 
non-added value activities. As a result, set ups that formerly took fifteen minutes 
currently take only two minutes. 
The plant manager said that the ultimate objective had always been the same: to produce 
one unit at a time, whether this was attainable or not. The different priorities adopted in 
the process were steps in that direction. The management in Toshiba did not see 
continuous improvement as the only path to achieving such a goal. A major change in 
production processes had already been tested that would allow the organisation to 
produce in cells instead of lines. 
A very important element of managerial discretion was to give timing and focus to efforts 
of all members of the organisation. In the eyes of British managers and workers, Japanese 
senior managers were very focused in the objectives they wanted to achieve. They 
targeted a feasible objective and worked consistently towards it. They directed the efforts 
of the whole organisation to this goal. Defining priorities and working consistently 
towards them were considered by Japanese senior manager to be the key, he said: 
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People here [in England] are so ambitious but have no time scale. It is 
easy to say that we want to achieve that. But you have to make priority. 
It is very important to define priorities. 
6.4.2. b. Management style 
In Toshiba, managers are very approachable, and they sponsor the empowerment of 
lower hierarchical levels. Members report that the egalitarian culture is stronger in the air 
conditioner plant than in the neighbouring TV plant. One important indication of the 
distinctive managerial style of the air conditioning division is that even senior managers 
wear ordinary working jackets, whereas the managers in the television plant do not. 
Moreover, all managers have their desks in open-plan room so that they can be 
approached at virtually any time. 
Middle managers tend to regard the Japanese senior member as an authoritarian figure. 
They say that they can rarely challenge his decisions and that he can interfere in every 
department. 
Initially not everyone could understand [what I was saying] and that was 
very frustrating for me. Then I had to be a dictator. But now gradually I 
am changing. I still feel frustrated sometimes. Two steps ahead, one step 
back. They still need to change. 
The implementation of shop floor changes now receives a great deal of input from 
operatives. On the occasion that we visited the shop floor, a layout was being set up for a 
new line based entirely on guidelines put forward by the operatives. The culture of 
empowerment took off when the organisation needed to improve productivity. This phase 
represented a change in managerial attitudes, although management recognises that 
workers' suggestions were put aside for a while when the order book was too busy. 
Management acknowledged that it should not happen again. 
Initially management was busy reaching the quality goals and satisfying 
the sales, it wasn't until we could sit back and does some analysis with 
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more emphasis on productivity and started to listen to the members 
because the members that were involved with the processes could make 
meaningful suggestions 
6.4.2. c. Senior management team work 
The relationship between the British and Japanese managers was initially difficult 
because of cultural differences and a lack of confidence on the part of the Japanese in the 
abilities of the British managers. It was the Japanese managers who took the first 
decisions regarding outsourcing and equipment acquisition. 
Neil Lancaster and me spent a lot of time trying to put our own 
interpretation in what they wanted to do. They say you will have a laser 
and we would say that perhaps we buy a British, but they would say that 
we have a plan and you will live with that. At the initial days we couldn't 
have any input, no ownership, no control. It lasted about two years. 
As managers developed new skills and proved themselves to be up to the standard 
demanded by the Japanese senior member, confidence began to grow. `Tom' considers 
the current management skills to be higher than they were five years ago. Thus 
increasingly there is ownership by British management over important decisions such as 
reducing the batch size. 
The achievement of effective teamwork at managerial level is considered to be very 
important. People should understand each other's intentions. As the senior manager 
explained: "If I say something, I should not explain all items in detail. You should know 
what to do". A key to the achievement of teamwork is to develop frank and good 
communications among managers. `Tom' said: 
Today I can say things like we should concentrate on this model by 
volume criteria, for instance, but I only suggest. 
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The plant's organisational structure is divided into three main areas: manufacturing, 
warehousing (supply and storage), and engineering. Above these come the British and the 
Japanese senior managers. The relationship among the British managers is said to have 
always been good. The sales function is executed by TUK, an independent company. 
When asked if there was any need for a close relationship with the sales director, `Tom' 
replied: `We are always in contact. He has to be like a brother to me... of course'. 
6.4.2. d. Performance control 
Relevant shop floor indicators such as process times, stocks, and WIP are measured and 
logged into the plant's computer system. The operation's superintendent and senior 
manager use these indicators to keep track of the performance of operations. However, 
the Japanese senior manager said that "detailed" measurement was not important for him, 
but input and output were. 
Financial measures are important. I sometimes see things like WIP in 
order to give them a hint from my experience. Sometimes I give detailed 
instructions. But I don't follow many items. Instead I only need to go 
around in the factory to know if there is something wrong. By listening 
to rhythmical noise I can say if there is improvement or not. 
Target management is used throughout the organisation. The plant management team 
defines the objectives and sends them out as a formal contract to Japanese headquarters. 
The plant is left to its own devices as to how to achieve the targets it has set itself. 
We submit our plans to Japan and we are expected to work towards it. If 
the market changes it is not acceptable that you do not achieve your 
price targets. There is quite a discipline. It turns back on you sort of 
way. 
These objectives are then filtered down through the organisation. The manufacturing 
manager receives his objectives and gives production superintendents specific tasks for 
which they engage team leaders. Objectives are demanding. A superintendent comments: 
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One of my objectives was to reduce the manning in each of the lines by 
one. In that way productivity can go up. I've got five team leaders and I 
had to involve all five we had to work as a team and they came up with 
new ideas about how we could reach the objectives. Other objective was 
to open a new line without provoking much disruption and train the 
people that were going to man that line. That is not an easy task. To keep 
quality and productivity at the same time may be out of my reach. 
Sometimes, objectives appear to be contradictory. One example is an insistence on 
maximising the output of machines at the same time as minimising batch sizes. This 
seems to contradict the observations of members on their trips to the parent plant where 
they found machines left idle in the name of little inventories. Japanese management 
explained that there was no contradiction because there is still too much muda and room 
for improvement. 
6.4.2. e. Behaviour alignment 
The history of the organisation has had an influence on how workers perceive their 
relationship with the company. A strong bond with the company was created when 
nobody was made redundant during the transition period in which the microwave oven 
plant was closed prior to the set up of the first production line of air-conditioners. Also, 
the very strict initial training in the first year of production helped to create a culture in 
which people achieved high standards. 
The initial conditions of the air-conditioning operations were defined by traits inherited 
from its mother plant operations in Japan and from the Toshiba corporations as a whole. 
Because the plant's managerial behaviour and organisational systems reflected those 
developed over many decades of lean production in Japan, there was no need for very 
significant changes. An example is the development of a multi-skilled workforce linked 
to the reward system. A multi-skilled work force is a common characteristic in any 
Toshiba operations, as are participative management style and an empowered workforce 
that make use of QCCs. 
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One important facet of leadership in Toshiba was its sponsorship of the development of a 
strong culture of continuous improvement and teamwork. `Tom' Nynomia has led the 
plant since it was set up. He is responsible for the overall performance of the plant 
whereas the senior British manager, Neil Lancaster, is responsible for running the 
operations. 
The Japanese senior manager regards teamwork as one of the elements that the 
organisation lacked at the beginning and needed to develop. According to his vision, 
middle managers have to be fully integrated into this culture first before they are able to 
lead members. He sees improvements on the shop floor as dependent not only on changes 
to shop floor processes but also on the evolution of management skills. He commented: 
Productivity means not only shop floor. Engineering productivity means 
that they have to improve their skills... very important. What you are 
saying is a narrow definition; I have a broader view. 
Managers are always expected to achieve a bit more improvement. "If I as a manager am 
satisfied with how things are, I am not useful to the organisation anymore", said the 
senior manager. In its five years of history, the organisation as a whole has constantly 
searched for ways to improve its capabilities or to eliminate muda. There has not been a 
long period where significant improvements have not happened. 
The culture enjoyed by the company is an effective substitute for supervision. The two 
production superintendents, one for the parts shop and other for the assembly shop, are on 
the top of a flat structure of only two hierarchical levels: team leader and members, but 
they have never felt the need for more supervision. The adaptation of workers who came 
from the dockyards into this committed culture of self-empowerment did not occur 
without difficulties. 
Toshiba is a culture shock. They come from a background that they 
don't really understand what factory life is all about It is also a Japanese 
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thing that to have the control of the place you need to have everybody 
understanding what they are responsible for... What I have learned was 
to take more responsibilities because there are not many people in 
charge. If you are a school leaver you get it quicker, but when you are 
used to another way you suffer. 
A second important facet of the leadership exercised by Tom Ninomya is the 
combination of clear objectives together with the timing of the introduction of these 
objectives, thereby allowing the organisation to pursue one objective at a time. All 
members at all hierarchical levels are made aware of the organisation's goals. One 
striking feature of the strategic process in Toshiba is the fact that and efforts of members 
at all levels are always aligned with specific operational objectives prioritised by 
management. 
6.4.3. Process control and redesign 
Toshiba adopts a process control that is close to the six-sigma paradigm. Machine 
operatives are in charge of checking elements described in a process sheet which can be 
dimensions of the part being manufactured or visual inspections. There is no use for SPC. 
Instead there is a reliance on visual control because variation in the processes should 
become visually evident. Workers are constantly working in QCCs or collaborating in 
engineering projects to promote changes in the production line. 
As Toshiba attempted to become more flexible (in terms of both range and delivery) it 
realised the need for a holistic view of its process. The reduction of the batch size to 25 
units caused a number of disruptions in the assembly shop because the parts shop could 
not supply the parts in time. After an initial tendency to blame people, management 
realised that it was necessary to understand the various factors interfering with the 
stoppages. 
We have to understand what the problem is until we can do anything. 
The problem is we don't really know what is the real reason for these 
stoppages. The reports say in September the parts shop stopped for that 
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but it wasn't just the parts shop there are a lot of things involved. There 
was a lot of breakdown. Was it because maintenance couldn't service the 
machine, because of lack of training because they never had the skill 
card? 
It was agreed that every time there was a stoppage, the three areas (manufacturing, 
engineering, and warehouse) should make a report of the causes. This should be sent to 
the department concerned who should comment on them. The objective of the effort was 
to "getting an idea of the influences", that could provide the grounds for "flagging up 
problem areas". In this sense, the ability to become more flexible was directly linked to a 
knowledge of the factors influencing the functioning of the production line. 
Each model may represent a different problem in the paint shop, or in 
the brazing shop, or the press shop. Therefore it is very difficult to 
achieve a balance. We have a long way to go to understand the 
relationship model by model, machine by machine. I think that if we 
knew more about it we could meet more of our customer demand 
without too many problems 
The organisation found it too difficult to establish the cause-effect relationships. Instead 
it opted to identify the micro-areas where the problem originated and to make the 
managers of that area accountable. But some cause-effect could be observed and could 
help define certain procedures. 
For instance, it was realised that whenever two complex products were scheduled to be 
produced in parallel, the production lines tended to jam. The solution was to schedule 
complex units in parallel only with simpler ones. It has been observed that the rate of 
introduction of new models was also a factor affecting the performance of the production 
line. 
When you do one new model a month it is OK but when you try to do 5 
or 6 it is a bloody nightmare. 
226 
Continuous improvement of the processes will soon be complemented by their redesign 
through the introduction of cell production. Eight parallel cells, manned by three or four 
people replacing three production lines will increase the ability to produce different types 
at the same time. It will also provide opportunities to reduce the batch of 25 even further. 
Management also sees advantage in the fact that it eliminates problems of balancing lines 
to produce different models, and diminishes the disruptive impact of absenteeism and 
vacations. 
6.4.4 Organisational processes 
Co-ordination Mean SD 
a. Flow of information 2.80 0.75 
b. Frequency of communication 3.18 0.81 
c. Openness 2.61 0.82 
d. Helpfulness 3.43 0.73 
Co-ordination general 3.01 0.84 
Degree of change 2.24 1.06 
Entrepreneurship Mean SD 
a. Breaking from past behaviour 3.35 0.74 
b. Striving for continuous improvement 3.48 0.87 
c. Developing personal links 3.11 0.75 
d. Tackling problems and dilemmas 3.20 0.67 
Entrepreneurship general 3.28 0.77 
Degree of change 2.27 1.14 
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Learning Mean SD 
a. Individual influence 2.48 0.81 
b. Eliminating ambiguity 2.43 0.79 
c. Testing 3.31 0.68 
d. Articulation of knowledge 3.03 0.84 
e Knowledge flow 3.31 0.61 
f Knowledge concentration 2.56 0.79 
g Challenging assumptions 2.30 0.73 
Learning general 2.77 0.85 
Degree of change 1.98 1.06 
Overall result Mean SD 
Intensity 2.97 0.85 
Degree of change 2.13 1.09 
Number of respondents = 65 
Co-ordination behaviour is helped by a number of shop floor practices. Team leaders are 
briefed daily by superintendents, and then hold briefings with their teams. Team leaders 
from parts and assembly shops communicate frequently in order to define a common 
approach to meeting the manufacturing orders of the day. The people on the shop floor 
perceived their colleagues as very supportive. This corroborated the high scoring of the 
helpfulness item. In fact, the change from long production runs to shorter ones 
contributed to making people more dependent on each other. 
The reported commitment to shop floor culture is highlighted by the high scoring of the 
entrepreneurial behaviour which indicates a strong pursuit of continuous improvements 
and an openness to change. Learning behaviour was partially jeopardised by the fact that 
many suggestions that came from the shop floor could not be implemented because the 
organisation was too busy fulfilling the order book. Also, the ability of individuals to 
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influence the production process is limited by the fact that most of the design of the units 
is still made in Japan. On the other hand, testing and documentation are supported by the 
implementation of the ISO 9000 standard. 
In this chapter we have described the current state and an account of the variation of the 
following variables: 
" Managerial processes: Gap closing, management style, senior management 
teamwork, performance control, and behaviour alignment 
" Process control and redesign 
" Organisational processes: co-ordination, entrepreneurship, and learning 
The next chapter is dedicated to cross case analysis. We draw from the within case 
analysis presented here to identify what is common among the cases and what is 
different. These findings are then linked with the issues from the literature. 
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Chapter 7- Cross Case Analysis 
In this chapter we finish the data analysis by performing the 
cross case analysis and begin the data treatment that will be 
concluded in the next chapter. At the beginning of the chapter we 
discuss the role of managerial rationality in the strategic 
process, supporting the arguments with the cases' 
commonalties. We then perform the formal assessment of the 
cases' similarities and differences. The chapter closes with the 
discussion of gaps in the literature presented in 2.16. in the light 
of the findings. 
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7.1. Cross case analysis 
In this chapter we draw conclusions based on the four within cases analysis presented in 
the previous chapter. Before proceeding with the similarities and differences analysis, we 
focus on one of the central issues of this research: the role of managerial rationality. A 
new piece of literature by Ocasio is introduced. Two factors account for this late 
introduction. Firstly it was published recently (1997). Second, it only became relevant 
when the research was already advanced. Ocasio's (1997) model suggests that what will 
be achieved by the organisation is dependent on the ability of managers to focus the 
attention of the organisation on particular issues. We found this perspective particularly 
useful to articulate and substantiate our field observations. 
Below we describe the dialectical relationship between managerial action and the initial 
conditions of the organisation. We consider the impact of particular decisions, but 
emphasise a processual perspective. By adopting a processual perspective, we can add to 
Porter's notion of the duality between managerial rationality and actions. What is 
important is not only what managers decide but also what they routinely do. The next 
step is a formal assessment of the similarities and differences between the four cases. We 
close the chapter by using cross case conclusions to answer the literature review chapter's 
questions which relate to the literature gaps. 
7.2. Managerial choices and initial conditions 
Porter's dialectic view of the process of strategy as depending on the interaction between 
managerial choices and initial conditions, could lead us to conclude that in the process of 
performance evolution, managers rationally address initial conditions. In other words, we 
should expect a direct relationship between the rationality of the management team and 
strategic outcomes. 
However, from the beginning of the field research, it was clear that the outcomes 
achieved by the companies we studied did not result from a `grand design'. We were 
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forced to consider the possibility that there is no connection between formal intention and 
outcome. This view is supported by a number of authors, such as Mintzberg who 
advocate that outcome and intention are not related. They argue that managers do not 
engage in a search for strategic plans. Rather, strategic outcomes are achieved through 
daily interaction between managers and the initial conditions. 
Our findings suggest a middle ground. There is a connection between intention and 
outcome. Managers determined end states and sometimes defined actions to be 
implemented by middle managers. But the relationship between intentionality and 
outcome is not always direct. It is more complex than the traditional view20 that managers 
at the top identify the gap closing objectives and the necessary actions, and only 
communicate them to middle managers who are responsible for implementing the 
strategy. 
We consider the relationship of senior management discretion with outcomes to fall into 
three categories. The first category is the one that is closer to the traditional view. 
Strategic planning exercises result in a `grand plan' which details a number of actions 
which should be implemented. There is a direct relationship between managerial 
rationality and outcome. Other organisational members participate little, other than 
carrying out instructions. This category is usually about "hard" decisions such as market 
positioning or structure design. In the table below we list some of the design elements of 
each case. 
The second category, in a decreasing order of direct relationship between rationality and 
outcome, relates to how managers engage in the search for a desirable end state of 
performance. Management identifies what the strategic problem is, and the gap-closing 
objectives where the strategic effort should be concentrated. But this is as far as planning 
goes. Senior managers do not define detailed action plans from the outset. Lower 
hierarchical levels are given the responsibility of defining the course of action. 
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One of the important elements of planning in SERASA was the implementation of the 
quality programme. Although senior management envisioned a desired end state in 
consequence of the implementation of TQM, such as the dramatic improvement of 
business processes, it did not define the course of action or even the time span. The 
quality department and middle managers were responsible for the decision making. 
Although CIGNA's management decided to organise the production in cells, which led to 
a change in the production processes, the new business processes were not designed by 
management. Management defined the levels of performance expected from the new 
business processes, which emerged through trial and error. 
FIRST PHASE SECOND PHASE 
SERASA " Flattening the organisational structure " Replacement of functional structure 
by eliminating several positions by matrix structure 
" Creation of four main areas with " Creation of process complete cells 
parallel development areas 
" Implementation of a planning system 
CIGNA Closing down facilities and moving to " Defining levels of performance 
Scotland " Structural changes 
TNT " Market redirection " Adoption of EFQM model 
" Redesign of customer interface 
" Fostering customer care 
TOSHIBA " Grading system aimed at developing multi-skilled workforce 
" Substitution of imports by in-house made parts 
Table 7.1 - Actions by design 
The first phase of the change process in TNT defined a number of desired end states, 
such as customer focus, cost control, and investment in technology. The organisation 
embarked on the second phase of the strategic process using the EFQM model as a guide 
when the first phase was concluded. The model provided a framework of desirable end 
states, such as empowerment and a continuous improvement culture. The end states 
20 That is also the MSM view. 
233 
envisioned by Toshiba's management are those that characterise a lean producer. The 
strategic process was divided into three phases where the focus was placed exclusively on 
a specific performance attribute at the time. 
This category acknowledges that managers address only a limited number of issues. They 
cannot account for all the decisions involved in the transformation of the organisation. 
The concept of bounded rational managers is extensively developed by a number of 
important researchers such as Cyert and March (1963) and Mintzberg (1990,1994). 
The third dimension of managerial intervention gives even more emphasis on emergent 
and processual aspects while still recognising the link between intention and outcome. 
Managers can determine the course of change not by taking decisions themselves, or even 
by only determining end-states, but by influencing the way in which the organisational 
members will take decisions. This is done by drawing the attention of all the decision- 
makers in the organisation to a certain number of issues and providing them with 
legitimised answers to deal with those issues. 
FIRST ORDER INITIAL CONDITIONS SECOND ORDER INITIAL CONDITIONS 
Business 
Processes 
Knowledge Beh. 
Processes 
Structure Man. 
Systems 
Market 
Niche 
Man. 
Processes 
SERASA 0 0 " 0 O 0 
CIGNA f 0 " 0 " 0 
TNT 0 0 0 0 " 0 
Toshiba f Q 0 0 
Figure 7.1 - Rationality and the initial conditions of the organisation 
" Senior management identifies end state and sets the repertoire of actions. 
f Senior management identifies end states. 
0 Senior management defines issues and answers. 
Q Developed without connection with the strategic process. 
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7.2.1. Indirect rationality 
The evolution of performance is the result of an enormous number of actions taken by all 
decision-makers inside the firm. Decision-makers exist at all managerial levels. In 
companies that empower lower hierarchical levels, even shop floor operatives may take 
decisions of some importance. The empty circle highlights those initial conditions whose 
transformation excludes detailed planning and defined end states. The dominance of the 
empty circles in the figure above suggests the importance of the process of strategy which 
is separated from the content of strategy. 
Simon (1947) saw senior managers influence the process by "allocating and distributing 
the stimuli that channel the attention of administrators in terms of what selected aspects 
of the situation are to be attended, and what aspects are to be ignored"21. Senior managers 
influenced the process by directing individual decision making throughout the 
organisation. Managers set the focus of attention and then worked to influence the 
context in which members are included. 
According to Ocasio (1997), the focus of attention is set by the definition of issues and 
answers. This means respectively the definition of mechanisms for making sense of the 
environment and the repertoire of possible actions that decision-makers should consider. 
We observed that the models included elements that indicated corporate concern (e. g., 
profit, survival, etc. ), marketing objectives of the business unit (focus on attributes of 
performance that are important for targeted customers), and strictly operational issues 
(e. g., elimination of bottlenecks). SERASA and TNT used the quality model as a base to 
define and legitimise the issues and answers proposed by management. CIGNA's issues 
and answers model was grounded on study that defined gap-closing targets in terms of 
service attributes and costs, and in the organisation's experience with reengineering 
projects brought in by the change team. Toshiba's answers and issues were directly 
associated with the Japanese mother plant's lean production practices. 
21 Quoted from (Ocasio, 1997). 
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Unlike other cases where the change focus was on broader organisational change, 
Toshiba's issues and answers were almost exclusively related to operational issues. This 
operational focus was possible because there was no need to effect a deep transformation 
of the second order of initial conditions. Systems and structure were already compatible 
with the lean production environment. 
TNT managers realised that it was necessary to not only give visibility to issues and 
answer but to legitimise them. When the non-premium three day traffic was eliminated, 
management faced fierce resistance from depot management. They refused to "kill" the 
undesirable traffic because they did not see it as a sound strategic move. A senior 
manager said: 
Now we know how important it is that everyone is convinced. You can 
feel the difference on the people on the depot. When their boss is 
convinced of the strategy they work much better... You cannot convince 
people by bringing them all to a forum. 
All four cases have in common the fact that managers provided a model of issues and 
answers during the strategic processes and made them a' able throughout the 
organisation. The organisations that could not import a consistent and legitimised model 
from headquarters, such as Toshiba and CIGNA, found in the quality model a very useful 
substitute. 
The quality model provides a consistent framework of issues by giving a clear idea of the 
relationship of the organisation and its processes to its environment. It also provided 
answers, by focusing attention on process improvement, empowerment, and appropriate 
managerial behaviour. Furthermore, it has the legitimacy of being generally accepted as 
"the" right model for organisational improvement. The prestige of national awards, that 
has a high profile in the press and in society, reinforces the legitimacy of the model. 
We observed that issues should be limited to only a few to avoid dilution. In the cases 
studied, managers were careful to limit the relevant issues and answers proposed. Toshiba 
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is a case of special interest. The issues and answers directly related to shop floor 
performance were focused on only one dimension of current performance. 
Toshiba did not begin the process by emphasising issues and answers to quality, 
productivity, and flexibility all at once. The result would have been a confused message 
from top management about what was expected from those in the shop floor. By 
providing legitimised answers to consistent issues, senior management could directly 
influence shop floor behaviour and performance. 
The need to limit the number of issues that the organisation can deal with successfully, is 
closely related to the notion of trade-off. Organisations can only cope with a limited 
number of issues. Thus setting issues that are either contradictory or that divide the 
attention of decision-makers, leads to poor outcomes. This helps to explain why the 
organisation cannot pursue improvements in all performance areas at the same time. 
7.2.2. Attentional structures and decision channels 
To define a model of issues and answers is not enough. Senior managers have to 
transform the organic functioning of the firm to induce continuous focus on their 
proposed model. The necessary change includes what is more complex than the redesign 
of structure and managerial systems. To adapt mechanisms of the firm to its new goals is 
an essential step; but change should be more encompassing and seek an intrinsic 
alteration by managing managers' behaviour. The nature of the managerial processes will 
define whether or not the strategic process will follow the issues and answers model 
adopted by the firm. 
Below we provide Ocasio's (1997) description of attentional structures and decision 
channels. These two concepts are associated with our managerial processes. Gap closing, 
ge ent style, senior management teamwork, and performance control are the 
rocesse that define flue sha of the decision channels. These processes considered 
12 Ocasio (ibid. ) calls it procedural and communications channels. 
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together define how the members of the organisation interact with each other, both 
laterally and vertically, and how decisions are taken. They define the "formal and 
informal concrete activities, interactions, and communications set up by the firm to 
induce organisational decision-makers to action on a selected series of issues". Ocasio 
(1997) adds, "the particular form and characteristics of the firm's procedural and 
communication channels significantly impact when, whether, and how decision-makers 
focus their attention, and how the attention of the various decision-makers interacts 
within the channel". 
How business processes were controlled and redesigned in the case studies also played a 
part in shaping the channels of interaction. Process control identifies issues on which 
members should focus. Process redesign, especially the creation of teams, greatly 
changes how members interact. 
Behavioural alignment is the managerial process that refers to how managers shape the 
attentional structures, defined by March and Olsen (1976) as the social, economic, and 
cultural structures that will determine the focus of attention, time and effort dedicated by 
organisational decision-makers. Ocasio (1997) argues that attention structures will 
mediate "the valuation and legitimisation of issues and answers, the creation and 
distribution of procedural and communication channels, and the interests and identities 
that guide decision makers' actions and interpretation". He examines the role of four 
categories of attentional structures: rules of the game, players, structural positions, and 
resources23. We present definitions of the categories below because they will facilitate the 
discussion of role of behavioural alignment. 
The rules of the game "provide a logic for action and embody a set of cultural and 
material values and incentives" (ibid. ). They link financial and social rewards to specific 
issues and answers, thus regulating behaviour in the organisation by dictating how 
members achieve social status and credit, and are rewarded in the process of achieving 
organisational objectives. 
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The rules of the game are dependent on the historical context in which they develop. By 
shedding all its senior managers, SERASA facilitated a change in the rules of the game 
by diminishing the importance of history. Reward systems also carry the previous history 
of the organisation and are transformed and realigned with operational objectives. One 
important difference between Toshiba and the other cases is that the "rules of the game" 
were not changed but built over the existent platform of lean production. 
Ocasio also distinguishes decision makers from players on the grounds that players are 
those who "through their social influence, power, and control, influence and regulate the 
decisions and activities of other decision makers". We have identified the role of players 
by isolating the leadership aspect. All four organisations had a leading figure who had a 
profound influence on the focus of attention of members. 
Structural positions differentiate the attention of decision-makers. Vertically, a manager 
should have a different perspective of the issues and answers than workers, while 
horizontally a marketing manager may have a different view from that of a production 
manager. The smaller this divergence is the better the whole organisation can focus on a 
unique set of objectives. The search for flatter organisations in all cases reflects this need. 
Again, only Toshiba was already `born' as a flat organisation. 
We should expect consistency between attentional structures and decision channels. In 
other words, we should expect consistency among the managerial processes that make up 
these two categories. This is in fact one of the hypotheses that was proposed in chapter 
three. . -s QQ 4 
((. V4e .a 
7.3. Cross cases similarities 
CAýt ý. 4 
Search for end goals of organisational transformation - The transformation achieved 
in the four cases has sound roots in intentionality. CIGNA, TNT, and SERASA are best 
23 Resources were not found to luve any correspondence to our field observations. 
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described as processes of strategic turnaround while Toshiba is an example of evolution. 
Nevertheless senior managers in all four companies engaged in the search for specific 
end states and worked towards achieving them. 
TNT and CIGNA initially implemented action plans in reaction to a declining 
competitive situation that was threatening their very survival. A second phase followed in 
which the search for strategic end goals occurred. The strategic objectives defined by 
senior managers went far beyond the definition of operational performance gaps. 
Managers wanted to achieve major alterations in the nature of the organisations which 
went beyond shop floor transformations. Nevertheless, the definition of operational gap 
closing objectives gave an important sense of direction to the organisations' efforts. 
CIGNA and Toshiba defined gap-closing goals during the planning phase. CIGNA 
performed an extensive survey of its customers. This resulted in a reasonably precise 
definition of gap closing objectives in terms of how its performance was perceived at that 
time and the standards desired by its customers. Toshiba managers arrived from Japan 
with a clear idea of the appropriate levels of quality24, dependability, productivity, and 
flexibility. SERASA and TNT used customer responses to define gap-closing objectives 
at various points of the process. 
Successful implementation - No U turns in strategy -The combination of a few 
critical choices, defined in the planning phase, and successful implementation were 
common to all cases. Managers made few strategic choices and were able to build enough 
momentum within the organisation to keep the change process on course until objectives 
were achieved. Although resistance was common, in none of the cases were senior 
managers forced to reassess original objectives and to reverse decisions, which would 
have been unavoidable if the change process had been brought to a complete halt. 
2' Quality could be directly compared %ith the standards of the mother plant. In fact matching the quality of 
the mother plant was proposed as the fu-st gap that should be closed. 
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In the example provided by SERASA, management aimed at three concrete goals: (1) the 
development of a planning system that involved the whole organisation in the business 
strategy formulation process, (2) the redesign of the organisation into a flat structure, and 
(3) the implementation of the TQMM ideas throughout the organisation. Although the 
achievement of these objectives could not guarantee strong operational performance, 
their implementation provoked deep changes in the organisation, making it compatible 
with the goals of strong performance. 
TNT successfully redefined its market niche. This decision, associated with the decision 
to create a customer-focused organisation, based on the implementation of TQM systems, 
proved essential in the evolution of operational performance. CIGNA's strategic choice 
was to organise production in cells. The success of this move concentrated most of the 
managerial attention for a long period. Toshiba's essential strategic choice was to select 
one attribute of performance at a time. Management would be fully committed to a 
certain attribute such as quality until they had achieved appropriate levels. 
Adapting the management style - The style of both middle managers and senior 
managers underwent adaptation during the strategy process. The degree of change, 
however, varied according to initial conditions. Toshiba, for instance, was the case in 
which observed mild changes are explained by the fact that its operations were born 
within a lean production organisation. Other organisations had to struggle to change 
incompatible managerial behaviours. 
The change in managerial behaviour in SERASA began with the replacement of the 
management team. Supported by the acceptance of TQM principles, senior managers 
worked towards transforming the behaviour of middle managers, who initially felt 
threatened and resisted the change process. Gradually middle managers adopted the roles 
of facilitators instead of supervisors. 
Similarly in CIGNA the change of management style began from the top. The 
authoritarian MD was replaced by a new manager, with a recognised participative and 
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coaching style. The change team interviewed senior managers to assess their willingness 
to adapt to the new style. Those who could not adapt eventually left the company. 
Likewise, line management was given training on the new skills required to perform the 
role of coaches. Those who could not develop abilities necessary to become team leaders 
were assigned a technical role. 
Although none of TNT's senior managers disputed the necessity of implementing 
changes to regain competitiveness, they were less keen on changing their own 
management style. The CEO initially campaigned to change the behaviour of senior 
managers using principles of the quality model as a paradigm. A strong change in attitude 
was experienced by the whole organisation as the senior managers in TNT Express 
changed their style and this change filtered down to lower hierarchical levels. Before this 
change in attitude, employees could be sacked if they disagreed with senior managers. 
This attitude was gradually eliminated and middle managers were given a great deal of 
discretionary power. 
These empowered middle managers reflected their new role in their attitude to 
subordinates, bringing the change in attitude closer to the shop floor. A manager who was 
able to create an atmosphere of empowerment, replaced the PDC's authoritarian 
manager. These changes are still in process, because section leaders (former foremen) in 
the PDC have to be yet fully converted from a supervisory to a coaching role. 
Toshiba's case demanded less adaptation because management style had already been 
integrated into a lean production culture. Most of the participative management practices 
have evolved over the years rather than undergoing significant change. There has always 
been sponsorship of an egalitarian culture with no offices and common dress, and the 
involvement of members in shop floor decisions. The most significant change occurred at 
the senior management level. Since British managers proved to have the managerial 
capabilities required by the Japanese senior manager, they were increasingly empowered. 
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Active senior management teamwork - Another important theme running through the 
cases was the co-operative behaviour among senior managers. The collaboration between 
the areas during the change process was dynamic and constant. There were no signs of 
any major political dispute over resources and power during and after planning. 
SERASA assembled its new management team with the philosophy that areas should 
come second to business processes. This was helped by organisational redesign which 
brought roles closer to business processes, and through a planning system which allowed 
and encouraged a great deal of lateral integration between the areas' lower hierarchical 
levels. The CEO said that senior managers were never allowed to protect the interests of 
the functions in opposition to the general interest of the business. 
CIGNA knew from other experiences of change that it could not afford to employ senior 
managers who were not willing to work together. It gradually expelled senior managers 
who were unable to engage in teamwork. It also eliminated the previous political power 
of big areas by redefining the organisational chart as a matrix structure. Now the senior 
managers are responsible for the results of their own line of business. They share 
responsibility of the production staff with the operations manager. 
TNT showed a great deal of teamwork at senior management level by backing the 
marketing manager in the face of criticism from middle managers when profits 
momentarily declined because of the new marketing strategy. Operations and marketing 
directors co-ordinate their actions very closely, avoiding inconsistencies between the 
traffic accepted by the sales department and the network's abilities. The relationship 
between the senior managers is very informal and they circulate in the same space and 
interact constantly. 
Toshiba also enjoys active teamwork among its senior managers. The Japanese senior 
manager considers it essential that managers have a clear understanding of each other's 
intentions and share the same objectives. Co-ordination with sales operations, which is 
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the responsibility of another Toshiba division, is ensured by the close relationship 
between the plant manager and the sales director. 
Close control of operational performance by senior managers through the extensive 
use of measurement - All four organisations have developed sophisticated methods of 
performance control, which is an important determinant of the relationship between 
senior managers and line managers. These metrics did not previously exist and were 
implemented during the change process (the exception is Toshiba which is not a case of 
transformation). 
SERASA's internal maxim is "what is not worth measuring is not worth doing". 
Aggregated indicators, which measure the advancement of the organisation towards its 
strategic goals, are followed personally by the CEO and senior managers and are used to 
define possible corrective action or call the attention of middle managers to specific 
trends. Non aggregated indicators assist line managers in focusing attention on deficient 
processes, and in identifying technical deficiencies in the workforce as a whole, or in 
individuals. 
CIGNA initially set performance indicators to keep track of the evolution of the pilot 
teams. During the early stages of the change process the quantitative measurement 
demonstrated the dramatic evolution of performance, and reinforced the legitimacy of the 
change process. The same indicators are still used to track team performance and for 
target setting. Each week, team leaders and the operations manager have a meeting to 
discuss the performance of those indicators and the evolution towards targets. 
The performance of each of TNT's depots is controlled by indicators of quality, 
operational costs, quality of customer interface, and customer feedback. These measures 
determine the actions taken and the relationship between senior managers and the 
managers of the depot. The comparative performance of all depots is published weekly 
25 In terms of the depots contribution to the network operations 
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and those with poor performance are highlighted. Annual targets of operational 
performance are set in relation to those outcomes which ensure continuity of 
improvement. 
Toshiba's senior managers define the general targets of the organisation, which are 
broken down into local targets assigned to managers. Managers are accountable for 
achieving those targets. This is in line with an important aspect of the relationship 
between the Japanese senior manager, the British management team, and the 
superintendents. The senior manager controls the continuous elimination of muda, by 
demanding constant improvements from managers, not only by checking on shop floor 
performance indicators but also by periodically inspecting the shop floor. 
The importance of strategic leadership - Authors who do not subscribe to a top-down 
vision of strategy, such as Aiintzberg, remind us that it is easy to overestimate the role of 
leadership. On the other hand, the literature in both academic and popular press has many 
examples of heroic leadership. Quality of leadership was a prominent facet of the case 
studies. However, senior managers performed a role distinct from that of heroic leaders, 
who are perceived as responsible solely for the turnaround processes. 
Leadership exercised by CEOs went beyond managerial aspect. Management was 
understood as providing order and procedures necessary to run the business. Leaders 
were able to inspire and motivate members by changing their behaviour and unleashing 
energy towards common objectives (Whittington, 1991). Adopting the same definition as 
Pettigrew and Whipp (1991), we can say that leadership can have three basic styles: 
transactional, transformational, and representational. The kind of leadership of interest 
here is the transformational one. 
Transformational leaders focus the attention of organisational members, and by being 
effective communicators, are able to build commitment and motivate people to trade 
short-term interests for higher objectives. The transformational leader induces changes by 
empowering other agents to participate in the process. 
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Pettigrew and \Vhipp (1991) assert that most of the time leadership is not regarded within 
a processual context. Non-processual perspectives tend to focus on specific actions of 
leaders and disregard history lines. The profile of leadership that emerges from this study 
is not one of charismatic leaders taking decisive dramatic action. Instead managers, as 
observed by Pettigrew and Whipp, relied on a great deal of preparatory work to create the 
right atmosphere and capabilities, and to legitimise actions. 
Allowing extensive preparation before any major change of action was a strong pattern in 
all cases. SERASA's new CEO allowed more than one year of preparations before 
beginning the implementation of TQM principles. In addition, the redesign of the 
organisational chart was an initiative to implement the strategic planning system. CIGNA 
allowed a long period of assessment of its competitive position and choices before taking 
essential decisions. During this period, the change team interviewed top managers to 
assess their commitment to the change process. They also explained the rationale for the 
proposed changes to workers and middle management. 
TNT understood the need to make preparations before the implementation of major 
changes when depot managers reacted negatively to the change in market positioning 
because they were not convinced of the appropriateness of the measure. In Toshiba, each 
time there was a change in the strategic direction for improvement, such as from quality 
to productivity, management was careful to rationalise the need to do so 
In accordance with the pattern observed by Pettigrew and Whipp (ibid. ) the style of 
leadership changed according to its context. The most striking example was CIGNA. 
Initially an authoritarian NID was considered adequate to initiate the change process. 
However. this process called for different abilities and management styles and another 
MD had to be appointed. Once the change process was completed there had to be a 
further change of AMD to appoint someone with the skills needed to run the business. 
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We also observed leaders to rely on managers throughout the organisation to lead the 
process at their level. Senior managers opted for developing the management skills of 
middle managers before enhancing their discretionary power. Without the participation of 
these intermediate' leaders, the change process would have been brought to a stand still. 
The bigger the organisation the more important was the role of these "intermediate" 
leaders. TNT designed special training programmes. CIGNA delegated part of the change 
leadership to the change team. Middle managers in SERASA were made responsible for 
the change in their areas. Toshiba's senior manager regarded it as essential that middle 
managers learn the necessary managerial skills in order to achieve a culture of continuous 
improvement. 
Redefinition of how members in all levels are rewarded for their actions - Leadership 
is not sufficient to accomplish complex processes of change. Nadler and Tushman 
(1990)`6 argue that successful change goes beyond energy and vision. Managers, they 
say, should also be able to "build teams, systems, and managerial processes". They also 
add, "It is this interaction of charisma, attention to systems and processes, and 
widespread involvement at multiple levels that seems to drive large system change". 
Managers did not generally have a system of incentives. Nevertheless, those managers 
who did not fit into the new "rules of the game" were gradually removed from the 
organisations or faced a bleak future. This was true for both senior and middle managers. 
For instance, a middle manager who was not concerned with achieving a culture of 
continuous improvement in his/her section could hardly aspire to be considered for 
promotion and probably would have difficulty keeping his/her position. TNT and 
SERASA both offered financial incentives to branch managers. However, while the 
financial reward built into TNT's programme is only symbolic, in SERASA it represents 
an important part of the branch managers' income. 
26 Refcrcncc: Wittington 1993 
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The "rules of the game" are defined by monetary or non-monetary systems of incentive at 
shop floor level. These systems are used proactively to support the achievement of 
operational goals. SERASA's managers showed a concern about the financial rewards 
systems saying that they should be implemented only when the organisation is well into 
the change process. Otherwise they could confuse workers. SERASA applies individual 
performance appraisal to the level of quality and productivity. 
In CIGNA, a team-based bonus was considered important to develop team spirit. Later, it 
was substituted with a system based on non-monetary rewards and individual 
development. TNT linked payment to performance in specific areas. A particularly 
successful example was the implementation of a system where workers received a bonus 
according to what time prior to three o'clock they finishing sorting. 
Toshiba confirms Schonberger's (1986) assertion that "there is little or no room for 
incentive plans in a \VCTM mature plant". Nevertheless, the grading system played a role 
in developing a multi-skilled work force. There were also implicit rewards at Toshiba. 
Workers who had shown interest in continuous improvement were later promoted to the 
engineering department or became team leaders. 
Behaviour tended to differ in intensity according to the category of behaviour - The 
companies presented the same general pattern of scoring higher on entrepreneurship, 
followed by co-ordination and then learning (the means were found to be statistically 
different). The only exception was CIGNA where co-ordination and learning means were 
found not to be significantly different (2-tail sig. = 0.134). 
The rates of change were perceived to be greater for co-ordination and entrepreneurship 
behaviour than learning. However, no significant difference could be observed between 
co-ordination and entrepreneurship. This suggests that change in managerial behaviour 
and the modification of organisational systems might affect co-ordination and 
entrepreneurship in a similar way. It indicates that the consequences of the alterations of 
managerial processes have a more straightforward effect on co-ordination and 
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entrepreneurship than they have on learning processes. Thus learning behaviour may tend 
to be more inertial than co-ordination and entrepreneurship, take longer to react to 
organisational change, and thus be more time dependent. 
Strong evolution of the production processes towards leanness - All companies 
presented high scoring on dependency, meaning that sequential tasks presented little or 
no buffer among themselves. We argue that dependency is a good representation of the 
degree of leanness of the production processes. The fewer buffers27 there are separating 
production stages the more dependent people have to be on each other's performance. 
As a simple example, consider two similar production lines in which one has a great 
quantity of WIP between the parts shop and the assembly shop and the other has very few 
or non-existent WIP. It is clear that in the second case, workers in the assembly shop will 
be more dependent on those in the parts shop than in the first case. 
The mean average score of dependency for all companies considered together is 4.15 
(0.81) achieved on a1 to 5 scale. It triangulates well with the observation that the 
production lines were very lean and buffers were being continuously reduced or 
eliminated, in many cases in a quite dramatic fashion. 
The mean difference is significant between SERASA and all other cases except CIGNA 
(2-Tail sig. = 0.305). However, there is no significant statistical difference between the 
mean scores of CIGNA, TNT, and Toshiba (Fprob. = 0.2365). The four means are not 
significantly equal but they can be considered so in practical terms. The relative 
difference between the means is generally below 10 percent of their value (see graphic 
below). 
The average score for change is 3.05 (SD = 1.18) revealing that a very significant 
evolution has been perceived by members. It was expected that CIGNA and SERASA 
'Buffers can be physical or not. Excess time and resources work as buffers and expand the common notion 
of buffers as physical WIP between tasks. 
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would score higher because they had undergone reengineering programmes which had 
redesigned many of their business processes. Nevertheless this was confirmed only in the 
case of SERASA (mean = 3.59 SD = 1.01) while CIGNA (mean = 2.53, SD = 1.12) 
scored below TNT (mean = 3.24 and SD = 1.11). 
This can be explained by the fact that although CIGNA dismantled large sections of the 
organisation in favour of cell production, it was done at a gradual pace while TNT 
eliminated three day sorting practically overnight. Toshiba's low scoring is consistent 
with its continuous path of improvement without major dramatic changes. 
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7.4. Cross cases differences 
Association between intensity of change in managerial process and bottom process - 
A strong pattern associating changes at one level with changes at another emerged in this 
study. This gives a strong indication that changes at the lower levels of the organisation 
are dependent on changes at higher hierarchical levels. More specifically, the evolution of 
organisational processes at the bottom is dependent on the evolution of managerial 
processes. This could be observed as the organisations differed in the intensity of change 
which occurred in their managerial as well as their organisational processes. 
i 
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Indeed the importance of what managers actually do and how it affects lower hierarchical 
levels cannot be overstated. For instance, sponsorship by top management of continuous 
business process improvements inspired by TQhs principles, would not have succeeded if 
the gap-closing process had kept on excluding the participation of middle managers. The 
same would be true if middle managers had maintained a tayloristic style and had not 
regarded workers as active agents of transformation. 
Among the four cases, SERASA is the one whose management processes were most 
dramatically altered. CIGNA and TNT come second because change was very significant 
but not as dramatic as in SERASA; and finally Toshiba, a case better understood as a 
process of evolution. 
SERASA had all of its management team removed at once. The new CEO managed to 
change managerial processes radically. Consequently, all the categories of organisational 
behaviour were reported to have undergone extensive change which rendered them very 
different from previous behaviours. At the other extreme, Toshiba's managers were 
already adapted to the Toshiba "way of doing". The new manager was responsible for 
gradual modifications in managerial behaviours. The extent of the transformation can 
hardly be compared to SERASA's case. 
TNT and CIGNA represent an intermediary category. In these companies managerial 
change was not as dramatic as in SERASA, but certainly cannot be considered 
evolutionary as in the case of Toshiba. The change process in CIGNA explicitly tackled 
the nature of the management processes, but unlike SERASA, senior managers were not 
dismissed. TNT also retained its basic management structure and promoted gradual 
changes in its managerial processes. 
The chart above shows the differences in member's perceptions of changes which 
occurred in the behaviour categories which represent the organisational processes. The 
means for CIGNA and TNT were found statistically to be the same (2-tail significance of 
251 
0.358), while SERASA and Toshiba occupy respectively the top and bottom corners of 
the chart and do not overlap. 
T 
Difference in scoring between companies in terms of intensity of organisational 
behaviour - The four companies considered in this study differed in the intensity of 
organisational behaviour (Fprob=0.0000). CIGNA achieved the highest overall scoring 
(considering all categories of behaviour at the same time), followed by TNT and 
SERASA which were not found to be significantly different (2-Tail sig. = 0.244), and 
finally by Toshiba. 
The division of scoring into three clusters suggests the influence of business processes on 
the intensity of organisational behaviour. CIGNA may show more intense behaviour 
because the same team performs all the production steps. However, because there is no 
need to co-ordinate with people from other functions, the only category of behaviour in 
which CIGNA does not have the highest scoring is co-ordination. 
TNT and SERASA occupy the intermediate cluster. A network of branches and central 
headquarters performs their production steps. The similarity of the organisation of the 
production processes may have contributed to placing them in the same cluster. 
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The fact that Toshiba the least intense organisational processes of all four companies, 
suggests the hypothesis that those beneficial behaviours could be more easily achieved in 
services than in manufacturing. Manufacturing operations, such as this case, present a 
great deal more complexities than the service operations considered here. This may have 
negatively affected co-ordination, entrepreneurship, and learning. 
7.5. Open issues from the literature review 
7.5.1. Does a company necessarily need to implement a manufacturing 
(operations) strategy to have competitive advantage? 
The MSM cannot account for the strategic processes that we have observed. The model is 
mechanist, it relies excessively on managerial rationality, and it misses essential issues 
that compound our explanation of strategic processes. Besides, the decision areas 
proposed in the MSM literature were difficult or impossible to recognise in service firms. 
However, two of the model's central elements stand firmly: (a) The definition of gap-tzý 
closing objectives which acknowledge the need for trade-off among performance criteria 
and (b) the content of strategy concentrated on structural decisions. % 
Some examples of the importance of gap-closing objectives are found in all cases. 
CIGNA defined carefully the expected standards of performance and the perception of 
the company's performance. TNT prioritised the development of dependability by 
focusing on on-time performance perceived by the customers as the most important 
attribute of service. Toshiba prioritised one dimension of performance at a time. 
SERASA focused on the quality and speed of its processes. 
Structural decisions largely concern the reorganisation of production processes and the 
redesign of the organisational structure. Both were evident in CIGNA who regarded the 
re-organisation of its production processes from large departments into cells as the most 
important single step to achieve its operational performance objectives. One of TNT's 
initial actions was to redesign its sales processes. SERASA's main design action 
concerned the redesign of the organisation. Although its strategic planning targeted 
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business processes, the use of reengineering was decided in an emergent way. Similarly, 
Toshiba's decision to substitute production lines with cell production came late in the 
process when the organisation had already closed quality and productivity gaps and was 
working towards achieving greater flexibility. 
Although some elements of the MSM correspond to field observations, Hayes and Pisano 
(1995) have argued that the adoption of the MSM cannot result in differentiation, and 
consequently in competitive advantage, in the long term. All competitors, they say, 
should be able to follow the same manufacturing strategy. They conclude that as long as 
managers take similar decisions to align structure and infrastructure with competitive 
strategy and embark on improvement programmes, there should be no differentiation in 
operational performance in the long term. Similarly, companies that adopt lean 
production techniques may see all their competitors adopting similar techniques and 
eliminating advantage. 
I 
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The strategic processes described here departed significantly from lean production and 
_I. 
the manufacturing strategy models. Our model shows that top-down initiatives are 
considerably less important than acknowledged by lean production and manufacturing 
strategy models. Senior managers may have taken decisions that can be associated with 
elements of both models, but those decisions play only a small part in the complex 
process that creates operational differentiation. 
The focus of strategy should be deviated from hard changes in production processes and 
managerial systems. The most important changes are invisible. They refer mainly to 
evolution of managerial and organisational processes. This is not addressed explicitly by 
any of the models. The development of managerial and organisational processes is 
emergent and intrinsic to each company and does not depend on resources available in 
perfect markets. Indeed the processes bore little resemblance to the MSM idea that 
companies implement their strategies mainly by acquiring elements from external 
markets and assembling these inside the organisation. 
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Unlike MSM and lean production, the model presented here meets Peteraf's (1993) three 
basic conditions that characterise competitive advantage: (a) the transformations 
observed cannot be bought in the available factor markets, (b) there are difficulties in 
replication by other companies and (c) the advantage is heterogeneously distributed 
among competitors. We have not tested the last condition because companies with poor 
performance were not included in our sample. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that an 
average competitor's performance would be at the level of those companies before the 
process of change. 
The strategic processes that we have studied are too complex to be described by the 
MSM. In these processes the role of top management is less one of defining actions than 
one of shaping the emergent processes. As senior managers shape the strategic process, 
they create conditions for organisational processes to develop. Very active, "invisible", 
organisational processes are responsible for the effectiveness of the production process 
and consequently the levels of performance. 
We conclude that firms do not need to implement an MS to have a competitive 
advantage, because the model misses the essential elements which explain how advantage 
based on operational effectiveness can be created and sustained. This does not mean to 
say that the MSM is inappropriate. Some elements of the model stand, proving that 
managerial intention is necessary. Although the notion of "grand design" strategy, in 
which all steps are defined from the outset, does not correspond to reality, strategic intent 
must exist. 
We found managerial intention and the outcome of competitive advantage to be 
connected. However, we see the nature of the connection between intentionality and 
outcome to be essentially different from that proposed by Vickery (1991). He suggests 
that competitive advantage results from a better ability to implement a strategy the 
content of which should be the same for all competitors. In contrast, intentionally, our 
view gives direction to the strategic processes which have a strong emergent component. 
/ 
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7.5.2. Which theory can best describe the evolution of operational performance: 
Resource-based theory or the manufacturing strategy framework? 
The theories considered here are not fully competing theories. They do not use the same 
constructs and they do not address the same set of issues. Nevertheless, they are theories 
concerned with the productive resources of the firm. In contrast to the MSM, the RBV is 
rather vague on how productive resources should be managed, but provides the 
foundations within which we can define the characteristics that must underpin any model 
of competitive advantage. 
As we have already discussed, the theories advocate opposite views of the strategic 
process. The RBV stands for a bottom-up strategy based on non-transferable productive 
resources that are particular to the firm and the MSM sees a top-down process in which 
the outcome is determined by managerial rationality. Our view of the strategic process, 
which leads to differentiation of performance, does not entirely subscribe to any of the 
views. In the figure below we show where our model stands in relation to the issues 
highlighted in item 2.16.2. Using the assumptions of each model as extremes in a 
continuum, we can see that although tending towards the RBV, no model in isolation can 
be used to describe the process. 
The observations support the RBV view of advantage depending on "invisible assets", 
instead of structural elements which is the MSM view. Nevertheless, these assets have a 
rather different nature from those that have been described in the literature. Nanda (1994) 
sees the "invisible assets" that account for competitive advantage to be a by-product of 
production processes and to have accumulated through organisational learning. 
According to this view, learning-by-doing generates firm specific learning. Learning is 
captured as technical expertise or is embedded in the behaviour of its members. 
According to this account, the role of management is negligible. 
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Figure 7.4 - Positioning of our model in relation to the MSM and RBV. 
Therefore the theories are at odds with what constitutes the basis of advantage and the 
management role in creating it, because the MSM sees senior management as only 
responsible for the development of the firm's abilities. As we rule out MSM's direct 
connection between senior management intentions and advantage, we also discard RBV's 
concept of invisible assets as a by-product of learning-by-doing. 
We propose that the strategic dimensions of the invisible assets are the organisational 
processes. They are: co-ordination, entrepreneurship, and learning. Organisational 
processes are developed, not by top-down implementation of strategic intent, but by the 
adaptive evolution of managerial processes, and by the action of redesign and control 
activities. In opposition to the RBV which sees no correspondence with the development 
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of invisible assets, we see a relationship although not as direct as the one described by the 
MSM. 
The issue of the nature of the strategic process deserves a middle ground. At the same 
time as it acknowledges a role in gap-closing activities and the definition of the content 
of strategy, as the MSM suggests, it sees also the strategic process as essentially emergent 
and adaptive. This is in accordance with the RBV, which suggests that the development 
of "invisible assets" has to be regarded in a processual way. The resulting model sees a 
role for the "rational manager", yet one which is a long way from the total rationality 
implicit in the MSM. Senior managers are seen to compensate for their limited rationality 
by focusing attention on specific issues and thus shaping the strategic process instead of 
concentrating all the decisions on themselves. 
An essential notion derived from the RBV is that organisations have inertia to change. 
Inertia results from the fact that the firm's original conditions interfere with the strategic 
process, limiting the outcome and the speed of change. MSM's assumptions of neo- 
classical economics roots misleadingly imply that change can be readily achieved and the 
organisation can redirect its path of improvement as much as it wants. The initial 
conditions of the firm affect the strategic process. The main difference between Toshiba 
and the other cases was that Toshiba's initial conditions were more compatible with its 
operational goals. Consequently, it could focus attention directly on operational issues, or 
on first order initial conditions. In contrast, the other cases concentrated their struggle on 
the change of second order initial conditions. 
The firm needs time to change its initial conditions, especially its managerial and 
organisational processes. The changes in these processes are not achieved through 
particular decisions. Instead, the alterations in organisational processes result from a 
gradual and ambiguous change process. The organisation needs a considerable amount of 
time to consolidate changes of its managerial processes that will make possible the 
gradual evolution of organisational processes. The total change process is likely to take 
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years, as we have observed, although considerable performance improvements can be 
achieved in the early stages. 
Sanchez and Thomas (1995) distinguish between capability building and capability 
leveraging. The former represents qualitative change in the (invisible) asset base of the 
organisation, while the later is best described as a quantitative development of the same 
resource base existing in the organisation, or the acquisition of resources from external 
markets. We suggest that there is qualitative change when the initial conditions are 
significantly altered. Because the MSM does not see a role for the systemic 
transformation of initial conditions, we consider that it can prescribe a capability 
leveraging process, never a capability building one. Only a capability building process 
can lead to differentiated outcomes. 
7.5.3. How does the model affect our view of the strategic importance of 
operations? 
Hayes and Pisano (1995) consider some changes in the way we regard operations strategy 
due to the change of paradigm of competitive advantage. Because the strategic question is 
now "how to compete", in place of the previous "where to compete", manufacturing 
strategy can produce answers to the strategic debate. We should be able to define 
prescriptive answers to the question how to compete. We use the MSM and Porter (1996) 
to highlight the issues on which prescription advice is based. We then discuss what we 
mean by operations strategy and how it fits into the dynamic capabilities framework. 
The MSM sees strategy as a matter of strategic fit. Operations should make a conscious 
effort to align what they can do with market demands. This implies, in the short term 
optimisation of the structural resources of the organisation by means of trade-offs aimed 
at achieving attributes of performance prioritised in terms of market importance28. The 
goal is to improve operational effectiveness. 
28 Slack adds the consideration of the relative performance of competitors. 
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Porter (1996) sees it differently. He makes a clear-cut distinction between the search for 
operational efficiency29 and strategy. Strategy is about finding different ways to perform 
similar activities or structuring production systems differently. Companies with strategy 
are those that assume choices in terms of trade-offs and limit what they offer. The firm 
should be able to create an ideal and sustainable competitive position by choosing to 
perform different sets of activities and interlock them in a series of strategic fits that will 
make replication difficult or impossible3o 
Porter (ibid. ) argues that whatever advantage the firm achieves by focusing on 
operational efficiency improvement is likely to be quickly eroded because best practices 
diffuse fast. As we have argued, strategy is seen here as the search for operational 
effectiveness, through a process that has little in common with the adoption of best 
practices described by Porter. The achievement of outstanding operational efficiency for 
the companies in our case studies means systemic and complex organisation wide 
evolution. 
In spite of the disagreement over the issue of what strategy is about, Porter (1996) 
highlights two of the most important elements of the strategic process. Strategy, he says, 
is about keeping the same course of action towards a specific goal by means of limiting 
what the organisation delivers. Thus we suggest that an organisation has a strategy when 
management acts consciously to limit what the organisation can offer and keeps the 
momentum of the change process focused on specific ends. 
Resistance by managers or employees did not precipitate U turns in the strategy. 
Throughout the strategic processes managers did not abandon courses of action or turn 
29 Operation effectiveness meaning "performing similar activities better than rivals perform them. 
Operational effectiveness includes but is not limited to efficiency. It refers to any number of practices that 
allow the company to better utilise its inputs by, for example, reducing defects in products or developing 
better products faster". 
30 According to Porter (1996) there are three levels of fit. The first one, also central the MSM, is the fit 
among the activities of each function. The second fit occurs when the firm's activities are not only 
consistent but also reinforcing. The third and more complex fit refers to co-ordination and information 
exchange across activities that allow the company to optimise its effort. In the example, Porter describes 
260 
their attention to other priorities before consolidating achievements in performance. For 
instance, CIGNA avoided expanding until the strategic process was consolidated. Many 
years after initiating the strategic process, it began cautious expansion into new markets. 
The central notion of the MSM remains important. Firms will not be able to achieve high 
performance in all attributes of performance simultaneously and should limit what they 
want to achieve. We have observed managers focusing the attention of members of the 
organisation on a limited number of issues. In Toshiba the issues were different according 
to the attributes of performance being pursued. Initially the organisation focused on 
issues connected with the quality of the product. Then it moved to issue of productivity. 
Other issues were gradually introduced and were considerably different. Everyone was 
engaged in eliminating inefficiencies in the production processes, such as bottlenecks. 
Until then it had not been a concern. In the same manner, when the focus was on 
flexibility, completely new issues were introduced. 
As a lean producer Toshiba's final goal was to achieve high performance in all attributes 
of performance. It may seem that there was no room for choice. The longitudinal 
perspective uncovered a process where managers were continuously choosing and 
limiting what they demanded from its production function, while maintaining a strategic 
course of improvement. 
So far, we have concluded that answers to "how to compete" relate to a search for 
operational efficiency characterised by keeping the organisation moving towards 
achieving specific goals while exercising choice by limiting what it can offer. Departing 
from these assumptions, our notion of operations strategy builds on the strategic advice of 
the dynamic capability perspective. Teece and Pisano (1994) place the strategic focus of 
analysis on the previous history of the organisation and on firms' processes. Managerial 
choice, or strategy, is about identifying and supporting difficult to imitate paths and 
processes that will be the basis for valuable products and services. 
the optimisation of turn over of stock in Gap to be possible by its sticking to low variety of models, which 
makes it easier to implement very short model cycles. 
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e first c cern of strategy is to recognise the importance of history because it limits the 
ch ' ailable. It is possible that the path of improvement o oý d by the organisation 
will limit its future options. Leonard-Barton provided us with examples of companies that 
were trapped in the expertise they developed and had lost sight of what was happening 
elsewhere. Instead of considering technological expertise as rigidities, we have observed 
that the path of improvement followed by the organisation influences the nature of the 
process drivers. It may also result in a number of complementary assets placed up 
(distribution channels) and down (suppliers) the production chain, which can create 
rigidities. 
Toshiba is again the case in point. Teece, Pisano and Schuen (1997) have argued that the 
path of development will determine what the organisation learns. This is intimately 
linked to its method of process control. Process control was initially based on the six- 
sigma paradigm during the quality and productivity phases. When the focus switched to 
flexibility the six-sigma paradigm was found to be inadequate. The organisation realised 
the need to control variables that were not only local but that could account for the 
process as a whole. 
The managerial processes are also affected by the course of improvement. Performance 
control process, for instance, would certainly have different foci according to the goal of 
improvement. Henderson and Clark (1990) argue that the choice of the path of 
improvement creates contingencies that shape not only learning but also communication 
channels, problem solving approaches, and interactions across functions borders. 
The prescriptive implication of the importance of the paths of improvement influencing 
the shape of the process drivers is to be found in the sand cone theory (Ferdows and De 
Meyer, 1990). The organisation may have to pursue goals that induce a coherent 
development of the drivers. Each stage has to build on the basis provided by the previous 
one. For instance, by seeking to achieve high quality, organisations develop six-sigma 
process control for eliminating local sources of variation. When the organisation is 
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seeking flexibility it can concentrate on organisation's wide sources of variation because 
the local ones are already under control. Similarly, it is possible that as the organisation 
moves through the sequence of development, the managerial processes will become 
increasin-ly more sophisticated. 
e second oncem of strategy is to identify the processes responsible for producing 
valu products and services. We propose that valuable managerial processes are those 
that support the model of issues and answers proposed by senior managers by defining 
coherent and purposeful attentional structures and decision channels. As this perspective 
is in its infancy, it is difficult to assess the importance of each managerial process. 
The importance of individual organisational processes is more evident. For instance, we 
can argue that in some cases co-ordination may be more important than learning. This is 
the case with processes that have limited room for improvement, rarely incorporate new 
knowledge, and/or are not easily disrupted by variations in inputs. One example is the 
process of turning a plane around in the gate. Hardly any learning will occur because 
employees rarely need to absorb new practices or be aware of new issues. In addition, the 
process is flexible enough to handle contingencies without being disrupted, which 
downplays the need to control sources of variation. Nevertheless, co-ordination is of 
fundamental importance to accomplish the task under time pressure (Gittel, 1996). 
Complex manufacturing operations are different. They are very sensitive to disruption 
caused by any variation in the system. Process control exists to identify and eliminate, 
where possible, the sources of variation. It is likely that new knowledge about product 
and process will need to be diffused. In addition, the continuous change of practices is 
central to continuous improvement. On the other hand, co-ordination has a more limited 
role. The ability to communicate and help each other is important in a factory but not as 
important as for example in the case mentioned above where individuals have less 
dedicated roles than in manufacturing plants. 
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We have not presented a radically new view of operations strategy. The model presented 
here grounds some of the basic elements of the MSM, such as the need for deliberate 
action and the concept of trade-off, into the new competitive framework. By developing a 
model based on the drivers of performance improvement, we have attempted to change 
the unit of analysis and the analytical focus of operations strategy. The proposed model 
gives strategic importance only to infrastructure while recognising structural issues as 
important elements in the strategic processes. It breaks with the decision areas paradigm 
and addresses infrastructural issues in terms of processes31. The process view gives a new 
perspective for understanding the infrastructural side of the organisation. 
Perhaps one essential virtue of the model presented here, is to transform the perception of 
strategic contribution at lower hierarchical levels and link it to what managers do. This 
contributes to removing much of the ambiguity and the lack of objectivity that have 
characterised discussions on this issue. It gives shape and demonstrates the strategic 
importance of firm-specific bottom processes: learning, co-ordination, and 
entrepreneurship. 
The new model makes operations strategy compatible with the emerging paradigm of 
competitive advantage. It also places the analytical focus on the inter-personal processes 
of the organisation, and incorporates other aspects of the literature, such as the learning 
organisation and business processes reengineering, which although related, were never 
discussed within the same model. Normative implications for the model are discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
7.5.4. Are distinctive advantages emergent or intentional? 
According to the model presented here there is an intimate link between intention and 
outcome. This results in an apparent paradox. If intention drives the outcome, then the 
means to achieve that outcome can be articulated. Once articulated, competitors can also 
implement the same recipe. According to Barney (1986), if a firm can articulate the 
31 Indeed, the literature has never succeeded in linking the strategic process to decision into infrastructural 
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mechanisms of its advantage, this knowledge will eventually spread to competitors. The 
acquisition or development of the resources that leads to performance will eliminate that 
relative advantage. 
The "core competencies" concept has become a buzzword and disseminated the idea that 
companies with an advantage have distinctive resources, often regarded as technological 
expertise. It reinforces the paradox by substantiating the RBV's notion that strategy is 
about the identification of imperfectly transferable resources. However, the notion of 
resources32 as the only differential explaining heterogeneous operational performance is 
not one that found correspondence in our field observations. 
The paradox is only apparent. Although managerial intention leads to performance 
outcome, managers are unable to establish cause-and-effect relationships between 
resources and outcomes. Instead, the role of management is to manage the emergent 
strategic processes to achieve the objectives set by the strategic intent. 
A number of authors have concluded that RBV's ideas will not find direct 
correspondence in the real world, and looked for alternative ways. Pisano (1994), for 
instance, has associated the development of "proficient" manufacturing with learning. 
Similarly, Nanda (1994) has moved away from discussions about managerial 
participation in the creation of advantage within the company's operations. 
The view that the development of outstanding performance is somehow independent 
from managerial action is, implicitly or explicitly, grounded on the concept of the 
learning curve. However, the learning curve cannot explain lasting performance 
differences. Differences of scale can create temporary advantage, but as soon as 
competitors accumulate production to the point when the organisation reaps most of the 
benefits, the difference in scale can only reap marginal benefits. 
areas as it did with structural ones. 
32 Resources seen as inputs for production that can be well defined, such as organisational culture. 
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The literature creates an artificial dichotomy between manual dexterity and managerial 
intention because it is unable to (a) picture the contribution of shop floor workers towards 
performance much beyond manual dexterity, and (b) understand the link between 
managerial intention and action, and what happens on the shop floor. 
The strategic process, as we have described it, is not exclusively emergent or intentional. 
The dichotomy is avoided only when we are able to establish the link between what 
management does and the evolution of first order initial conditions. The strategic intent 
leads the way but direct managerial deliberation cannot account for the process of 
strategic performance improvement. 
7.5.5. What are the drivers of performance evolution? 
The strategic process may be characterised by a succession of performance leaps and 
periods of continuous improvement. Performance leaps imply planning. Manufacturing 
strategy explains precisely this aspect. In contrast, lean production is closer to continuous 
improvement and stresses the active role of lower hierarchical levels in improving the 
firm's abilities. However, none of these theories can propose adequate descriptive 
variables of the strategic process. 
Our proposed model contains what we believe can describe the strategic process in 
function of the states of its variables. Consequently, our field study was organised to 
describe the states and the elements of the proposed model. The within case analysis has 
demonstrated the relevance of each of the variables. 
Gap closing is the managerial process associated with the search for performance 
objectives. This is the only driver of performance evolution considered by the MSM. We 
consider it an essential managerial process. It captures the intentional element of the 
strategic process. Nonetheless, apart from the MSM, we have observed managers being 
concerned with infrastructural issues instead of allocating existing resources to reshape 
structural elements. The role of the gap-closing process is better described by Sanchez 
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and Heene (1995) as working to motivate and to give direction to capability building and 
capability leveraging, instead of determining top down action plans. W" 
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The other managerial processes that shape decision channels in the organisation are: 
management style, senior management teamwork, and performance control. Together 
with the gap-closing process, they determine how the members in the organisation 
interact. The managerial processes are complemented by behaviour alignment that shapes 
the attentional structures. The managerial processes as a whole guide the strategic process 
by focusing the attention of the firm on the issues and answers model proposed by 
management. 
Process redesign and control is a driver independent from managerial processes. It 
reflects how the organisation manages its business processes. Together, these six drivers 
work against the inertia of initial conditions. Only when initial conditions evolve can the 
organisational processes, which are the last drivers of evolution, come into play. 
The organisational processes represent the component that sustains strong operational 
performance. It gives meaning to Hayes and Wheelwright's (1985) assertion that a firm 
that aims at strong operational performance should expect "the bulk of its improvements 
to bubble up from lower levels in the organisation". Active organisational processes can 
give the organisation an edge because they, and only they, can eliminate "organic slack". 
The dimensions of the organisational processes are: co-ordination, entrepreneurship, and 
learning. 
In this chapter we have developed the core ideas of this thesis. We have: 
" Discussed the nature of management influence on the evolution of the firm's initial 
conditions. Three levels of influence between intentionality and outcome have been 
proposed. The results are articulated in terms of, and supported by, a model 
developed in Ocasio (1997) 
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" Articulated the similarities among the various cases. Because within case analysis is 
organised according to the elements of the model, most of the conclusions relate to 
the issues highlighted by the model. However, statistical treatment of the quantitative 
data helped uncovering relationships not related to the model 
" Addressed the literature gaps in the light of research findings 
From here we move to close this research. The final chapter is dedicated to the 
consolidation of the proposed model. 
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Chapter 8- Conclusion 
This last chapter concludes data treatment that was initiated in 
the previous one. Conclusions which emerged in the previous 
chapter are formalised and the model is consolidated. We begin 
the chapter by discussing the final version of the model. The 
elements of this model are strengthened through the test of the 
research hypotheses. We then summarise the general research 
findings and discuss how they affect the literature. The last topic 
concentrates on a discussion of the model and its 
consequences. The ideas in this last item represent the core 
findings of this research and have important implications for 
future approaches to strategy in operations. Finally, we evaluate 
the opportunities for further research opened up by this thesis 
and, with the benefit of hindsight, critically assess the 
methodology employed. 
8.1. The model of operational performance improvement 
The field research largely supports the model which we have proposed during the 
grounded phase of research and presented in 3.2. There is, however, an important point of 
departure from the original model. The results suggest that the bottom up influence, 
represented by organisational processes, on the development of the strategic process is 
more limited than we initially thought. 
During the research, it became clear that the transformations necessary to sustain 
vigorous improvement in performance need to transcend the floor. This was notry 
clear during the initial phases of the research. So we concluded that there was a 
possibility that the strategic process was essentially emergent, and the organisational 
processes were its central driver. The role of management would therefore be limited to 
leveraging the sources of advantage that would `spontaneously' emerge from operations; 
But the final picture is a rather different one. 
The model shows that the evolution of performance depends on the evolution of initial 
conditions that hinder the strategic process. Organisational processes cannot lead the 
transformation of the firm because its development depends on the two other drivers. 
Even when developed it cannot affect second order initial conditions. Although 
organisational processes cannot by themselves create the conditions for the evolution of 
initial conditions, they are strategically important. The effectiveness of the production 
(business) processes depends on the level of activity of the organisational processes. 
The transformation does not emerge from the shop floor. However, middle managers play 
an important role. With the exception of a few "hard" decisions, such as those related to 
the organisational structure redesign, there was no line dividing thinking by senior 
managers and acting by middle managers. Outcome was mainly a product of countless 
micro-decisions which happened at the bottom of the organisation and were supported by 
compatible managerial processes at the top. 
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The model presented here demonstrates the link between managerial and shop floor 
behaviour. By developing appropriate and consistent managerial processes, managers 
create conditions for the development of active organisational processes. The managerial 
processes set the direction for improvement, the model of issues and answers, and define 
attention structures and decision channels. Thus, senior management moulds an 
intentional shape to a strategic process where evolution occurs gradually and is 
essentially emergent. 
8.2. Analysis of the research hypotheses 
The elements provided by the four case studies are used to support or refute the 
exploratory hypotheses proposed in the chapter that describes the grounded research. 
8.2.1. Hypothesis 1: Strategic operational performance improvement requires the 
evolution of all initial conditions that hinderVthe evolutionary process 
The initial conditions considered here reflect elements to which there are no factor 
markets outside the organisation. Structural elements, such as technologies, are purchased 
from the external markets that are available to all competitors and thus cannot hinder the 
evolution of operational performance. The initial conditions categories identified in the 
grounded research chapter were divided into first and second order, respectively: business 
processes, knowledge, behavioural processes; and structure, market, managerial systems, 
and managerial processes. Below we follow the sequence above to discuss and 
summarise the description of the evolution of each process performed by the analysis 
chapters. 
Business processes evolved significantly in all four cases. SERASA and CIGNA 
experienced redesign of existing processes and the move to cell production. In CIGNA, 
the reengineering of processes was the essential element of organisational transformation, 
while in SERASA reengineering occurred in an emergent way. With the appointment of 
the new board, the attention of the managers was directed to the inadequacy of the 
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business processes. Processes were mapped, and stages that were not adding value were 
eliminated. Later, working cells were implemented. These changed the existing processes 
significantly. 
In TNT, especially at the PDC, processes were changed because sorting, which had 
previously been done in three days, would now have to be done overnight. Later with a 
change of management, there was a formal initiative to redesign manual processes. The 
processes in Toshiba had evolved continuous improvement. Now the assembly processes 
are going to be redesigned through the introduction of production cells. 
Knowledge of the production process was a not significantly important initial condition 
except in Toshiba's case. The evolution of quality in Toshiba depended heavily on 
shaping the working routines on the shop floor and training and supervising members 
until they could consistently achieve adequate standards. The productivity phase involved 
efforts by employees and engineers to eliminate bottlenecks. 
The flexibility phase, however, highlighted the problems created by the elimination of 
buffers associated with long production runs. The parts shop was initially blamed for the 
disruption, but soon there was a realisation of the need to investigate the causes of 
disruptions. As the articulation of cause and effect was considered too complex, the 
organisation opted to highlight the production stage responsible for the each stoppage of 
the production line. This resulted in great reduction of the stoppage time in the span of 
just a few months. 
The change in the behavioural process was significant. The high performance of these 
processes was the product of considerable evolution from the initial state. In Toshiba, the 
case closer to pure continuous improvement, the members found that change was 
significant but moderate (mean = 2.15, SD = 1.08). At one extreme, members of 
SERASA found change to be very salient (mean = 3.17; SD = 0.99). This is reflected in 
the huge changes that the organisation has experienced in its organisational processes and 
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structure. Similarly, CIGNA (mean = 2.60; SD = 1.18) and TNT (mean = 2.67; SD = 
1.12) have experienced considerable change in their behavioural processes. 
The structure in both SERASA and CIGNA went through great changes. SERASA 
eliminated several hierarchical levels and redefined roles closer to business processes. It 
also created parallel functions responsible for incorporating new trends from outside the 
company borders, as well as supporting the continuous improvement effort. The 
department parallel to operations is responsible for keeping updated the methodology 
used to evaluate credit risk and to test suggestions before implementation. 
CIGNA developed a matrix structure where the production cells report both to the 
operations manager and to the manager responsible for the product. TNT management 
made little change in the organisational chart apart from the creation of the role of 
regional co-ordinators. These regional co-ordinators facilitated communication and co- 
ordination between headquarters and the depots. Some important players were removed 
to make way for changes in managerial processes in the PDC. 
Some positioning was also revised. Toshiba gradually entered new market segments 
which were served by models produced in Japan. SERASA expanded into the market 
represented by non-financial companies which have a need for credit risk information or 
management. The jump from a captive market represented by the shareholder banks, to a 
market defined as "SERASA information behind every business", demanded the 
development of customer orientation which had not previously existed. SERASA did not 
have a marketing department until 1989. At early stages of the turnaround process 
CIGNA dropped the life pension business in order to concentrate exclusively on health 
care products for corporate clients. 
TNT is the case where the initial market orientation represented an initial condition 
especially difficult to overcome. When it decided to replace the three day market with 
overnight delivery, it faced internal resistance forcing senior management to take a 
considerable risk in supporting the strategy. If the new market strategy had failed to show 
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an increase in profits, the management team and particularly the marketing manager who 
had championed the initiative, would probably have had to resign. 
The transformation of managerial processes and systems is intrinsically linked. The 
transformation of the managerial processes which defined the way in which members 
interact (gap closing, management behaviour, senior management teamwork, 
performance control) is directly linked to managerial systems such as those that 
determine performance evaluation and strategic planning. The managerial processes that 
define attention structure are directly linked to systems of human resources management, 
especially those related to performance reward. 
The managerial processes that define gap-closing objectives were considerably modified. 
SERASA changed the gap closing routines by implementing a new strategic planning 
system. CIGNA evolved from a situation in which workers had no say to the point that 
the teams set their own targets under the supervision of the operations manager. TNT 
began to set targets for indicators of service and costs, and left it to the depot manager to 
make them work. In Toshiba, senior managers defined overall targets for the plant and set 
goals for each area. 
Senior management teamwork was improved in all four cases. SERASA's CEO 
appointed new senior managers departing from the essential idea that they should have as 
broad a vision as possible of the business, instead of concentrating their attention on only 
one function. The new planning system contributed to the achievement of teamwork at 
senior level because plans normally emerged from lateral multi-functional interaction at 
the bottom of the organisation. Senior managers are also encouraged to take courses in 
credit management to be aware of the essence of the business. 
To achieve teamwork among CIGNA's senior managers to support the change process 
was a goal of the change team and a main concern of the CEO. The new matrix structure 
also collaborated to create a teamwork environment, once managers had shared 
responsibilities. New managers who were able to work in the new environment, gradually 
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replaced the old management team. Collaboration between TNT's functional areas did 
not previously exist. Now operations and sales managers control the traffic in the network 
on a daily basis. In Toshiba, the ability of senior management to work together was 
gradually increased as English managers developed a number of management skills, 
which the Japanese members considered essential, and proved themselves up to the task. 
With the exception of Toshiba, where change was gradual, the management style was 
radically transformed in all cases. Senior and middle management adapted their style to 
the new set of issues and answers and allowed greater empowerment of the hierarchical 
levels below them. The substitution of large departments with cell production in 
SERASA and CIGNA was important to revolutionise the relationship between the 
workforce and line management. Line managers were changed from supervisors to 
coaches. 
All the cases implemented mechanisms of performance control. SERASA developed an 
extensive collection which amounted to more than a thousand indicators from which 15 
were checked daily by senior management. CIGNA's operations manager now discusses 
the indicators of performance at a weekly meeting with team leaders. TNT has developed 
a sophisticated range of performance indicators which tracks the performance of each 
depot in terms of costs and service quality. Toshiba also measures shop floor 
performance indicators that are used to track whether improvement is happening or not. 
The transformation of attention structures received special attention from management. 
Top managers presented the firms with consistent models of issues and answers that 
should guide behaviour. SERASA and TNT based their model on the quality model, 
while CIGNA and Toshiba based theirs on successful formulae from their parent 
companies. The companies made extensive use of reward systems. Leadership was the 
glue which united all the elements in the process of aligning the behaviour of the 
organisational members. In all organisations this process evolved and became more 
sophisticated in the strategic process. 
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Conclusion: The hypothesis is partially supported. 
The hypothesis is only partly supported because not all initial conditions were considered 
important in all cases. Knowledge was found to be an issue only in Toshiba. We can 
speculate on a number of explanations. One hypothesis could be that the service's 
business processes are less subject to disruption due to variations of inputs of process. 
Therefore, service companies do not need to develop the knowledge about which are the 
variables that affect the outcome of the process, and how to control them. The other two 
categories of first order initial conditions, business processes and organisational 
processes, could be observed to have evolved in all cases. But the evolution of second 
order initial conditions is not so evident. Structure, for instance, that developed so 
dramatically in SERASA and CIGNA, was only adjusted in TNT, and hardly suffered 
any change in Toshiba. Toshiba was organised from the beginning as a lean organisation 
and TNT structure was reasonably flat. It could not be said, however, that in these cases 
structure was not hindering the improvement of operational performance. 
Market positioning was not seen as an issue to Toshiba but was very important to 
SERASA, TNT, and CIGNA. For CIGNA it meant the concentration on only one type of 
business. For SERASA, it allowed the expansion of the organisation output. TNT's new 
market strategy unexpectedly created conditions for elimination of structural slacks. In 
these three cases the new target market represented a successful strategy that allowed the 
organisations revenue and/or profits to be significantly increased. As a cause and effect 
relationship between increased profits and change was established, it gave an indisputable 
legitimacy to the change process and the senior managers responsible for it. It also 
offered other hierarchical levels a perspective of gains in the form of higher income or 
even simple opportunity of keeping their jobs, which had previously been threatened. 
Not all managerial systems were equally important to all firms. Toshiba hardly used 
monetary reward systems while other organisations made extensive use of theirs. 
However all organisations were careful to eliminate those managerial processes that were 
running contrary to the objectives of the organisation. TNT, for instance, changed its pay 
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system for shop floor workers. It had been paying operatives on an hourly basis when it 
wanted the work in the PDC to be finished quickly. 
8.2.2. Hypothesis 2: The relevant drivers of strategic operational performance 
improvement are (a) the organisational processes co-ordination, 
entrepreneurship, and learning; (b) the managerial processes: gap-closing, 
management style, senior management teamwork, performance control, and 
behaviour alignment; and (c) activities related to process control and redesign. 
When we defined the research methodology, we chose to describe the process as "a 
category of concepts linked to actions of individuals and organisations". We 
operationalised the categories proposed by the hypothesis as constructs and measured 
them as variables. These variables interact with the initial conditions33 to produce 
strategic outcomes. To be a relevant driver a variable has to describe the actions of 
individuals, at both managerial and staff level, which have any influence on the outcome 
of high operational performance. It should also consider the actions of the organisation, 
which cut across hierarchical levels and cannot be related to any particular individual. 
The variables were initially proposed through grounded research. During the research we 
refined them and clarified their boundaries. In particular the variables related to 
organisational processes were refined by means of statistical treatment. 
In chapter six we defined the state and variation of each variable. Because they all proved 
relevant, we can conclude that the managerial and organisational processes have 
succeeded in the actions of managers and staff which affect the desired strategic outcome. 
The implication is that strategic outcome is dependent on whether or not managers are 
doing things like engaging in gap closing processes, adopting a participative management 
style, etc. The same is true for organisational processes. A desirable outcome is 
dependent on whether or not staff behaves in a way which results into intense 
organisational processes. We have also shown that the way in which the organisation 
manages its business processes, through redesign and control, is also an important 
variable. The variables fulfil the goal of prediction suggested by this research. The power 
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and precision paradox explains that even if we have an incomplete understanding of the 
systems function, it is possible to make an accurate prediction. 
Conclusion: The hypothesis is supported. 
8.2.3. Hypothesis 3: The drivers of strategic operational improvement are 
mutually dependent and supportive 
The chart shown in 7.4. indicates that companies that underwent greater change in their 
managerial processes also achieved a greater degree of change in their behavioural 
processes. However, before becoming compatible with the development of beneficial 
shop floor behaviour, management processes need to develop internal coherence. 
We argue that it was necessary to achieve internal consistence among the managerial 
processes, which determine interaction between organisational members (gap-closing, 
senior management teamwork, management style, and performance control), and the 
managerial processes that determine attention structures (behaviour alignment). The 
consistency and compatibility of the managerial processes, supported by the management 
of business processes allowed the organisation to develop high performance 
organisational processes. 
The processes that shaped the interaction of the decision-makers had to be compatible. 
Gap closing processes were responsible for involving decision-makers from all levels in 
the implementation, and sometimes in the formulation, of strategy (especially in the case 
of SERASA). To be effective, gap-closing processes needed to be compatible with other 
processes, such as the style of management. A style of management that did not respect 
the ideas and values of other managers and workers would go against participation of 
lower hierarchy levels in strategy. 
33 Note that managerial and organisational processes are also initial conditions. 
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The same holds true for senior management teamwork. If senior managers engaged in 
political dispute over prestige and organisational resources, gap-closing processes would 
not be able to mobilise organisation-wide strengths to support eventual initiatives. 
Similarly, in a case where performance control failed to provide the appropriate debate 
and interaction between the hierarchical levels, the strategic processes would be 
jeopardised. Thus, we should expect internal consistency among the managerial processes 
that determine the interaction of members and the decision making processes. 
Behaviour alignment is the managerial process that defines the attention structures. It 
creates and distributes decision channels, regulates the "valuation and legitimisation" of 
issues and answers through leadership, and redesigns structure and systems to shape the 
"interests and identities that guide decision makers' action and interpretation" (Ocasio, 
1997). Therefore it should be compatible and supportive of the other managerial 
processes. Imagine that the gap closing process identified what should be the objective of 
the organisation, but it was contrary to members' interests and identities. The strategic 
process would probably be crippled by sabotage from individuals or groups who perceive 
the process to be a threat to them. In conclusion we can say that the managerial processes 
are very dependent on each other. 
We have concluded over the need of managerial processes to be internally coherent and 
compatible with organisational processes. We should now examine the need for 
compatibility between these two drivers and the process redesign and control. The 
popular press normally attributes successful turnaround process to punctual intervention 
of management in business processes. CIGNA, for instance, was described as a case in 
which the only important drive of transformation was the redesign of its business 
processes. SERASA is also a case where reengineering has been attributed a central role 
in the transformational process. 
Some strong evidence supports the idea that strategic performance improvement depends 
on systemic coherence. Leonard-Barton (1992) investigates in detail an outstanding 
performer, Chaparral Steel, which she sees as an example of the use of the factory as a 
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learning laboratory. She attempts to explain the means by which the company has built an 
unmatched operational advantage. This she attributes to its ability to learn faster than the 
competition. She concludes that this can be explained in terms of four dependent 
subsystems. Each subsystem is made up of three elements: (1) a learning activity that 
permeates the whole factory; (2) an underlying value, of which the learning activity is the 
operational expression; (3) a consistent managerial system whose procedures and 
incentives are supportive of the two initial elements. These subsystems are considered 
"tremendously" dependent on each other. She writes34: 
As the Chaparral example demonstrates, learning skills, management 
procedures, and values are interrelated. Values unsupported by 
management systems are vapid; management systems that run counter 
to values are likely to be sabotaged; learning activities unsupported by 
values and management practices will be short-lived. If a learning 
capability is to be developed, the whole system must eventually be 
addressed. 
It has been shown here that the redesign and control of business processes are only 
another driver in a larger process of transformation. The redesign of processes without 
the change in managerial and organisational processes would afford no lasting significant 
improvement of the order achieved by the organisations in this study. 
The evolution of managerial processes and the redesign of processes that eliminated 
unnecessary steps and brought production people closer, allowed organisational processes 
to flourish. It is difficult to see how entrepreneurship can develop when there are no high 
profile gap closing processes creating an environment of change, or where managers are 
authoritarian and do not respect workers as active agents of transformation. 
Non-compatible managerial behaviour provides no incentive for learning, which can be 
made virtually impossible by obsolete business processes crippled by buffers where the 
34 She also notes that other authors (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Senge 1990) had already referred to the 
interrelated nature of organisational elements such as strategy, structure, and culture in determining how 
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learning cycle cannot be closed. The same is also true for co-ordination which is highly 
dependent on managerial systems and practices (Gittel, 1996). 
Conclusion: The hypothesis is fully supported. 
8.2.4. Hypothesis 4: Very active organisational processes are a necessary 
condition to achieve strategic operational performance improvement 
The companies studied evolved from a precarious competitive position, with the 
exception of Toshiba which started from scratch, and reached a position of acknowledged 
excellence in their industries. Hayes and Wheelwright (1994) say that companies that 
achieve stage 4, do so by opting for a continuous improvement path. Continuous 
improvement means active participation of the lower levels. Our view of the importance 
of shop floor operatives goes beyond their participation in continuous improvement 
activities. The strategic contribution of these organisational members is determined by 
the intensity of their organisational processes. Only if the firm manages to develop very 
active organisational processes can it develop its operational performance to a level that 
can affect its competitive position. 
The scores achieved by the four companies are very significant in absolute terms. There 
are no similar research results with which we can compare them, with the exception of 
Gittel (1996). Nonetheless, it is difficult to dispute the fact that the processes are very 
active. The scores approach four in a scale that ranges from one to five. By assigning four 
in our scale, the respondent meant that that particular behaviour happened very 
frequently. 
The histogram below shows normal distribution. It shows the proportion of the cases that 
corresponds to each case. It is coherent with the size of the companies. Cigna had around 
200 employees in total, while TNT and SERASA had several thousand. The distribution 
of the population shows a similar pattern for all companies. The overall results, 
considering the three behaviours together are listed below: 
effectively an organisation can learn. 
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Companies Average Standard 
deviation 
Number of' 
cases 35 
SERASA 3.60 0.87 974 
CIGNA 3.94 0.85 254 
TNT 3.65 0.86 622 
Toshiba 2.98 0.85 983 
Table 8.1 -Behaviour statistics 
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Figure 8.1 - Histogram of intensity of behaviour sorted by company. 
Conclusion: The hypothesis is supported 
Companies 
= Toshiba 
lIM TNT 
® CIGNA 
W SERASA 
The conclusion is not fully supported because we lack comparative data from average 
performers. Gittel (1996) obtained results in which a company with higher operational 
performance (Southwest) scored higher in co-ordination. In that case, a difference of one 
point proved to be very significant. However we can compare the same companies ex- 
ante and ex post the strategic process. A strong indication that these companies would 
score higher than their competitors, is the fact that processes were reported to have 
improved. At the beginning of the strategic process they were average performers and 
could he considered to he at the same level as the other competitors. 
It rcI rý to the number of valid entries, not respondents. 
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8.2.5. Hypothesis 5: Strategic operational performance improvement results in 
leaner organisations 
An organisation is not lean when it has resource slacks built into its operations. 
Organisations use buffers to deal with speed and complexity (Galbraight, 1995). Airlines 
that are not lean have more employees and take longer to turnaround planes at the gates. 
Manufacturers that cannot react fast enough to customer demand, have stocks of finished 
goods. Intermediate WIP stocks compensate for the lack of knowledge of causal effects 
that disrupt production processes. Thus, companies use buffers to compensate for both 
lack of knowledge and poor organisational processes. 
Resource slack can be structural or organic. Structural slack refers to poor organisation of 
the production steps. CIGNA's large sections separated by WIP, TNT's policy of slowing 
down the flow of parcels through the system, because they had to be delivered in three 
days instead of overnight, and SERASA's highly inefficient processes are examples of 
structural slacks. Managerial actions that eliminate structural slacks include the creation 
of more efficient modes of production such as cell production, change of policy, and the 
redesign of inefficient processes. 
The organisation should move to eliminate organic slacks after eliminating structural 
ones. Southwest is leaner than its competitors although their production processes are 
organised in similar ways. This occurred because Southwest was more successful in 
eliminating organic slacks. This made the difference to performance, not structural 
slacks. 
When structural slacks are being eliminated, the company enjoys great leaps in 
improvement. TNT's managers were astonished to find out they could sort all traffic 
overnight, offering a premium product while saving resources. Similarly SERASA and 
CIGNA multiplied output and increased quality dramatically, while using the same 
resources. 
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However, when maturity is achieved and most of the gross obstacles to efficient 
production are eliminated, the way towards leanness and competitiveness will depend on 
organisational processes. Gittel (1996) demonstrated that superior co-ordination 
processes allowed Southwest to have fewer buffers. 
Learning has the same effect. The more successful the organisation is in completing the 
learning circle, the fewer resources it will need. When any member can contribute tested 
and unambiguous knowledge which can quickly permeate the organisation, the 
organisation becomes more efficient and members make fewer mistakes. Another 
important facet of knowledge is the articulation of knowledge. 
Articulating the knowledge of a production system means understanding what causes 
what and controlling factors that might disrupt production and affect the end product. 
Toshiba learned that it should not produce two complex products in parallel. By creating 
and SOP36 in which complex products should never be produced in parallel, Toshiba 
avoided disruption and now has more production time. Entrepreneurship has the same 
effect as members show concern for tackling dilemmas and incorporating efficient new 
behaviours. This indicates commitment to go "an extra mile" when necessary and to 
pursue continuous transformation. 
Conclusion: The hypothesis is fully supported. 
Leanness can provide lasting advantage. But an organisation cannot be designed to be 
organically lean. The use of BPR and the implementation of best practices can at best 
eliminate structural slack. But advantage lies in the elimination of organisational slack. It 
can only be achieved by very active organisational processes. Because the development 
of organisational processes depends on the appropriateness of the managerial processes, 
we can conclude that advantage is dependent on complex organisation-wide 
relationships, which cannot be achieved by programmatic changes. We can now present a 
simplified path of the evolution of operational performance: 
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conditions 
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Figure 8.2. - The process of strategic operational improvement 
Very active 
organisational 
processes 
8.3 Summary of the main empirical findings that run counter or add to the 
established theory 
8.3.1. The process that describes the development of outstanding operational 
performance is fundamentally different from the MSM 
The service companies in our sample identified relevant competitive criteria, estimated 
the operational gaps, and focused their activities to close them. But they had not formally 
considered the trade-off of competitive criteria. In contrast, the manufacturing company 
36 Standard Operating Procedure. 
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addressed trade-offs in a formal way. The top manager chose to follow the sequence 
quality (dependability), productivity, and flexibility. 
According to the MSM, trade-off decisions, or more loosely, the limitations imposed onto 
the production function, guide the decisions on structural and infrastructural areas. Hayes 
and Wheelwright (1994) define the MSM as a "sequence of decisions [in terms of the 
decision areas] that, over time, enables a business unit to achieve a desired manufacturing 
structure, infrastructure, and set of specific capabilities". 
There were decisions taken over structural and infrastructural areas. These were mostly 
emergent decisions, rarely taken during the planning phase of the strategic process. The 
emergent character is closer to Hayes and Wheelwright's view of the strategic process 
than to the exclusively top down approach advocated by Skinner. However, these 
decisions are a poor descriptor of the strategic processes we have observed. If decisions 
were the relevant descriptors of the process, the ambiguity element would be lost. 
Competitors would be able to replicate quickly the same decisions. 
The lean production model, as described in the literature, consists of the adoption of a 
family of techniques. Like the MSM, it fails to realise that changes have to transcend the 
shop floor and affect all aspects of the organisation. Both models may be essentially 
misleading because they do not highlight the fact that the analytical focus of the strategic 
process should be what managers do every day. As a result, managers may believe that 
they can implement changes that will affect only shop floor routine while their own 
methods remain untouched. 
The model presented here require managers to acknowledge that they have to modify 
their ways. Without giving up incompatible behaviour it is unlikely that the company can 
achieve an operational performance strong enough to influence its competitive position. 
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8.3.2. Operational advantage is neither the exclusive product of managerial 
rationality as implied by the MSM nor emerges without connection with 
managerial activity as suggested by the RBV 
The MSM tends to see the transformation that leads to an increase in operational 
performance as the result of managerial decisions, even when taken in an emergent way. 
On the other hand, the RBV regards proprietary superior abilities to have evolved based 
on learning detached from managerial activities, in a process generally associated with 
the learning curve effect. 
We have shown that there is a connection between intention and outcome. By itself it 
contradicts the RBV. Intention is manifested in three degrees. Only the first, and more 
direct one accords with the MSM's view. The most important transformation occurs via 
indirect rationality. To guide the process in an indirect way, senior manager(s) set the foci 
of attentions and redefine the organisational context, thus influencing routine micro 
decisions. 
Influenced by the RBV ideas, in the initial stages of the research we expected advantage 
to be unrelated to what management does, and to emerge mainly from organisational 
processes. The RBV suggests that productive resources may occur by chance or as an 
unexpected consequence of following a certain path of improvement. We found that 
organisational processes are essential to achieving advantage, but they evolve as a 
consequence of a process that is firmly rooted in managerial intention. Intention is 
nonetheless far less powerful than the MSM supposes. Its role is to shape an emergent 
and complex process. 
8.3.3. Competitive advantage does not mean literal implementation of the content 
of strategy 
Distinctive competencies refer to what the firm can do better than competitors. A number 
of authors see competencies as the result of a special ability to implement strategy. 
Competitive advantage, according to this view, will be achieved by firms that have better 
"preparedness, skill, or capability" to implement a certain product-market strategy 
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(Cleveland, Schroeder, and Anderson, 1989). Managerial rationality is unquestioned, and 
what managers decide is assumed to be problem free. The central problem then becomes 
the ability of the rest of the organisation to realize decisions. It immensely simplifies the 
explanation of the phenomenon of heterogeneity of performance by reducing it to the 
concept of "ability to implement". 
This notion departs from what we have observed on at least two counts. First, it calls 
attention to the short run optimisation of the existing productive resources. In contrast, 
we have observed long term processes based on the gradual development of 
infrastructural elements. The strategic processes stretched over periods that were at least 
a year. A long-term vision is necessary so that initial conditions can evolve. Initial 
conditions are non-active and need time to absorb complex changes. 
Second, it assumes that other members of the organisation do not have an active role in 
the strategic process. Our cases have shown that there is little to the content of strategy. 
Managers did not detail a "grand strategy" that should be carried out by lower levels. 
Instead, the role of managers was to manage complex strategic processes. The process 
outcome was dependent on managerial behaviour not the content of strategy. By making 
use of the three kinds of rational intervention we have identified, managers were able to 
engage and guide the efforts of all members towards desired end states. Thus, all 
members, including shop floor operatives are important actors in the processes. 
8.3.4. The evolution of operational performance is supportive of a business 
strategy but not determined by it 
Skinner saw corporate strategy as defining a business strategy which should define 
functional strategies. It is generally accepted that the operations function should develop 
the capabilities that support the current product-market strategy. Some authors, however, 
have criticised the notion that operations strategy is about informing senior managers 
about the limitations of operations. Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) speculate on whether 
operations would be able identify points of advantage that could not be matched by 
competitors and thus contribute proactively to the strategic debate. Anderson et al. (1989) 
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consider that corporate objectives should "be confined to what operations is capable of 
doing". Hayes (1985) has argued, that particularly when the environment is difficult to 
forecast, manufacturing should develop its abilities independent from product-market 
strategies which could later be leveraged by a product-market strategy. 
We observed senior managers proposing end states, defined in terms of the necessary 
level of performance to compete successfully. This provided the strategic stretch and 
gave purpose to the capability building effort that generated the expansion of productive 
resources. Thus, the cases studied were not essentially inward looking and were 
supportive of the firm's business strategy. However, the notion that the improvement of 
operational performance is determined by the business strategy is not confirmed for two 
main reasons: (a) we have dismissed the notion of strategic fit, and (b) the strategic 
processes transcend the operations function. 
Strategic fit means short run optimisation of production resources. We have argued here 
that the companies adopted a long-term framework instead of quickly matching their 
existing resources to business strategy. This is an emergent and introspective strategic 
process, connected to business strategy (gap closing process) but not determined by it. 
The classical order of well defined and detached corporate/business/functional strategies 
was also blurred. Transformation cut across the organisation both vertically and 
horizontally. 
Because the strategic process is not determined and has a strong element of introspective 
transformation, Hayes' (1985) idea that inner strengths could influence market strategy is 
substantiated. The evolution of second order initial conditions and the consequent 
development of consistent managerial behaviour and active organisational processes 
could prove to be a strong basis for pursuing different market strategies from the one that 
had guided the strategic process. When recently CIGNA was investing in a different 
segment of the health insurance market, we asked a manager if the advantage they 
enjoyed in the corporate segment could be reproduced in the new private segment. He 
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answered that he felt confident that, although business processes were different, the 
sources of advantage were already in place. 
8.3.5. Explicit determination of the nature of rents 
Any model of strategy should be clear about how it sees value creation and rent 
appropriation. We initially moved away from the monopoly rents view of Porter's 
framework. According to this view, above average rents occur in those firms able to 
manipulate market forces. Research evidences, however, support the RBV's view that 
firm specific factors are more important than the industry structure in determining the 
rent generated and appropriated by the firm (Cool and Schendel, 1988; Rumelt, 
1991; Jacobsen, 1988; Hanson and Wernerfelt, 1989). The Ricardian view, associated 
with this perspective, sees the variation in rents generated by firms occurring because 
they are dependent on production resources that are firm specific, and whose supply is 
restricted in nature. 
We nevertheless departed from this view. Instead of performance being underpinned by 
static, clearly identifiable resources, we should expect financial performance to be 
dependable on the development of internal processes of the firm. Thus instead of 
concentrating on exploring its specific assets, which would be the RBV's advice, a firm 
should look for ways of developing its processes at both managerial and organisational 
level. The "dynamic capability" framework develops the idea of advantage being based 
on internal processes. Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) write: "competitive advantage of 
firms lies with its managerial and organisational processes, shaped by its (specific) assets 
position, and the paths available to it". 
However, it should be noted, that the case studies were operating in competitive 
industries where the barriers of entry were very low. Also, little value could be created 
outside the production processes. In industries where there are high barriers of entry, such 
as brand name (e. g. the beverage industry) or where value is mainly created by R&D (e. g. 
the pharmaceutical industry) the relationship between internal processes and financial 
performance may not be so evident. 
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We have shown here that the quality of managerial and organisational processes will 
determine the effectiveness of the firm's production processes, which by its turn, will 
determine the value that the company will be able to deliver to its customers. We thus 
share the Schumpeterian perspective with the "dynamic capability" framework, where a 
firm enjoys rents that are above normal while its advantage lasts. This recognises the 
dynamic character of competition. Advantages do not last indefinitely. However, the 
inertial nature of the initial conditions safeguards advantage from improvement leaps37. 
Therefore, there is no short cut to eliminating advantage. Porter (1996) says that 
advantage based on operational effectiveness can be quickly eliminated by the 
implementation of best practices. We have shown that the reality is far more demanding 
than that. The cases that we studied were not making any profits at the beginning of the 
strategic process. By the end of this process, they were enjoying consistent profitability. 
8.3.6. Strategic trade-offs are necessary when the dimensions require attention 
to different issues 
Organisations cannot be everything to every customer. To develop competitive advantage 
a company should restrict what it produces. This is the MSM's view and that is supported 
by our observations. But achieving progress in simultaneous performance attributes 
depended on how far from the efficiency frontier the firm was operating. SERASA, for 
instance, had business processes that were so ineffective that their redesign and changes 
produced dramatic gains in every area. Even more important, it also depended on how 
much overlap there was in the issues related to each of the performance attributes. 
It has been argued that one of the characteristics of the strategic processes studied here is 
that managers set a model of issues and answers and attempt to focus the attention of the 
organisation around that. Within the model some issues are tangible problems and 
process related. Examples are the elimination of bottlenecks and quicker set ups. 
Management focuses the attention of everyone to achieve results in these areas. 
291 
Each issue relates directly to one or more performance attributes. In the example above, 
the elimination of bottlenecks is related to productivity (costs), whereas the search for 
more efficient set ups occurs when the organisation is pursuing flexibility. Some issues 
may be placed in the overlap of two or more attributes, affecting simultaneously more 
than one attribute. 
Consider the figure below. Each circle represent the issues that are related to only one 
performance criterion. The circles represent quality, flexibility, and costs. Operational 
issues may be placed where the circles overlap or not. Therefore some issues affect 
exclusively one attribute of performance while others, contained by the overlapping 
spaces, affect two or more performance attributes. For instance, smaller batch size is an 
operational issue contained by the part of the circle that represents flexibility that does 
not overlap, whereas elimination of WIP would be contained by the overlap of the circles 
that represent productive and flexibility. 
We observed that services are different from manufacturing. Issues in services tend to be 
related to more than one performance criterion at the same time, whereas in 
manufacturing they tend to be of an independent nature. Consider CIGNA's example in 
which by focusing the attention of the organisation on issues related to the improvement 
of responsiveness, it ended up improving another dimension such as quality (understood 
as conformance to specification). The operational issue identified was the reduction of 
the level of rework. The logic was that by reducing the number of claims that had to be 
reprocessed it would be possible to cut the turnaround time for paying claims 
(responsiveness). In order to get the payment form completed correctly at the first attempt 
(quality), CIGNA identified systematic mistakes and rooted them out by training or by 
simply calling attention to them. Increased responsiveness resulted automatically in 
higher levels of quality, and higher productivity once each member of staff was able to 
handle more claims. 
37 This issue is further discussed in 8.3.8. 
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In Toshiba (manufacturing) it is evident that the issues tended to affect the attributes of' 
performance in an independent fashion. Trade-off was necessary because Managers could 
not call the attention to all issues at the same time for three reasons. First, managers are 
not ultra-rational agents. Although. due to their experience in Japan. senior managers in 
Toshiba had a good idea of the issues that would need to he addressed, there was an 
emergent element in the process. Second, the organisation needed time to absorb a 
limited number of issues into its organisational routines. Finally, the models of issues and 
answers needed to he consistent. Simultaneously highlighting the importance of, for 
instance, extreme care for quality details, together with a strong push I'or productivity and 
reduction of hatches (flexibility) would he inconsistent and confusing. 
LSERVICES LMANUFACTURING 
Figure 8.3 - Issues overlapping in services and manufacturing 
8.3.7. Central importance of strategic leadership 
Leaders are important players in spite of lean production and MSM's limited reference to 
strategic leadership. Quality models prescribe strategic leadership. I lowever, they 
adopted a quality model, all cases were greatly influenced by the CEO's personal input. 
Doz ( 1994) suggests that long lasting sources of competitive advantage need clear goals 
and objectives in order to be developed, diffused, integrated, and leveraged. The role of 
leadership is to keep the organisation continuously moving towards those goals. Strategic 
leadership fulfils at least three important roles: (a) facilitating the process through their 
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model of issues and answers, (b) involving the whole organisation, and (c) keeping the 
momentum of change. 
Strategic leaders managed the evolution of competitive advantage not by taking dramatic 
action, but instead by shaping the strategic process, close to what Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1991) have defined as the transformational manager. By being able communicators, 
these leaders are able to focus the attention of organisational members, build up 
commitment, and motivate people to embrace higher objectives instead of short-term 
interests. 
Senior managers had a holistic view of the organisation. The elimination of internal 
barriers resulting from changing managerial process, such as senior management 
teamwork, allowed the diligent leveraging of operational advantages through other 
functions, such as sales. 
Another important function fulfilled by strategic leadership was to keep up the strategic 
momentum. The pace of change was slow but continuous. The organisations studied did 
not regard the change process as a project that had a beginning and a functional end. 
Instead, they set out on a "journey with no finish line". Leadership, especially in the 
Toshiba case, also provided a purposeful sequence to the process, anchoring the 
development of a new attribute of performance in previous developments (Ferdows and 
De Meyer, 1990). 
8.3.8. The importance of initial conditions 
The literature on operations does not acknowledge the importance of initial conditions. 
Organisations are assumed to have no problem in pursuing whatever course of 
improvement management sets. However, outcome is not the product of deliberate choice 
(Porter, 1995). Choice is limited by history, and history is embedded in the companies' 
initial conditions. 
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The importance of initial conditions can be explained through an understanding of three 
central concepts: that (a) the strategic process is emergent, that (b) advantage cannot be 
matched by improvement leaps, and that (c) the strategic process has a long-term vision 
and is based not on optimisation but on transformation of the productive resources. 
One of the central ideas of this thesis is that those initial conditions that hinder the 
development of operational performance should evolve. We have demonstrated here that 
initial conditions are multi-dimensional and have complex relationships. Initial conditions 
such as managerial processes cannot be regarded within a mechanist framework in which 
a number of decisions will generate the desired outcome. For those dimensions, simple 
cause and effect relationships do not exist. The one adopted here, instead of process 
perspective which sees the firm in terms of structure and systems, affords us a better 
stand point to appreciate the limitations of direct rationality. 
Only by purposefully pursuing a line of improvement for a considerable amount of time, 
would it be possible for an organisation to achieve a position of competitive advantage. A 
number of studies support this notion. Teece et al. (1990) argue that "value augmenting 
strategic change" can only happen incrementally. They conclude that strategy involves 
"choosing among and committing to long-term paths or trajectories of competence 
development". Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) had already defended the notion that only 
the companies that were committed to long-term incremental developments could expect 
their operations to carve them a position of advantage. De Meyer and Kim (1996) 
reinforce this idea by saying that: "strategic competencies do not happen overnight, 
strategic drivers cannot be implemented in a vacuum. They are established over time on 
the base of numerous programs". 
The argument here is that improvement leaps can reorganise production processes. The 
organisation may be able to eliminate structural slacks and thus considerably improve its 
effectiveness. Strategic operational improvement, as described here, is ultimately based 
on the elimination of organic slack. It is dependent on very active organisational 
processes, which in their turn, are dependent on the evolution of second order initial 
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conditions. Therefore there is no short cut to operational advantage other than a slow 
process of evolution. 
The last concept discusses a similar issue. It says that the resource base of the firm has to 
be transformed. Because initial conditions are relevant, the analytical focus of strategy 
should not be optimisation of the existing resource base but rather the evolution of initial 
conditions, which should provide a new resource base. One of the corollaries from this 
conclusion is that management will probably have to change their ways. 
8.3.9. Firm level heterogeneity is sustained by isolating mechanisms 
Porter (1996) has argued that companies should focus on strategizing, or organising their 
production functions in distinctive ways, as opposed to economising, or looking for 
performance improvement. He argues that the firm should not attempt to compete in 
terms of operational effectiveness because best practices diffuse very fast. In fact, neither 
the MSM nor the lean production model possesses any elements that we can use to prove 
him wrong. 
On the other hand, a quick glance at any industry will reveal uneven operational 
performance. It will only rarely be explained by innovative designs of business processes. 
Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine how a manufacturer could innovate so radically in 
the organisation of its production processes that this innovation alone could give it lasting 
advantage. So if successful competition is normally based on operational effectiveness, 
how can we explain how it lasts? 
Any possible explanation has to rely on isolating mechanisms. There are three kinds. The 
first is path dependence. This accounts for the fact that history matters, as we have 
discussed above. According to the state of its initial conditions, it should be either more 
costly or impossible for a contender to develop these initial conditions in a shorter period 
of time. The contender will also be at a disadvantage with a competitor who can advance 
faster because it already has the right conditions. 
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Causal ambiguity explains that the firm itself and consequently its competitors, do not 
understand what the sources of its advantages are (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). Models 
of "business excellence", such as the EFQM, intend to find a way to proceed to achieve 
advantage. But they are far from providing a recipe of cause and effect relationship that 
leads to advantage. They are better understood as broad frameworks in which managers 
can base their models of issues and answers. 
Even if we accept that the causes of advantage are to be found in the processes within the 
organisation that we have identified, imitation remains equally impossible. Even if the 
company wants to replicate the routines to underpin advantage from one site to other 
sites, it would be very difficult because of several factors (Szulanski, 1994). Initially the 
routines cannot be articulated, making it impossible to transfer unless staff who are 
responsible for the routines are physically moved. The routines may also have complex 
interactions with other routines. They may not be able to resist the change of 
environment, and they may have elements not previously recognised with which they 
have interdependence. 
Even if an imitator is able to overcome the problems above and be able to explain beyond 
any ambiguity what causes advantage, the concept of uncertain imitability would prove 
an effective hurdle preventing imitation. There is no indication of the process through 
which such processes were developed. In addition, these processes are so socially 
complex that this would render imitation impossible. A specific managerial process 
depends on other managerial processes to work. Even more complex is the dependency of 
organisational processes on the proper working of all managerial processes. So, imagine 
that even if the routines that support the organisational process of learning could be 
perfectly transferred, they would not survive in an environment where the managerial 
processes are incompatible. Thus replicating part of the routines, in spite of the 
complexity of the task, is likely to generate zero benefits in the end. 
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8.4 The proposed model's main implications 
The model introduced here presents several new insights into the evolution of operational 
performance that has become a source of competitive advantage. It has highlighted the 
importance of history carried in the firm's systems, structure, and tangible assets, and 
above all, in its most elementary unit of analysis, organisational routines. Process is 
composed of a number of organisational routines and thus is a more aggregated unit of 
analysis. This is the unit of analysis used in this research. 
Without using processes as the main unit of analysis we would not be able to describe the 
process of strategic operational improvement. The resulting model highlights the 
interdependence of the several processes, discusses the interaction of top-down or bottom 
up forces of transformation, highlights the strategic importance of shop floor behaviour, 
and associates leanness with the overall result of the process. Next, we discuss the 
implications of the proposed exploratory hypotheses. 
8.4.1. The evolution of initial conditions is a necessary condition for the 
development of operational effectiveness as a source of competitive advantage. 
It has been shown that those conditions that hinder the process have to evolve, otherwise 
the strategic process as a whole would be jeopardised. The hypothesis was not fully 
supported because some dimensions of the initial conditions were not relevant in some 
cases. But it carries enough evidence to show that the change process is very complex 
and engages many facets of the organisation simultaneously. 
The important corollary from this hypothesis is the multi-faceted and multi-level 
dimension of the evolutionary process. Several pieces of the organisational game have to 
be moved simultaneously. Change cannot be restricted to the production function. It 
affects laterally some other functions and vertically other superior hierarchical levels. If 
incompatible second order initial conditions remain inertial, strategic operational 
performance improvement will not be achieved. Consequently, no programme concerned 
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exclusively with the production processes, such as BPR, can aspire to become a strategic 
driver in isolation. 
An associated corollary, less evident but nonetheless equally important, is the 
inefficiency of top-down initiatives. The nature of the initial conditions is immensely 
complex and in our case studies no manager could devise a plan that could contain all the 
necessary decisions. This implies that the process has to have a strong emergent 
component. At best, senior managers affect the course of the process by influencing how 
the managers below them take decisions. 
This conclusion strongly supports numerous pieces of literature which suggest, as Hayes 
and Wheelwright (ibid. ) have, that only those companies committed to vigorous and 
consistent processes of continuous improvement can achieve stage four of 
competitiveness. There is room for programmatic interference, such as process redesign, 
but this should be regarded as an auxiliary step. This process is emergent but should be 
carefully managed. It is important to highlight that by continuous improvement we do not 
mean a search for efficiency in the shop floor, as in lean production. We see managers 
giving strategic direction and carefully guiding the strategic process towards well defined 
objectives. 
8.4.2. Managerial and organisational processes and business process control 
and redesign are the drivers of strategic operational performance improvement 
This hypothesis was included to confirm that the elements of the model we have 
proposed were relevant. The confirmation of the hypothesis suggests that the analytical 
focus of strategy in operations is somehow different than previously assumed. The MSM 
would focus on the trade-off between the performance attribute alternatives and the 
consequent structural and infrastructural decisions. The lean manufacturing model would 
focus on the efficiency of the production processes to be achieved through the 
implementation of best practices and vigorous continuous improvements. 
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Our model shows that the analytical focus should be different. The organisation should 
pursue a process of capability building in which all the initial conditions that can 
potentially hinder the development of the strategic process must be altered. The focus is 
on managerial processes. For performance evolution to be strategically significant, 
management processes have to be fine-tuned and grounded on a solid model of issues and 
answers. Then, and only then, will the organisation be able to develop very active 
organisational processes, with the help of process control and redesign activities. 
That does mean to say that the MSM and the lean production model should be 
disregarded. Trade-offs are important, but only where the issues related to different 
performance attributes are incompatible. The objective of the lean production model is 
fundamentally supported because our model also advocates that organisations should go 
leaner. No organisation can experience an improvement of operational performance that 
is strategically significant if it does not go leaner. But leanness is a consequence, not the 
objective of strategy. The ultimate goal of strategy is to develop active organisational 
processes that enable the productive processes of the organisation to deliver those 
strategic operational objectives envisaged by management. 
8.4.3. Managerial processes should be mutually reinforcing and consistent with 
business processes control and redesign in order to favour the development of 
organisational processes 
The strategic driver represented by process control and redesign has the effect of 
eliminating structural slack. The presence of large buffers in the production process 
works against the development of learning, co-ordination, and entrepreneurship 
behaviours. Thus, structural slacks prevent the development of organisational processes 
and the use of redesign and process control is an important instrument for creating the 
necessary conditions for the organisational process to develop. 
Managerial processes represent the other strategic driver. Supporting this hypothesis, we 
have found that during the strategic process, managerial processes converge towards 
consistency. We were able to demonstrate that these processes are interdependent. If one 
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of the processes is incompatible, the strategic process is jeopardised. We have observed 
that organisations that had experienced more changes in their managerial processes also 
experienced more changes in their organisational processes. This is because firms can 
only develop organisational processes if there has been an evolution of managerial 
processes. Thus the change at the bottom level is dependent on changes of behaviour at 
upper levels. How the organisation manages its business processes, by means of control 
and redesign, is also an important factor regulating the development of managerial and 
organisational processes. This provides a link between what management does and how it 
affects the lower levels of the organisation. 
This facet of the model is of central importance. The drivers of change have to be 
consistent and compatible. Advantage is based on superior operational efficiency. It 
depends on the intensity of organisational processes, which by its turn depends on the 
suitability of the managerial processes and the management of business processes. 
Consequently, managers at all levels are responsible for shop floor performance. Senior 
and line managers cannot disassociate themselves from the effort to improve operational 
performance. The implication is that only deep (and probably uncomfortable) changes in 
managerial behaviour and systems can serve as a basis for developing lasting superior 
operational effectiveness. Another implication is that complex combination of several 
processes in the organisation which cut across hierarchical levels and function, make 
transferability or replicability of advantage practically impossible (refer to item 7.3.9). 
8.4.4. Organisational processes are the basis of superior operational 
performance 
Organisational processes are the core of advantage. The proprietary ingrained patterns of 
behaviour exhibited by the members at the bottom of the organisation are what set the 
operational performance of the companies in our study apart. It is important to note that 
we have not included the improvement of manual dexterity and gradual improvement of 
the production processes. This, we associate with process control. 
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We refer to behaviours that are routinely manifested. Processes are composed of a 
number of organisational routines. It has been said that the organisational routines are the 
very DNA of the company. Several of these routines, which are rather amorphous by 
themselves, can be grouped to form a process. The routines that form the categories of 
organisational processes proposed here were initially suggested by the literature and 
initial interviews and later "purified" by statistical means. 
The MSM does not acknowledge the participation of shop floor operatives in the strategic 
process, or limit their role to participation in continuous improvements efforts normally 
associated with the formation of QCCs. It certainly does not see any strategic importance 
in the bottom levels of the organisation. It implies that a workforce could be substituted, 
and given enough time to develop manual dexterity and levels of performance would not 
suffer. However, we propose that advantage is essentially embedded in the interpersonal 
relationships between individuals. Therefore, substitution would result in poorer 
performance because many organisational routines would be lost. 
We conclude that members at the bottom of the organisation carry the essence of 
differentiation. These processes belong to the organisation, not individuals. Few 
individuals can be substituted without damage to organisational processes. It should also 
be kept in mind that the development and the intensity of organisational processes at any 
time are dependent on managerial processes. 
8.4.5. Organisations that develop outstanding operational effectiveness go 
necessarily leaner 
Galbraight (1995) has argued that organisations use buffers because they cannot cope 
with complexity and speed. The concept of buffers used here, as explained before, goes 
beyond WIP. Buffers can be understood as extra staff or taking longer to perform a task. 
Staff and time are resources, and resources in excess are buffers. 
The firm has slack built into its production process. It is of two kinds: structural and 
organic. To become more effective in the use of its resources, a firm has to shrink both 
kinds of slack. The initiatives are directed at structural changes. The organisation 
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redesigns and reorganises its processes. By doing so it is able to eliminate karge parts of 
its structural slacks and move closer to the efficiency frontier. After this change is 
complete. organic slack is likely to remain untouched. How organisations learn to cope 
with speed and complexity better than other organisations usually has little to do with 
management or any hard resource, such as an IT system, that can also he acquired by the Zýk 
competitors. It has to do with the patterns of behaviour that are ingrained on the shop 
floor. 
A virtuous cycle is created in which the elimination of structural slack and the 
development of supportive managerial behaviour favour the development of 
organisational processes that will continuously erode organic slack, incrementally 
pushing the organisation's efficiency frontier ahead. The figure below summýnariscs the 
idea that business processes carry slack of two distinct kinds. Thus, structural slacks arc 
eliminated through the strategic driver that we have called process control and redesign. 
Organic slack is eliminated by the action of organisational processes. 
Process control and redesign 
fez: 
Figure 8.4. Kinds of slacks 
8.5. Some issues left unexplored 
The inno ativc character of the research leaves us with many further opportunities for 
research that we were not able to explore here because of obvious limitations. The 
process perspective has immense research potential. 
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Organisational processes 
The strategic management literature since Chandler (1962) has focused on the 
relationship between strategy and structure or between strategy and planning systems 
(Ansoff, 1965) and management control systems (Anthony, 1965). It has given little 
opportunity for the integration of other streams of literature into the strategic debate. 
Garvin (1994) has noted that by focusing on the process of the organisation we can 
integrate important pieces of literature such as learning organisation, or business process 
reengineering. 
This is what we have attempted in this research. Garvin (1994) has highlighted that we 
still do not understand how variations in strategy affect the processes in the organisation 
and consequently how they can affect performance. The relationship between internal 
processes, both managerial and organisational, remains a fertile ground for ideas and 
empirical research. 
We have developed a model that is pioneering and general. A natural next step is to 
develop contingencies that are not contained here. We have proposed that organisational 
routines form organisational processes. Managerial processes have decisive effects on 
these processes. Organisational processes sustain performance, which can be understood 
in a number of dimensions such as quality and flexibility. 
Further research could establish what the relationship between the various organisational 
processes and the dimensions of performance is. It is intuitive to expect that performance 
dimensions such as speed should have a decisive impact on the organisational process of 
co-ordination. There is also reason to believe that an increase in performance of any 
organisational process will affect costs directly because more effective organisational 
processes would mean better use of productive resources and elimination of 
organisational slack. 
If such relationships could be established, then we could move to the next stage to 
determine more precisely how managerial processes affect each other and how they affect 
the organisational process as a whole or individually. We have seen in this research that 
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the various organisational processes do not react evenly to changes in managerial 
processes. Learning was demonstrated to be slower to develop. 
These relationships are likely to be complex ones. But the development of a deeper 
understanding of such relationships would allow the development of a model of strategy 
sensitive to the competitive reality to which the firm belongs. This is compatible with the 
idea that there is not only one way of competing suggested by models of business 
excellence associated with quality policies and the lean production model. If there is 
room for strategy it is because there is room for contingency. 
Another important element that needs to be explored is the role of particular initial 
conditions in the process. Some of these conditions may relate to research happening 
outside the field of operations management, but others suggest new avenues of research 
within the field, such as the need to improve articulation of the knowledge of the 
production process. It is likely that the initial conditions that are not considered important 
at present, increase in their importance as the organisation gets the other initial conditions 
right. Thus a possible way forward for companies that have accomplished appropriate 
managerial and organisational processes is to develop initial conditions such as 
knowledge. 
8.6. A critical review of the employed methodology 
At this point, we can evaluate the research method that was used. By acknowledging 
limitations in the research, we hope to make other researchers pursuing similar lines of 
research aware of methodological faults that might not be evident at the outset of the 
research. While some of these faults could have been avoided others represent 
compulsory trade-offs due to the limitations of resources available or the contingencies of 
the research. The advantages of adopting this line of research are also illustrated. 
The use of grounded research was found to be a way of overcoming the lack of similar 
works that could provide a basic framework. After deciding on the adoption of a process 
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view of the organisation, it was difficult to identify the processes that should be 
considered. Another problem was the insertion of important pieces of literature in the 
same framework, such as those which referred to process redesign and process control. 
The grounded research which was performed in one of the companies in our case studies, 
and later included in the sample, was crucial in our elimination of concepts which had no 
connection with reality. It also facilitated the development of new concepts, and 
contributed to the organisation of the research framework. By mixing data analysis with 
theory at early stages of the research we attempted to take full advantage of the flexibility 
allowed by the method. 
A longitudinal research that is done ex-post to the process which it attempts to analyse 
faces three main problems: (a) Some of the main players may have left the company or 
are unavailable, and (b) the history told by the interviewees may be biased, and (c) the 
interviewees may have problems remembering events that happened a long time ago. 
In the case of CIGNA, for instance, almost the totality of the senior managers had left the 
company. For this reason, crucial players such as the former MD were unavailable to 
contribute their view. This gap was filled with the views of other managers and a number 
of publications in which the former MD was interviewed about the process of change. 
The second problem refers to people who tell a different story by hiding a number of 
imperfections. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to see a coherent story line 
running through it. The actors tended to emphasise their rational participation in the 
process while the reality was far more ambiguous. 
There is also the more prosaic issue that people had problem remembering how things 
were a number of years ago. In the questionnaire we asked workers how certain 
behaviours were a couple of years ago. The answers certainly carried some intrinsic 
errors due to the difficulty of remembering it accurately. Another issue related to 
questionnaires was its translation into Portuguese. In an attempt to reduce the possibility 
that the meaning had been altered by translation, I asked some people to read the 
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questionnaire and explain what they had understood by the questions. As a result, some 
of the questions were rephrased. 
Finally, we should consider the issue of generalisation. We attempt to design the research 
to enhance its generalisability by making it as independent as possible from the time and 
place that the research was performed. The findings were carefully anchored in the 
literature. However we cannot claim the universality of the findings. This research should 
be considered as a first step which has opened new opportunities. The findings need 
confirmation from studies that include a large sample of companies that perform below 
and above average in several industries. Only then we will be able to assert if it is the 
difference in the way which the strategic drivers determine operational performance. 
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Appendix 1. Factor Analysis 
Here we present the results for factor analysis obtained from SPSS for windows version 
6.0. Comments are framed to distinguish it from the programme output. The idea of 
factor analysis is to "purify" a scale, what means to increase the homogeneity of the joint 
meaning of the items that compound the scale. This is done by the elimination of those 
items whose meaning deviate from the intended one. For instance, a number of items 
have been selected to refer to co-ordination behaviour. Through statistical treatment we 
can identify items which mean something else other than co-ordination. 
We present the statistical results before and after rotation. The numbers highlighted 
indicate the important results. Ideally, the items representing each dimension of 
behaviour should load on a single factor. Thus, those items that load on different factors 
are candidates for elimination. 
1.1. Factor analysis of co-ordination with all initial factors 
Analysis number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values 
Correlation Matrix: 
COORDI COORD2 COORD3 COORD4 COORD5 
COORD 1 1.00000 
COORD2 
. 04116 1.00000 
COO R D3 
. 07414 . 47078 1.00000 
COORD4 . 26942 . 35304 . 29590 1.00000 
COORD5 . 17045 . 30735 . 21014 . 30864 1.00000 
Determinant of Correlation Matrix = . 5202462 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = . 67720 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity = 117.94828, Significance = . 00000 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Components Analysis (PC) 
Initial Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of 
Var3s 
Cum Pct 39 
1 2.05197 41.0 41.0 
2 1.05455 21.1 62.1 
3 . 76803 15.4 
77.5 
4 . 62295 12.5 
89.9 
5 . 50251 10.1 
100.0 
PC extracted 2 factors. 
Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
COORD 1 . 36176 . 
81609 
COORD2 . 74274 . 
39152 
COORD3 . 68393 . 
39463 
COORD4 . 71696 . 
23534 
COORD5 . 62260 . 
15537 
1.2. Analysis repeated after rotation 
Final Statistics: 
38 Explains the percentage of the variation that can be explained but that factor. 
39 Accumulates the explanation power of the various factors. 
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Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 2.05197 41.0 41.0 
2 1.05455 21.1 62.1 
Reproduced Correlation Matrix: 
COORDI COORD2 COORD3 COORD4 COORD5 
COORDI . 79688* . 09198 . 
14877 . 18201 . 18158 
COORD2 . 05082 . 70495* . 19171 . 
08734 . 09425 
COORD3 . 07463 . 66249 . 62350* 10158 15436 
COORD4 . 45143 . 44038 . 39748 . 56942* . 17430 
COORD5 
. 35203 . 40160 . 
36450 . 48294 . 41177* 
The lower left triangle contains the reproduced correlation matrix; the diagonal, 
reproduced commonalties; and the upper right triangle residuals between the observed 
correlation and the reproduced correlations. There are 10 (100%) residuals (above 
diagonal) with absolute values > 0.05. 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
VARIMAX converged in 3 iterations. 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
COORD 1 . 13807 . 88194 
COORD2 . 83641 . 07333 
COORD3 . 78866 . 03885 
COORD4 . 47512 .5 8624 
COORD5 . 43913 . 46791 
Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Factor 1 . 84052 . 54178 
Factor 2 . 54178 . 84052 
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The results above show that the variable coord 1 loaded heavily on the second factor 
while the other variables loaded on factor 1. This indicates that coord 1 meaning deviates 
from the meaning of the remaining items. We eliminate coord 1 from the scale and 
reproduce the tests to assess the homogeneity of the "purified" scale. 
1.3. Factor analysis eliminating co-ordination 1 
Correlation Matrix: 
COORD2 COORD3 COORD4 COORD5 
COORD2 1.00000 
COORD3 . 47078 1.00000 
COORD4 
. 35304 . 
29590 1.00000 
COORD5 . 30735 . 21014 . 
30864 1.00000 
Determinant of Correlation Matrix = . 5702277 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = . 68956 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity = 101.57763, Significance = . 00000 
Extraction 1 for analysis!, Principal Components Analysis (PC) 
Initial Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 1.98215 49.6 49.6 
2 . 82848 20.7 70.3 
3 . 67474 16.9 87.1 
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14 
. 51463 
112.9 100.0 
PC extracted 1 factors. 
Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 
COORD2 . 78383 
COORD3 . 71549 
COORD4 . 69071 
COORD5 . 61543 
Final Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 1.98215 49.6 49.6 
Reproduced Correlation Matrix: 
COORD2 COORD3 COORD4 COORD5 
COORD2 . 61439* . 
09004 . 18836 . 17504 
COORD3 . 56082 . 51193* . 
19830 . 23019 
COORD4 . 54140 . 49420 . 
47708* . 11644 
COORD5 . 48239 . 42508 . 
37876* . 44034 
The lower left triangle contains the reproduced correlation matrix; the diagonal, 
reproduced commonalties; and the upper right triangle residuals between the observed 
correlation and the reproduced correlation. 
There are 6 (100%) residuals (above diagonal) with absolute values > 0.05. 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
Warning # 11310 
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Only one factor was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated. 
2.1. Factor analysis for entrepreneurship with all initial factors 
Correlation Matrix: 
ENTRI ENTR2 ENTR3 ENTR4 
ENTR I 1.00000 
ENTR2 39884 1.00000 
ENTR3 . 28995 . 40284 
1.00000 
1 ENTR4 . 40854 . 
33485 . 30849 1.00000 
Determinant of Correlation Matrix = . 5342895 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = . 72166 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity = 115.22994, Significance = . 00000 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Components Analysis (PC) 
Initial Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 2.07352 51.8 51.8 
2 . 75407 18.9 
70.7 
3 . 63011 15.8 
86.4 
4 54230 13.6 100.0 
PC extracted 1 factors. 
Factor Matrix: 
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Factor 1 
ENTRI . 73375 
ENTR2 . 75066 
ENTR3 . 68387 
ENTR4 . 70990 
Final Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 2.07352 51.8 51.8 
Reproduced Correlation Matrix: 
ENTRI ENTR2 ENTR3 ENTR4 
ENTRI . 53839* . 15196 . 21184 . 11236 
ENTR2 . 55080 . 56349* . 11051 . 19804 
ENTR3 . 50179 . 51335 . 
46767* . 17699 
ENTR4 . 52089 . 53289 . 
48548 . 50396* 
The lower left triangle contains the reproduced correlation matrix; the diagonal, 
reproduced commonalties; and the upper right triangle residuals between the observed 
correlation and the reproduced correlation. 
There are 6 (100%) residuals (above diagonal) with absolute values > 0.05. 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
Warning # 11310 
Only one factor was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated. 
3.1. Factor analysis for learning with all initial factors 
Correlation Matrix: 
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LEARNT LEARN2 LEARN3 LEARN4 LEARN5 LEARN6 LEARN7 LEARN8 
LEARN I 1.00000 
LEARN2 . 52764 1.00000 
LEARN3 . 23847 . 24549 1.00000 
LEARN4 . 24088 . 33381 . 17163 1.00000 
LEARN5 . 17843 . 20628 . 14941 . 35756 
1.00000 
LEARN6 . 39571 . 48954 . 28533 . 45242 . 
27792 1.00000 
LEARN7 . 38775 . 43727 . 17072 . 36370 . 
26912 . 47811 1.00000 
LEARN8 . 41975 . 44866 . 19909 . 
32287 . 19439 . 35865 . 38233 1.00000 
Determinant of Correlation Matrix = . 1489295 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = . 85658 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity = 338.01015, Significance = . 00000 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Components Analysis (PC) 
Initial Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 3.32429 41.6 41.6 
2 1.00248 12.5 54.1 
3 . 88146 
11.0 65.1 
4 . 67938 8.5 
73.6 
5 . 63040 7.9 
81.5 
6 . 56941 7.1 
88.6 
7 . 47376 5.9 
94.5 
8 . 43883 5.5 
100.0 
PC extracted 2 factors. 
Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
LEARN I . 68040 -. 
40002 
LEARN2 . 75024 -. 28043 
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LEARN3 
. 42649 -. 14598 
LEARN4 
. 63042 . 46866 
LEARN5 . 46991 . 68311 
LEARN6 . 75191 . 07112 
LEARN7 . 70271 . 03301 
LEARN8 . 66271 -. 22378 
Final Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 3.32429 41.6 41.6 
ry- 
1.00248 12.5 54.1 
3.2. Analysis repeated after rotation 
Reproduced Correlation Matrix: 
LEARNT LEARN2 LEARN3 LEARN4 LEARN5 LEARN6 LEARN7 LEARN8 
LEARN I . 62296 . 09500 . 11011 . 00058 . 13196 . 08744 . 07717 . 12068 
LEARN2 . 62264 . 64150 . 11541 . 00773 . 04531 . 05463 . 08067 . 11129 
LEARN3 . 34858 . 36091 . 
20320 . 02882 . 04872 . 02497 . 12416 . 11621 
LEARN4 . 24146 . 34153 . 20045 . 
61707 . 25883 . 05494 . 09477 . 00996 
LEARN5 . 04647 . 16098 . 10069 . 61638 . 68745 . 12399 . 08364 . 03584 
LEARN6 . 48315 . 54417 . 31030 . 50735 . 40191 . 57043 . 05262 . 12374 
LEARN7 . 46492 . 51795 . 29488 . 45847 . 35276 . 53073 . 49489 . 07598 
LEARN8 54042 . 55995 . 31531 . 31290 . 15854 . 48238 . 45831 . 48926 
The lower left triangle contains the reproduced correlation matrix; the diagonal, 
reproduced communalities; and the upper right triangle residuals between the observed 
correlations and the reproduced correlations. There are 20 (71.0%) residuals (above 
diagonal) with absolute values > 0.05. 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
VARIMAX converged in 3 iterations. 
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Rotated Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
LEARN I . 78865 . 
03146 
LEARN2 . 78273 . 16981 
LEARN3 . 43769 . 10783 
LEARN4 . 27685 . 73513 
LEARNS . 02587 . 82872 
LEARN6 . 59403 . 46644 
LEARN7 . 57325 . 40777 
LEARN8 . 67847 . 17013 
Again we have detected the need to purify the scale. Rotation stressed the trend 
demonstrated by factors learn 4 and learn 5 in the first table. It is clear from the table 
above that learn 5 has become salient from the other factors. Learn 4 will be affected by 
the elimination of learn 5. The results bellow will determine whether it will be suitable to 
remain in the scale or should also be eliminated. 
Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Factor 1 . 84117 . 54077 
Factor 2 . 54077 . 84117 
Analysis number 1. Listwise deletion of cases with missing values 
Correlation Matrix: 
LEARNI LEARN2 LEARN3 LEARN4 LEARN6 LEARN7 LEARNS 
LEARN 1 1.00000 
LEARN2 . 53127 1.00000 
LEARN3 . 25657 . 25246 1.00000 
LEARN4 
. 
24392 
. 
33504 
. 17755 1.00000 
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LEARN6 . 39284 . 48898 . 28413 . 45265 1.00000 
LEARN7 . 40143 . 44224 . 18794 . 36449 . 47468 1.00000 
LEARN8 . 43362 . 45112 . 22397 . 32675 . 35536 . 39440 1.00000 
Determinant of Correlation Matrix = . 1717980 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = . 85257 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity = 316.76489, Significance = . 00000 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Components Analysis (PC) 
Initial Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 3.18855 45.6 45.6 
2 . 87575 12.5 58.1 
3 . 82266 11.8 
69.8 
. 62955 9.0 78.8 
5 . 56658 8.1 86.9 
6 . 48114 6.9 93.8 
7 . 43578 6.2 100.0 
PC extracted 1 factors. 
Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 
LEARN I . 70646 
LEARN2 . 76760 
LEARN3 . 44861 
LEARN4 
. 60751 
LEARN6 . 74720 
LEARN7 . 70972 
LEARN8 
. 68404 
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As Learn 4 loaded on factor one and factor 2 was discarded, the scale can now be 
considered homogeneous. 
Final Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 3.18855 45.6 45.6 
Reproduced Correlation Matrix: 
LEARNT LEARN2 LEARN3 LEARN4 LEARN6 LEARN7 LEARN8 
LEARN I . 49909* . 01102 . 06036 . 
18527 . 13503 . 09997 . 04962 
LEARN2 . 54228 . 58921* . 09189 . 13129 . 
08458 . 10255 . 07395 
LEARN3 31693 . 34435 . 20125* . 09498 . 05107 . 
13045 . 08289 
LEARN4 . 42919 . 46633 . 27254 . 36907* . 00129 . 06667 . 08881 
ARN6 . 52787 . 57355 . 33520 . 45394 . 55831* . 05563 . 15575 
LEARN7 . 50139 . 54479 . 31839 . 43117 . 53031 . 
50371 * . 09108 
LEARN 8 . 48325 . 52507 . 30686 . 41556 . 
51111 . 48548 . 46790* 
The lower left triangle contains the reproduced correlation matrix; the diagonal, 
reproduced communalities; and the upper right triangle residuals between the observed 
correlations and the reproduced correlations. There are 18 (85.0%) residuals (above 
diagonal) with absolute values > 0.05. 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
Only one factor was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated. 
4.1. Factor analysis of all dimensions of behaviour with purified scales 
Correlation Matrix: 
COORD2 COORD3 COORD4 COORD5 ENTR1 
COORD2 1.00000 
COORD3 . 47566 1.00000 
COORD4 . 35877 . 28963 1.00000 
COO R D5 . 31936 . 22063 . 30129 1.00000 
ENTRI . 23181 . 22965 . 36042 . 
24498 1.00000 
ENTR2 . 28111 . 28415 . 31794 . 
30709 
. 38134 
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ENTR3 . 27235 . 29723 . 28320 . 30503 . 29837 
ENTR4 . 24613 . 19917 . 38400 . 28735 . 39704 
LEARN 1 . 24553 . 24136 . 38638 . 16532 . 21450 
LEARN2 . 35457 . 26293 . 38313 . 19930 . 28674 
LEARN3 . 19258 . 06085 . 16979 . 08180 . 19085 
LEARN4 . 32702 . 21894 . 32441 . 35698 . 28745 
LEARN6 . 35904 . 26823 . 41489 . 37798 . 24119 
LEARN7 . 37325 . 21284 . 39339 . 15645 . 05287 
LEARN8 . 22929 . 24557 . 33969 . 16386 . 27772 
ENTR2 ENTR3 ENTR4 LEARNT LEARN2 
COORD2 
COORD3 
COORD4 
COORD5 
ENTR1 
ENTR2 1.00000 
ENTR3 . 41822 1.00000 
ENTR4 . 31645 . 27995 1.00000 
LEARN 1 . 28352 . 33256 . 32107 1.00000 
LEARN2 . 33142 . 34126 . 34305 . 52141 1.00000 
LEARN3 . 20055 . 07901 . 17604 . 24714 . 25171 
LEARN4 . 41732 . 29941 . 29146 . 24574 . 32349 
LEARN6 
. 37573 . 31388 . 38146 . 39935 . 48360 
LEARN7 . 17428 . 23374 . 21835 . 40669 . 44911 
LEARN8 . 22635 . 32258 . 27644 . 42974 . 44725 
COORD2 
COORD3 
COORD4 
COORD5 
ENTRI 
ENTR2 
ENTR3 
ENTR4 
LEARNT 
LEARN2 
LEARN3 1.00000 
LEARN4 . 18239 1.00000 
LEARN6 . 29598 . 44945 1.00000 
LEARN7 . 18814 . 37711 . 48067 1.00000 
I LEARN 8 . 22051 . 32923 . 36170 . 40182 1.00000 
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Determinant of Correlation Matrix = . 0128147 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = . 89211 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity = 750.15796, Significance = . 00000 
Extraction 1 for analysis 1, Principal Components Analysis (PC) 
Initial Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 5.23371 34.9 34.9 
2 1.30835 8.7 43.6 
3 1.08670 7.2 50.9 
4 . 95088 6.3 57.2 
5 . 89061 5.9 63.1 
6 . 81649 5.4 68.6 
7 . 69431 4.6 73.2 
8 . 64313 
4.3 77.5 
9 . 59148 3.9 81.4 
10 . 54632 3.6 85.1 
11 . 53360 3.6 88.6 
12 
. 48299 3.2 91.9 
13 
. 44468 3.0 94.8 
14 . 40317 2.7 97.5 
15 . 37356 2.5 100.0 
PC extracted 3 factors. 
Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
COORD2 . 59507 . 09055 . 48830 
COORD3 . 50153 . 21108 . 49647 
COORD4 . 65830 . 00063 . 00332 
COORD5 . 49922 . 42837 . 15453 
ENTR 1 . 52012 . 41504 . 41914 
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ENTR2 . 60223 . 
36806 . 15709 
ENTR3 . 57675 . 23833 . 
01599 
ENTR4 . 58104 . 17597 . 32119 
LEARN I . 62865 . 
36693 . 13114 
LEARN2 . 69621 . 
30390 . 06755 
LEARN3 . 37037 . 
26180 . 39594 
LEARN4 . 62200 . 
11624 . 04737 
LEARN6 . 71953 . 
13416 . 02922 
LEARN7 . 59557 . 50213 . 28086 
LEARN8 . 60467 . 31214 . 11666 
4.2 Analysis repeated after rotation 
Final Statistics: 
Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct 
1 5.23371 34.9 34.9 
2 1.30835 8.7 43.6 
3 1.08670 7.2 50.9 
Reproduced Correlation Matrix: 
COORD2 COORD3 COORD4 COORDS ENTR1 
COORD2 . 60074* . 08433 . 03465 . 09195 . 
08939 
COORD3 . 55999 . 54257* . 04231 . 19688 . 08928 
COORD4 . 39342 . 33194 . 43338* . 02812 . 
01916 
COORD5 . 41131 . 32942 . 45659* . 12769 . 41751 
ENTR I . 14242 . 14037 . 34126 . 37267 . 
61846* 
ENTR2 . 31499 . 30174 . 39616 . 43403 . 53183 
ENTR3 . 37260 . 34751 . 37988 . 39249 . 
39219 
ENTR4 . 20486 . 16909 . 38155 . 31581 . 50987 
LEARN I . 27683 . 17273 . 41318 . 13638 . 22965 
LEARN2 . 35379 . 45790 . 20694 . 26429 . 25149 
LEARN3 . 00335 . 06608 . 24234 . 01156 . 24993 
LEARN4 . 40379 . 36001 . 40970 . 36763 . 35191 
LEARN6 . 43029 . 34706 . 47369 . 30625 . 30632 
LEARN7 . 44608 . 33214 . 39269 . 12562 . 01635 
LEARN 8 . 27459 . 17946 . 39748 . 15012 . 23385 
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ENTR2 ENTR3 ENTR4 LEARNT LEARN2 
COORD2 . 03388 . 10024 . 
04128 . 03130 . 00078 
COORD3 . 01759 . 05028 . 03008 . 
06863 . 01144 
COORD4 . 07822 . 09669 . 00245 . 02680 . 07478 
COORD5 . 12694 . 
08745 . 02847 . 02893 . 00764 
ENTR 1 . 15049 . 09382 . 
11283 . 01515 . 02245 
ENTR2 . 52282* . 01433 . 14870 . 
01939 . 01339 
ENTR3 . 43254 . 38970* . 09197 . 05953 . 01322 
ENTR4 . 46514 . 37192 . 47174* . 02175 . 02969 
LEARN I . 26414 . 
27303 . 34282 . 54703* . 03663 
LEARN2 . 31803 . 
32803 . 37274 . 55804 . 58162* 
LEARN3 . 18888 . 
14489 . 29630 . 38081 . 36416 
LEARN4 . 40993 . 38720 . 
36665 . 34215 . 39452 
LEARN6 . 37936 . 38349 . 
38509 . 49773 . 53974 
LEARNT . 12974 . 22832 . 16748 . 52182 . 54827 
LEARN8 . 26759 . 27249 . 
33388 . 50996 . 52372 
LEARN3 LEARN4 LEARN6 LEARN7 LEARNS 
COORD2 . 18923 . 07677 . 07125 . 07283 . 04530 
COORD3 . 14107 . 07882 . 11930 . 06612 . 
12693 
COORD4 . 07254 . 08528 . 05880 . 00070 . 05779 
COORD5 . 07024 . 01065 . 07174 . 03082 . 
01373 
ENTRI . 05908 . 06445 . 06513 . 06922 . 04387 
ENTR2 . 01166 . 00739 . 00362 . 04455 . 04124 
ENTR3 . 06588 . 08780 . 06961 . 00542 . 05009 
ENTR4 . 12026 . 
07519 . 00363 . 05086 . 05744 
LEARN I . 13368 . 09641 . 09838 . 11513 . 08022 
LEARN2 . 11244 . 07103 . 05614 . 09916 . 07647 
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LEARN3 . 36248* . 00121 . 
00593 . 05270 . 13135 
LEARN4 . 18118 . 40264* . 01611 . 05173 . 00507 
LEARN6 . 29005 . 43334 . 53658* . 02344 . 11185 
LEARN7 . 24083 . 32538 . 
50410 . 68572* . 08228 
LEARN 8 . 35186 . 
33430 . 47355 . 48410 . 47667 
The lower left triangle contains the reproduced correlation matrix; the diagonal, 
reproduced communalities; and the upper right triangle residuals between the observed 
correlations and the reproduced correlations. 
There are 62 (59.0%) residuals (above diagonal) with absolute values > 0.05. 
VARIMAX rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1- Kaiser Normalization. 
VARIMAX converged in 6 iterations. 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
COORD2 . 24811 . 11564 . 72513 
COORD3 . 09711 . 13752 . 71710 
COORD4 . 44091 . 35612 . 33489 
COORD5 . 00049 . 46121 . 49384 
ENTR1 . 12442 . 77593 . 03009 
ENTR2 . 16709 . 64799 . 27388 
ENTR3 . 21282 . 45705 . 36813 
ENTR4 . 32011 . 60280 . 07685 
LEARN! . 70931 . 17793 . 11069 
LEARN2 . 69807 . 22038 . 21391 
LEARN3 . 50699 . 24890 . 20854 
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LEARN4 . 32554 . 38644 . 
38384 
LEARN6 . 57446 . 28906 . 
35074 
LEARN7 . 71169 . 15054 . 
39567 
LEARN8 . 65122 . 19210 . 
12522 
Factor Transformation Matrix: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Factor 1 . 67134 . 
54311 . 50432 
Factor 2 . 71982 . 
63987 . 26912 
Factor 3 . 17654 . 
54369 . 82051 
The final results shows that the items coherently load on three factors. The meanings are 
not completely orthogonal as demonstrated by the table above. This means that they share 
something in common; but because they load on three different factors we can be sure 
that each category a distinctive meaning. 
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Appendix 2. Reliability Analysis 
1.1 Introduction 
Reliability analysis assesses the error that is inherent to the scale. The objective is to 
ensure that the error inherent in our scale falls within acceptable limits. Bellow we show 
the output of SPSS for windows version 6.0. The descriptive statistics and calculations 
are shown. Of special interest is the last table where reliability is calculated when each 
item is excluded, one at the time. The result shows that in none of the possible cases, the 
elimination of a item produces a significant increase in the reliability of the scale. The 
resulting reliability coefficient is considered appropriate. 
1.2. Descriptive statistics 
Mean Std Dev Cases 
1. COORD2 3.1955 . 8419 179.0 
2. COORD3 3.5810 . 8791 179.0 
3. COORD4 3.3073 . 9718 179.0 
4. COORDS 3.6313 . 7920 179.0 
5. ENTR1 3.6816 . 8102 179.0 
6. ENTR2 4.0000 . 8546 179.0 
7. ENTR3 3.5531 . 8488 179.0 
8. ENTR4 3.6034 . 8102 179.0 
9. LEARNT 2.9721 . 9506 179.0 
10. LEARN2 3.1006 . 9124 179.0 
11. LEARN3 3.3799 
. 7867 
179.0 
12. LEARN4 3.5363 
. 8821 179.0 
13. LEARN6 3.8771 
. 8048 179.0 
14. LEARN7 3.1788 
. 9430 179.0 
15. LEARNS 2.9162 
. 9294 179.0 
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1.3. Covariance Matrix 
COORD2 COORD3 COORD4 COORD5 ENTR1 
COORD2 . 7087 
COORD3 . 3520 . 
7729 
COORD4 . 2935 . 
2474 . 9444 
COORD5 . 2129 . 1536 . 
2319 . 6273 
ENTR1 . 1581 . 1636 . 2838 . 1572 . 6565 
ENTR2 . 2022 . 2135 . 2640 . 2079 . 2640 
ENTR3 . 1946 . 2218 . 
2336 . 2051 . 2052 
ENTR4 . 1679 . 1419 . 3023 . 
1844 . 2606 
LEARN! . 1965 . 2017 . 3569 . 1245 . 1652 
LEARN2 . 2724 . 2109 . 3397 . 1440 . 2120 
LEARN3 . 1276 . 0421 . 1298 . 0510 . 1216 
LEARN4 . 2429 . 1698 . 
2781 . 2494 . 2054 
LEARN6 . 2433 . 1898 . 
3245 . 2409 . 1573 
LEARNT . 2963 . 1764 . 
3605 . 1168 . 0404 
LEARNS . 1794 . 2006 . 
3068 . 1206 . 2091 
ENTR2 ENTR3 ENTR4 LEARNT LEARN2 
ENTR2 . 7303 
ENTR3 . 3034 . 7205 
ENTR4 . 2191 . 
1925 . 6564 
LEARNT . 2303 . 2683 . 
2473 . 9037 
LEARN2 . 2584 . 
2643 . 2536 . 4523 . 8325 
LEARN3 . 1348 . 0528 . 1122 . 1848 . 1807 
LEARN4 . 3146 . 
2242 . 2083 . 2061 . 2604 
LEARN6 . 2584 . 
2144 . 2487 . 3055 . 3551 
LEARNT . 1404 . 1871 . 1668 . 3646 . 3864 
LEARNS . 1798 . 2545 . 2081 . 3797 . 
3793 
LEARN3 LEARN4 LEARN6 LEARN7 LEARN8 
LEARN3 . 6189 
LEARN4 . 1266 . 7782 
LEARN6 . 1874 . 3191 . 6477 
LEARN7 . 1396 . 3137 . 3648 . 8892 
LEARNS . 1612 . 2699 . 2705 3521 . 8637 
Number of Cases = 179.0 
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Statistics for Scale 
Mean Variance Std Dev Variables 
515140 58.6108 7.6558 15 
Item Means 
Mean Minimum Maximum Range Max/Min Variance 
3.4343 2.9162 4.0000 1.0838 1.3716 . 1018 
Inter-item covariances 
Mean Minimum Maximum Range Max/Min Variance 
. 2250 . 0404 . 4523 . 
4119 11.1966 . 0064 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale mean if 
item is deleted 
Scale Variance 
if item deleted 
Corrected 
item-total 
correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Alpha if item 
deleted 
COORD2 48.3184 51.6227 . 5191 . 3759 . 8549 
COORD3 47.9330 52.4674 . 4217 . 2883 . 8598 
COORD4 48.2067 49.7604 . 5766 . 3648 . 8517 
COORD5 47.8827 53.1828 . 4156 . 2687 . 8598 
ENTRI 47.8324 52.7470 . 4425 . 3220 . 8586 
ENTR2 47.5140 51.4984 
. 5203 . 3575 . 8548 
ENTR3 47.9609 51.8468 . 4944 . 3029 . 8561 
ENTR4 47.9106 52.1268 . 4981 . 2973 . 8560 
LEARN I 48.5419 50.3395 . 5462 . 3880 . 8534 
LEARN2 48.4134 49.8394 . 6162 . 4439 . 8496 
LEARN3 48.1341 54.4875 . 3017 . 1515 . 8648 
LEARN4 47.9777 51.0557 . 5376 . 3566 . 8539 
LEARN6 47.6369 50.6034 . 6427 . 4652 . 8491 
LEARN7 48.3352 50.9095 5062 . 4295 . 8556 
LEARN8 48.5978 50.8036 . 5241 . 3403 . 8546 
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1.4. Final result 
Reliability Coefficients 15 items 
I Alpha = . 8639 Standardized item alpha = . 8631 
1 
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Appendix 3 
Questionnaire 
In this questionnaire we will be asking you to answer 18 questions. The objective is to drawn a 
picture of the collective behaviour, how it has evolved, and its connection to continuous 
improvement. 
For each question you will find a scale which ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 and 5 are extreme 
situations. The idea is to measure the intensity of that behaviour. Another similar scale measures 
the intensity of the change of that behaviour. 
Please mark these two scales in all questions. 
Finally, we ask you to illustrate one or more situations that resulted in a improvement of the 
production process. Remember that all sorts of comments are welcomed. Feel free to attach any 
extra space that you find necessary. Please note that the information you give here is confidential 
and you are not asked to identify yourself. 
Thanks very much for your collaboration,. 
Fabio Alher 
350 
Co-ordination 
1. Do you see the outcome of other people's jobs influencing how well you perform your 
task? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all. Very much. 
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It has not changed It has changed completely 
2. Does the information reach you when you need it'' 
12345 
Almost never. Always. 
1? 345 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
3. Do pcoj)le communicate frequently? 
Not at all. Very frequently. 
23l5 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
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4. Do people hide information in order to avoid blaming in case something goes wrong'? 
2 3 4 5 
Always. People tend tu dissociate 
themselves fron problematic situations 
Never. There is no fear of blaming. 
1? 3 -t 5 
It has not changed lt has changed 
completely 
5. Are people helpful'? 
2345 
Never. Always. 
I? 345 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
Entrepreneurship 
Do you see yourself and your peers keen on breaking from past behaviours and/or 
practices in order to improve the way tasks are performed'? 
234S 
Never Always. 
45 
It has not changed It has changed conipleichY 
;; ' 
2. Do you see yourself and your peers keen on striving for continuous improvements and 
moving beyond what would he considerate adequate`? 
2345 
NO. not at all. YES, very much. 
1? 345 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
3. Do you see yourself and your peers keen on developing personal links with people 
working in your specific function or across boundaries? 
12345 
NO, not at all Yes, very much 
1? 3d5 
lt has not changed It has changed coinpktely 
4. Do vOu , cc ýuuýsclI and vuwf peers keen on tackling problems and dilemmas anal 
proposing creative solutions when a problem occurs? 
345 
Not at all Yes, vcrv much 
12345 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
35 3 
5. Do you see yourself and your peers keen on understanding what caused problems even 
if it means challenging previous assumptions? 
i? 345 
Not at all Yes, very much 
1345 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
Learning 
1. When one has a suggestion on how to improve the production processes, how 
influential is he/she in actually implementing the change? 
I? 3a5 
Not influential at all. Very influential. 
2. When a suggestion is presented (by workers or management alike) do people openly 
discuss and clarify the suggestions presented in order to eliminate ambiguity? 
1 
_' 
345 
Never Always 
1 _' 
345 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
354 
3. When a suggestion is accepted is it tested (by any sort of experimentation) 
before 
being put into practice? 
2 3 4 5 
Never Always 
i45 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
4. When an unexpected situation arises (provoking variation in the production process), 
do you (or someone) attempt to articulate what caused it`? 
ý? 34S 
Nc%cr Always 
45 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
ý. A\ iicn a hrOhICnl Occurs and a solution is Iound. is it documented? 
3 .4 S 
NeN cr Ahi ays 
5 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
;;; 
6. Do you network with other colleagues working in our function as well as other 
tutictions? 
1? 345 
little ýý lot 
345 
It has not changed It has changed completely 
7. Is knowIedgýe concentrated on one a few "technical" individuals. 
i 5 
Yes No. it is shared by all 
members 
. 
Do people question what management assumes to he the "%av of' doing things awniid 
here. '? 
234j 
Never Always 
3i(ß 
Please describe and comment on the space bellow one or more circumstances that 
resulted in the improvement of the production processes. Clarify the roles that you 
and your peers' and management in making it happen: 
;: 7 
